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This dissertation investigates the implications of different methods of identifying 
exogenous shocks to defense purchases for estimating the macroeconomic effects of 
shocks to government purchases. Four identification schemes are examined: the narrative 
approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997), a more comprehensive narrative approach that 
tries to isolate exogenous reductions in defense purchases as well as exogenous increases 
in defense purchases, the Choleski decomposition, and long-run restrictions. 
The effects of alternative methods of identifying policy shocks are examined 
within two common VAR systems estimated over specific sample periods. The 
benchmark model includes four lagged values of defense purchases, real GDP, the three 
month interest rate on Treasury bills, and the GDP deflator. The alternative model 
includes six lagged values of the same variables and a “Perron-type” time trend.  
The effects of a shock to defense purchases reported for the narrative approach of 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and the more comprehensive narrative approach are similar in 
terms of patterns; however, they differ in terms of magnitudes. Furthermore, results 
presented using the narrative approaches are consistent with the shocks identified being 
exogenous. Finally, some of the key results reported using the narrative approaches, in 
particular for interest rates and non-residential investment, are sensitive to small 
perturbations in the dates of some of the shocks identified. 
The IRFs reported for a shock to defense purchases using the Choleski 
decomposition and long-run restrictions are problematic. However, when new orders of 
defense products are substituted for defense purchases in the models estimated, the IRFs 
reported using the Choleski decomposition and long-run restrictions appear better than 
the IRFs reported for a shock to defense purchases.  
The IRFs presented using the narrative approaches, the Choleski decomposition, 
and long-run restrictions differ greatly. Furthermore, the IRFs reported using the different 
identification schemes are not sensitive to perturbations in the list of variables used; 
however, they are sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used. As a result, in 
spite of methodological advances in estimating the effects of exogenous shocks to 
government purchases, there is still no consensus on the effects of these shocks.  
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CHAPTER 1.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY                  
1.1 Introduction 
From the traditional IS-LM models presented in undergraduate macroeconomic 
textbooks to the more complex real business cycle (RBC) models recently introduced in 
the literature, many theoretical macroeconomic models predict that fiscal policy, in 
particular changes in government expenditures, has significant effects on the economy. 
Furthermore, it has long been believed among policymakers and many economists that 
fiscal policy can be used to affect private demand and output. 
However, there is little agreement on even the basic effects of fiscal policy among 
the multitude of theoretical studies available in the literature. For instance, following a 
temporary increase in government purchases, many RBC models predict diametrically 
different responses for consumption and investment than do the traditional IS-LM model 
or the standard one-sector neoclassical model. 
In order to determine which of the theoretical models presented in the literature 
best describe the actual behavior of U.S economy, a plethora of empirical studies of the 
effects of fiscal policy have been published. Different approaches have been applied that 
have generated very different estimates. Traditionally, reduced form equations are 
estimated, and the impact effects and/or long-run effects of fiscal policy are estimated. 
By and large, this framework has failed to provide robust empirical evidence.  
Therefore, since the publication of a recent study by Ramey and Shapiro (1997), 
dynamic models, especially vector autoregressive (VAR) models, have been used in a 
small but influential literature to estimate the macroeconomic effects of exogenous 
shocks to fiscal policy. A key element of this literature is the identification of exogenous 
fiscal policy shocks, and a variety of methods have been used to identify these shocks. 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) apply a narrative approach in the spirit of Hamilton 
(1983) and Romer and Romer (1989,1994) to identify exogenous increases in defense 
purchases, and hence government purchases. Using historical records and current 
accounts, they identify three geo-political events in the post-World War II era that 
marked the onsets of large and sustained increases in defense purchases. Then, they 
construct a dummy variable that takes the value one at the onsets of the increases in 
defense purchases, and zero in other periods.  
To estimate the effects of an exogenous increase in government purchases, Ramey 
and Shapiro (1997) include the dummy variable as an exogenous variable in a series of 
univariate equations. However, they acknowledge that including their dummy variable in 
VAR systems would provide further insight on the effects of an exogenous increase in 
government purchases. This is done by Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) and Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999), who include the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable as an 
exogenous variable in a series of VAR systems and compute impulse response functions 
(IRFs) that present the effects of an average Ramey-Shapiro episode on a number of 
aggregate variables.  
Blanchard and Perotti (1999) and Fatas and Mihov (2000) advocate alternative 
identification schemes that impose contemporaneous restrictions on the estimated 
residuals of a VAR to identify exogenous shocks to defense policy. Following Bernanke 
and Mihov (1998) who use a structural approach to identify exogenous monetary policy 
shocks, Blanchard and Perotti (1999) use institutional information about tax and transfer 
systems as well as the timing of tax collections to identify structural fiscal policy shocks. 
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More simply, Fatas and Mihov (2000) use a Choleski decomposition to identify structural 
shocks to government purchases.  
Among other things, Perotti (2000) compares the effects of shocks to government 
purchases estimated within the frameworks presented by Blanchard and Perotti (1999) 
and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). He argues, “…Contrary to what the policy 
discussion seems to take as granted, there is clearly no consensus even on the basic 
effects of government spending on output and its components” (Perotti 2000, p. 22).  
In fact, the evidence reported using the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997) and VAR-based approaches, i.e. contemporaneous restrictions, differ greatly. 
However, since the studies cited above differ in terms of the method of identifying the 
exogenous policy shocks, the variables in the model estimated, and the sample period 
over which the model is estimated, the source of the different results across studies has 
remained unknown. 
The focus of this dissertation is on the implications of different methods of 
identifying exogenous shocks to fiscal policy. In order to investigate these implications, 
the effects of alternative methods of identifying policy shocks are examined within a 
common VAR system estimated over a specific sample period. The identification 
schemes examined include the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997), a more 
comprehensive narrative approach that tries to isolate exogenous reductions in defense 
expenditures as well as exogenous increases in defense expenditures, a Choleski 
decomposition, and long-run restrictions. 
Since different issues have arisen with regard to each approach, the dissertation 
also examines issues specific to each approach. First, the small numbers of shocks 
identified using the narrative approaches may be problematic. Therefore, a methodology 
presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) is modified to assess the relative 
influence of the individual shocks identified on the results reported for the narrative 
approaches.  
Furthermore, the exogeneity of the shocks identified using the narrative approach 
of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) has been questioned. Therefore, a methodology used by 
Leeper (1997) to study the exogeneity of Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable is 
applied to investigate the exogeneity of the shocks identified using the narrative approach 
of Ramey and Shapiro (1997). It is also applied to investigate the exogeneity of the 
shocks identified using the comprehensive narrative approach. 
Finally, it has been argued that the shocks identified using VAR-based approaches 
may not be exogenous and economic agents may know of changes in defense purchases 
before they are recorded in quarterly data. Therefore, models in which suitable alternative 
variables replace defense purchases are estimated when the implications of the Choleski 
decomposition and long-run restrictions are investigated.  
The plan of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 presents a 
review of the effects of fiscal policy within several theoretical models. It focuses on the 
channels through which shocks to government purchases may affect the economy without 
any attempt to provide a full coverage of the existing literature. Section 1.3 discusses the 
recent empirical literature in which VAR models are estimated to investigate the effects 
of fiscal policy. Section 1.4 lays out the remaining structure of the dissertation. 
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1.2 Theoretical Models 
There is an abundant literature in which theoretical models of the effects of 
shocks to government purchases on the economy are analyzed. Generally, the predictions 
of the different theoretical models differ if the shocks to government purchases are 
temporary or permanent and if the economy is closed or open. This subsection discusses 
the effects of a temporary shock to government purchases within several closed economy 
theoretical models, and focuses on the channels through which shocks to government 
purchases affect the economy.  
1.2.1 IS-LM Model 
A framework commonly used to present the effects of fiscal policy to students of 
macroeconomics is the sticky-wage/price aggregate demand-aggregate supply-type 
model, in which aggregate demand is determined by IS and LM functions. The short-run 
aggregate supply is upward sloping and the long-run run aggregate supply curve is 
vertical. Within this framework, a temporary increase in government purchases affects 
the economy mainly through the government purchases multiplier.  
At the initial level of interest rates, an increase in government purchases shifts the 
IS curve outward, and a higher equilibrium level of real income and aggregate 
expenditures is established. As real income increases, so does the demand for money. 
Therefore, interest rates rise. Furthermore, as aggregate expenditures increase, the 
aggregate demand curve shifts outward. Thus, excess demand appears on the product 
market at the initial price level, and the price level rises to clear the market. 
The rise in the price level reduces the real money supply. Therefore, the LM curve 
shifts inward, and interest rates are pushed upward further. In addition, given the 
existence of rigid wages, the rise in the price level initially leads to a reduction in real 
wages, and therefore, an increase in employment. Then, real wages gradually return 
toward their original level. The speed at which they adjust depends on the way 
expectations are formed and the degree of rigidity in wages. 
Assuming that private consumption is a function of disposable income and the tax 
rate is unchanged, an increase in government purchases will lead to a rise in private 
consumption. Furthermore, assuming that the level of investment rises as the level of 
output increases, it will yield an increase in private investment. However, since an 
increase in government purchases forces interest rates upward, it may also crowd out 
private investment.  
If the increase in government purchases is temporary, the level of real income and 
aggregate expenditures ultimately return to their original values, and the increase in 
government purchases has no permanent effect on the economy. In contrast, within the 
standard one-sector neoclassical model, a persistent increase in government purchases 
has a permanent effect on some variables. Furthermore, it generates very different results 
than the IS-LM model in the short-run. 
1.2.2 One-sector Neoclassical Model 
The main features of the standard one-sector neoclassical model include an 
optimizing representative agent who faces an intertemporal budget constraint as well as 
flexible prices and wages. Furthermore, two “goods,” leisure and a consumption good, 
are assumed to be available in the economy. Within this framework, a temporary increase 
in government purchases affects the economy mainly through the wealth effect on the 
representative agent. 
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As government purchases increase, the representative agent faces a higher present 
discounted value (PDV) of taxes and its wealth decreases. Therefore, if leisure and the 
consumption good are normal goods, the representative agent consumes less of both 
leisure and the consumption good. Assuming that the representative agent knows that the 
increase in government purchases is temporary, the decrease in private consumption is 
smaller than the increase in government purchases so that the level of aggregate 
expenditures initially rises. 
 As in the IS-LM model, the rise in aggregate expenditures pushes both the price 
level and interest rates upward. Furthermore, since consumption of leisure declines, the 
labor supply increases, real wages fall, and employment rises. Therefore, the effect of the 
increase in government purchases on private investment may be either positive or 
negative. Whereas the rise in interest rates pushes investment down, the increase in 
employment pushes it upward since labor and capital are complements in production.  
Since the wealth effect is permanent, while consumption of leisure and the private 
good decline permanently, labor supply and employment increase permanently. 
Furthermore, as Perotti (2000) argues, because the capital stock should increase to 
maintain the ratio of labor to capital in the economy constant in the long run, gross 
investment should be permanently larger after an increase in government purchases. 
However, real wages should gradually return to their original level. 
With regard to the size of the effects of a temporary increase in government 
purchases within the standard one-sector neoclassical model, Aiyagari, Christiano, and 
Eichenbaum (1992) argue that the wealth effect is larger as the increase in government 
purchases is more persistent. Therefore, the impact of the increase in government 
purchases on labor supply, investment and output is stronger as it is more persistent.  
Furthermore, it is assumed that taxes are lump-sum in the standard one-sector 
neoclassical model; however, Baxter and King (1993) have shown that the effects 
predicted by the standard one-sector neoclassical model can be very sensitive to whether 
taxes are assumed as lump-sum or not. Perotti (2000) argues, “…Even a moderately 
distortionary taxation can overturn the key signs of the effects of fiscal policy in the neo-
classical model” (Perotti 2000, p. 4). 
1.2.3 Two-sector Neoclassical Models 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) demonstrate that increases in government purchases in 
the United States have been concentrated in a few industries, and the government has 
been the primary purchaser of goods from these industries since the end of World War II. 
Therefore, they argue that it is better to investigate the effects of changes in government 
purchases within a two-sector neo-classical model, in which public and private sectors 
coexist.  
In fact, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) present several models in which different 
functions for technology and preferences are used. They fundamentally differ from the 
standard one-sector neoclassical model by incorporating not only two consumption and 
capital goods but also imperfect capital mobility. Within the framework used by Ramey 
and Shapiro (1997), the frictions caused by imperfect capital mobility play a fundamental 
role in generating the results predicted. 
To estimate the effects of a shock to government purchases on the economy, 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) calibrate their models so that they match key aspects of the 
U.S economy. In particular, sector 1 of the economy is assumed to be seven times larger 
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than sector 2. Then, they compute numerical simulations for an increase in government 
purchases in sector 2. The initial shock to government purchases is assumed to be 
unforeseen; however, the time path of government purchases, which is of the magnitude 
and composition of the Korean War, is assumed to be perfectly foreseen afterward.  
The results of the simulations carried out by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) can be 
summarized as follows. After an increase in government purchases in sector 2 of the 
economy, the demand for consumption and investment goods increases in this sector; 
however, the demand for consumption and investment goods decreases in sector 1. 
Overall, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) argue that whereas consumption decreases 
persistently, investment rises temporarily.  
The responses of consumption and investment in sector 2 of the economy push 
interest rates up; however, the responses of consumption and investment in sector 1 drive 
interest rates down. Therefore, since sector 1 is much larger than sector 2, Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) argue that interest rates may decline in the short run. Then, they gradually 
increase as capital shifts from sector 1 to sector 2.  
Furthermore, the relative price of goods, which is defined as the ratio of the price 
of good 2 to the price of good 1, increases persistently in response to an increase in 
government purchases in sector 2. Product wages, which are defined as wages in a sector 
divided by the price of the good produced in this sector, decrease persistently and 
employment increases persistently. Finally, output rises strongly initially, and then 
declines slightly. However, it remains at a new permanently higher level.   
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) also present a two-sector neo-classical 
model in their study. Their model fundamentally differs from the standard one-sector 
neo-classical model by distinguishing between non-residential and residential investment. 
It also differs from the model presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) because markets 
are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Within the model presented by Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), a persistent increase in government purchases affects the 
economy mainly through the wealth effect on the representative agent; however, it 
generates different results than the standard one-sector neo-classical model does because 
of the existence of two investment goods in the economy. 
To estimate the effects of a shock to government purchases on the economy, 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) calibrate their model so that it matches the data 
for the U.S economy in the post-World War II era. Then, they compute numerical 
simulations for an increase in government purchases. The results reported for their 
simulations are qualitatively similar to the ones reported by Ramey and Shapiro (1997). 
They can be explained as follows.  
Since a representative household faces higher taxes when a persistent increase in 
government purchases takes place, it reduces its consumption and increases the number 
of hours worked. As a result, the marginal product of labor and real wages decrease, and 
employment increase. Since hours worked and market capital are complements in 
production, non-residential investment increases. Moreover, if residential investment is 
considered as an investment in consumer durables similar to investment in other 
consumer durables, residential investment declines because a representative household 
reduces its level of consumption.  
In spite of the negative responses of consumption and residential investment to an 
increase in government purchases, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) argue that 
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output rises strongly and persistently after an increase in government purchases. 
Furthermore, they claim that interest rates increase immediately and persistently.  
Overall, the different theoretical models examined above predict that the price 
level, interest rates, and employment rise in response to an increase in government 
purchases. They also predict that the level of output rises and real wages decline. 
However, it should be noted that the level of output can decrease in some neo-classical 
models and real wages can increase in some RBC models.  
Furthermore, the different theoretical models examined above yield very different 
results with regard to the effects of an increase in government purchases on consumption 
and investment. Therefore, the macroeconomic effects of an increase in government 
purchases should be determined empirically.  
1.3 Recent Empirical Studies 
In the late 1980s, as vector autoregressions (VARs) became increasingly 
predominant in the empirical literature on the effects of monetary policy, several studies 
used VAR systems to investigate the macroeconomic effects of exogenous fiscal shocks 
(Garcia-Mila (1989), Christiano (1990)). However, after that, VAR models were 
essentially ignored in the fiscal policy literature until Ramey and Shapiro (1997) 
published their recent study.   
In order to estimate the effects of the episodes Ramey and Shapiro (1997) 
identify, they construct a dummy variable that takes the value one at the onsets of 
military build-ups, and zero otherwise. Although they include the dummy in a series of 
univariate equations, they note, “… In his discussion of this paper, Martin Eichenbaum 
presents estimates of the effect of our military build-up dummy by including it in a vector 
autoregression. Such an analysis could supply further insight into the effects of military 
shocks” (Ramey and Shapiro 1997, p. 45). 
Shortly after the publication of the paper by Ramey and Shapiro (1997), 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) investigated 
the implications of including the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable as an exogenous 
variable in VAR systems. Furthermore, several studies were published in which VAR 
systems are used to estimate the effects of fiscal policy (Yuan and Li (1999), Blanchard 
and Perotti (1999), Fatas and Mihov (2000), Perotti (2000)). 
The following sub-sections present the different methodologies used to identify 
exogenous shocks to government purchases and the main findings reported in the recent 
studies cited above. First, the narrative approach is examined, and then contemporaneous 
restrictions are considered. Finally, the empirical evidence reported is briefly discussed. 
1.3.1 The Narrative Approach  
As was mentioned before, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) use historical records and 
current accounts to identify three geo-political events in the post-World War II era that 
marked the onsets of large and sustained increases in defense purchases. They focus on 
military build-ups because, “…[They] occur rapidly and unexpectedly, so they are 
naturally modeled as shocks” (Ramey and Shapiro 1997, p. 39). Furthermore, they claim 
that military buildups are driven by geo-political shocks and imperatives of foreign 
policy; therefore, “… [They] are likely to be exogenous with respect to macroeconomic 
variables” (Ramey and Shapiro 1997, p. 39). 
Defense purchases have long been used as a proxy for government purchases in 
empirical studies of the macroeconomic effects of government purchases (Barro (1981), 
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Kormendi (1983)) because defense purchases are widely believed to present several 
relative advantages over other components of government purchases. 
First, defense purchases as well as changes in defense purchases have been large 
in the post-World War II era. Therefore, they are more likely to have substantially 
affected the U.S. economy than smaller components of government purchases. 
Furthermore, the level of defense purchases at any given time is largely determined by 
geo-political considerations, in particular the level of threat to the nation. Therefore, it 
can be argued that defense purchases, or changes in defense purchases, are independent 
of current or recent economic conditions, and thus are exogenous with respect to the 
economy. Finally, quarterly data on defense purchases are widely available in the post-
World War II era. 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) estimate a series of univariate equations and compute 
IRFs that present the effects of an “average” Ramey-Shapiro episode on a number of 
aggregate variables. These equations include a contemporaneous and eight lagged values 
of their dummy variable and eight lagged values of each variable whose response is under 
study. Furthermore, a “Perron-type“ time trend is added to their equations, which means 
two linear time trends are included. The first trend starts in the first quarter of 1947 and 
the second trend starts in the second quarter of 1973.  
Ramey and Shapiro (1997), who estimate their equations over the sample period 
from 1948:2 to 1996:1, argue that total GDP increases significantly for several periods in 
response to a shock to government purchases episode. They also claim, ”…Residential 
investment falls substantially and statistically significantly… Non-durables and service 
consumption falls modestly. Durables and housing expenditure fall significantly with 
little or no subsequent rebound… Non-residential investment rises significantly after the 
military shock” (Ramey and Shapiro 1997, pp. 54-55). Furthermore, they indicate that 
there is no evidence for an increase in real wages after a shock.  
The IRF for the real interest rate reported by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) decreases 
significantly, and then it slowly rises. Finally, it returns to its original level. The IRF for 
the price of manufacturing relative to the GDP deflator rises significantly and 
temporarily. Overall, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) note that the results computed for 
univariate equations are similar to the evidence computed when VAR systems are 
estimated (Ramey and Shapiro (1997) p. 45).  
Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) include the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable as an exogenous variable in a series of VAR systems. In addition to the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes, the benchmark model they estimate includes four endogenous 
variables: real defense purchases, real total GDP, the net three month interest rate on 
Treasury bills (RTB), and the producer price for crude fuel. Four lagged values of the 
endogenous variables are used and a time trend is added to each equation in the 
benchmark model, which is estimated over the sample period from 1948:2 to 1996:1.  
Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) also compute IRFs that present the 
effects of an “average” Ramey-Shapiro episode on a number of aggregate variables. To 
compute the IRFs for any given variable, they add the variable to the benchmark model 
as an endogenous variable. Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) summarize their 
findings as follows,  
“… In response to an expansionary shock in government purchases:  
• defense expenditures as well as total government purchases rise, 
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• output rises, both in the aggregate and in all the sectors that we look at, 
• real wages fall, 
• non-residential investment rises sharply, 
• residential investment declines sharply,  
• after a delay, purchases and production of consumer durables and nondurables 
fall,  
• real interest rates initially fall but then rise”  
      (Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 1999 p. 3). 
The benchmark model estimated by Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) is identical to 
the one presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999), except that no time trend 
is included. Furthermore, it is estimated over the sample period from 1948:1 to 1988:4. 
Since Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) focuses on the effects of shocks to government 
purchases on real wages and productivity, the number of IRFs they present is more 
limited than Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). More importantly, the empirical 
evidence they present is consistent with the results reported by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher (1999). 
 The studies in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is used to identify 
shocks to government purchases generally claim that the narrative approach is superior to 
the VAR-based approaches (see Ramey and Shapiro 1997, p. 39; Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher 1999, pp. 2-3). In particular, it is argued that, since military build-ups are 
unlikely to be the results of feedback from the domestic economy, they are truly 
exogenous.  
However, studies in which a VAR-based approach is used to identify shocks to 
government purchases, in particular Perotti (2000), often questions the validity of the 
narrative approach.  Perotti (2000) argues that some of the assumptions implicitly or 
explicitly made when the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are used may be inappropriate (Perotti 
2000, p. 7).  
Among other things, Perotti (2000) questions whether the increase in military 
purchases were really unanticipated by economic agents, whether the different military 
build-ups were similar in the shape of their effects, and whether the increases in 
government purchases were the only large fiscal policy shocks that occur around the 
periods of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. 
1.3.2 Contemporaneous Restrictions 
A decade before Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and 
Fisher (1999) integrated the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) in VAR 
systems, Garcia-Mila (1989) used a Choleski decomposition to identify exogenous 
shocks to government purchases. She broke down government purchases into three 
components: defense purchases, non-defense purchases, and state and local purchases. 
These components were included in a nine variable VAR system of real GNP that also 
included consumption of durables, consumption of non-durables and services, residential 
investment, non-residential investment, net export, and change in business inventory.  
The VAR system was estimated using five lagged values of the variables over the 
sample period from 1948:2 to 1983:2. Then, IRFs that present the effects of shocks to the 
different components of government purchases were computed. In the Choleski 
decomposition used by Garcia-Mila (1989), the residuals of three components of 
government purchases were ordered after the residuals of other variables, which were 
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ordered as listed above. With regard to the IRFs computed for a shock to military 
purchases, Garcia-Mila (1989) reported, 
“The GNP response to military purchases is initially positive and significantly 
different from zero for the first four quarters. It declines after a year and becomes 
negative after about three years, although it is it is not significantly different from 
zero different from zero. The military purchase response to its own shock is 
positive, persistent, and highly significant for many periods” (Garcia-Mila 1989, 
p. 378). 
Yuan and Li (1999) considered two measures of shocks to government purchases: 
shocks to federal government purchases and shocks to defense purchases. They stated, 
“The reason to consider military purchases is that it is usually regarded as an exogenous 
component in government spending” (Yuan and Li 1999, p. 5). They estimated two 
benchmark systems that included federal government purchases or defense purchases, 
real RTB, real total GDP, and employee hours worked in non-agricultural industries.  
The systems were estimated using four lagged values of the variables over the 
sample period from 1948:1 to 1993:4. Then, IRFs that present the effects of shock to 
federal government purchases or defense purchases were computed. In the Choleski 
decomposition used by Yuan and Li (1999), the residuals of the variables were ordered as 
listed above.   
The IRF for defense purchases reported by Yuan and Li (1999) increases 
significantly for three years following a shock to defense purchases and it reaches its 
maximum a year after a shock. The IRF for real total GDP increases modestly and it is 
significantly different from zero for less than a year. The IRF for real RTB is not 
significantly different from zero at any horizon.  
The VAR systems estimated by Garcia-Mila (1989) and Yuan and Li (1999) are 
different in spirit from the VAR systems estimated by Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) and 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). Garcia-Mila (1989) did not include a measure 
of the price level or interest rates in her model. Yuan and Li (1999) did not include a 
measure of the price level in their benchmark models.  
Fatas and Mihov (2000), who also use a Choleski decomposition to identify 
exogenous shocks to government purchases, estimate a benchmark model in the spirit of 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). It includes five endogenous variables: real 
government purchases, real private GDP, the GDP deflator, government receipts net of 
transfers, and real RTB. Four lagged values of the endogenous variables are included in 
each equation of the system, which is estimated over the sample period from 1960:1 to 
1996:4.  
Fatas and Mihov (2000) use economic theory to impose a recursive 
contemporaneous causal structure among the variables in their model. They assume that 
government expenditures are predetermined with regard to macroeconomic shocks. 
Furthermore, they assume that government expenditures are determined before decisions 
about taxes are taken and that government receipts may respond to contemporaneous 
changes in output and the price level. Therefore, in the Choleski decomposition used for 
the benchmark model, the residuals of the variables are ordered as listed above.  
Fatas and Mihov (2000) report IRFs that present the effects of structural shocks to 
government purchases on numerous aggregate variables. In order to compute the IRFs for 
any given variable not included in the benchmark model, they simply add the variable to 
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the benchmark model. Overall, the evidence presented by Fatas and Mihov (2000), in 
particular with regard to consumption, are at odds with the results reported by Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). Fatas and Mihov (2000) summarize the main findings of 
their study as follows:  
“First and foremost, an increase in [government] spending leads to a persistent 
rise in private output, with consumption and residential investment being the 
driving factors. Second, the expansionary fiscal policy is also associated with 
rising manufacturing wages and increasing total private employment. The 
response of the real interest rate is always positive and significant” (Fatas and 
Mihov (2000), P. 3).  
Blanchard and Perotti (1999) use a structural approach to identify exogenous 
shocks to fiscal policy. More specifically, they use institutional information about tax and 
transfer systems as well as the timing of tax collections to estimate the elasticity of 
government spending and taxes with respect to output. Then, they impose 
contemporaneous restrictions on the relations among the structural residuals of their VAR 
model.  
Blanchard and Perotti (1999) estimate a benchmark model that includes four 
lagged values of government spending, net taxes and real GDP. A dummy variable is also 
entered as an exogenous variable to control for a sudden tax rebate that occurred in 
1975:2. Finally, a deterministic or a stochastic time trend is added to each equation in the 
system, which is estimated over the sample period from 1960:1 to 1997:4.  
Blanchard and Perotti (1999) compute IRFs that present the effects of various 
structural fiscal shocks, including government spending shocks, on several aggregate 
variables that added to their benchmark model. The evidence they present, in particular 
with regard to investment, is at odds with the results reported by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher (1999). They summarize their findings as follows, 
“From the several specifications we have estimated and the different exercises we 
have performed, we reach the following conclusions: … when [government] 
spending increases, output increases… While private consumption increases 
following spending shocks, private investment is crowded out to a considerable 
extent” (Blanchard and Perotti 1999 p. 25). 
The studies in which a VAR-based approach is used to identify shocks to 
government purchases generally argue that the restrictions imposed on the model 
estimated are appropriate (see Blanchard and Perotti (1999) pp.5-9, Perotti (2000) pp. 7-
10, Fatas and Mihov (2000) p. 3-4). In particular, it is argued that shocks identified using 
quarterly data are likely exogenous with regard to the economy since there is little or no 
discretionary response of fiscal policy to unexpected economic developments within a 
quarter.  
However, the studies in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is used to 
identify shocks to government purchases are often critical of the VAR-based approaches.  
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) claim that shocks identified with a VAR-based approach, “are 
due solely to timing effects on military contracts and do not represent unanticipated 
changes in military purchases” (Ramey and Shapiro 1997, p. 40). Furthermore, Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) argue that the inference reported using VAR-based 
identification schemes appears, “quite fragile to perturbations in the sample period used 
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and the list of variables included in the VAR” (Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 1999, 
p. 3). 
1.3.3 Discussion of the Recent Studies 
Perotti (2000) compares the effects of an increase in government purchases 
computed when the models presented by Blanchard and Perotti (1999) and Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) are estimated. For both models, he reports estimates of 
the short-run and long-run effects of a shock to government purchases on consumption, 
investment and wages.  
Perotti (2000) stresses the fact that the evidence reported in the recent literature 
greatly differs across studies, and no consensus is likely to emerge on the effects of 
exogenous shocks to government purchases in the foreseeable future. He argues, “… 
Despite some methodological advances, there is absolutely no consensus on even the 
basic effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy” (Perotti, 2000 p. 1).    
Still, like the other studies cited above, Perotti (2000) argues that VAR models 
represent an appropriate, indeed the best, framework available to study the effects of 
fiscal policy. He claims, “VAR’s allow a relatively unstructured specification of the 
dynamics of the model, an especially attractive feature when, as in our case, one would 
like to first investigate the basic multivariate time series properties of the data” (Perotti, 
2000 p. 5). Furthermore, he notes,  
“VAR’s seem ideally suited to apply two of the main recent methodological 
innovations in the study of fiscal policy, namely... 1. The realization that any 
serious investigation of the effects of fiscal policy must first address the issue of 
the endogeneity of fiscal policy… 2. A new attention to the issue of anticipations 
of fiscal policy. Most theoretical arguments suggest that unanticipated changes in 
fiscal policy have very different effects from anticipated ones, but disentangling 
the two in a credible way had always proved difficult” (Perotti 2000, p. 6).  
However, Perotti (2000) also points out, “… Of course, no model can do away 
with all a priori restrictions, and VAR’s are no exceptions” (Perotti, 2000 p. 5, italics 
mine). In fact, as was mentioned before, a variety of identification schemes that have 
both strengths and weaknesses has been used to identify exogenous shocks to government 
purchases. Yet, the recent VAR studies have provided limited evidence on the 
implications of different approaches for estimating the effects of fiscal policy.  
Surely, the evidence reported differs because different identification schemes are 
used to identify fiscal shocks. However, it is possible that they also differ because the 
variables included in the models estimated, the specifications of the models estimated, 
and the sample periods used for estimation differ across studies.  
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
The studies cited above differ in terms of the method of identifying the exogenous 
policy shocks, the variables in the model estimated, and the sample period over which the 
model is estimated. Consequently, it is of interest to determine the source of different 
results across studies. The focus of this dissertation is on the implications of different 
methods of identifying exogenous shocks to fiscal policy. 
As was mentioned before, to investigate these implications, the effects of 
alternative methods of identifying policy shocks are examined within a common VAR 
system estimated over a specific sample period. The identification schemes examined 
include the Ramey-Shapiro narrative approach, a more comprehensive narrative approach 
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that tries to isolate exogenous reductions in defense expenditures as well as exogenous 
increases in defense expenditures, and two identifications schemes that use the estimated 
residuals from the VAR. One VAR-based identification scheme is a Choleski 
decomposition similar to that used by Fatas and Mihov (2000), and the other employs 
long-run restrictions to identify fiscal policy shocks.     
The methodology implemented to investigate the implications of different 
methods of identifying exogenous shocks to fiscal policy follows in the footsteps of 
Perotti (2000) and McMillin (2001), who examines the implications of contemporaneous 
versus long-run restrictions for estimating the effects of monetary policy shocks.  
McMillin (2001) notes that the estimates of the effects of monetary policy in 
VAR systems “often differ with regard to both timing and magnitude.“ Furthermore, he 
observes, “the studies generating these estimates frequently differ in terms of the 
variables constituting the model, the sample period for estimation, and the method of 
identifying policy shocks” (McMillin 2001, p. 618).  
Therefore, he suggests estimating the same VAR model over a specific sample 
period. Then, for the different identification schemes under study, IRFs that present the 
effects of an exogenous shock to the monetary policy variable can be computed. Since 
the variables included in the system estimated, the specification of the system estimated, 
and the sample period used are held constant, it follows that discrepancies in the IRFs 
computed using different identification schemes can be attributed to the identification 
schemes. 
For each identification scheme under study in the dissertation, the same 
benchmark model is estimated over the sample period from 1948:1 to 1999:2. The 
endogenous variables included in the benchmark model are defense purchases by the 
federal government, real total GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator. They are identical to the 
variables used by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), except that the GDP deflator 
replaces the PPI for crude fuel. Furthermore, when the narrative approach is used to 
identify shocks to defense purchases, a dummy variable is also entered in the benchmark 
model as an exogenous variable. 
The studies of the different identification schemes follow the same structure in the 
following chapters. After presenting the IRFs computed for a unit shock to defense 
purchases for the endogenous variables of the benchmark model, the robustness of the 
results reported for the benchmark model to adding time trends and changing the lag 
length used is examined. Furthermore, the robustness of the results reported for the 
benchmark to substituting alternative measures of the price level for the GDP deflator 
and alternative measures of interest rates for RTB is investigated.  
Next, since the specification of the equations selected by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher (1999) may not be the best for the VAR system estimated, an alternative 
specification for the VAR system under study is selected based on the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). Whether a dummy variable is included in the system 
estimated or not, it appears preferable to estimate an alternative model with six lagged 
values of the endogenous variables1 and a “Perron-type” time trend. Therefore, IRFs that 
present the effects of a unit shock to defense purchases on the endogenous variables of 
the alternative model are computed.  
                                                           
1 When the narrative approach is used to identify shocks to defense purchases, the contemporaneous value 
and six lagged values of a dummy variable are also included in the alternative models. 
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In addition, the robustness of the evidence reported for the narrative and VAR-
based approaches to perturbations in the list of variables or the sample period used has 
been questioned. Therefore, the sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative 
model to adding, in turn, a series of exogenous and endogenous variables is examined. 
Moreover, to examine the relations between defense purchases and monetary policy or 
other fiscal policy components after a shock to government purchases, the IRFs for 
several fiscal and monetary variables are computed. Finally, the sensitivity of the results 
reported for the alternative model to using different sub-sample periods is examined.     
In order to further investigate the implications of the different approaches under 
study for estimating the macroeoconomic effects of shocks to defense purchases, the 
dissertation also addresses issues specific to each approach. First, the number of shocks 
to defense purchases identified using the narrative approaches is limited, and they differ 
greatly in size. Therefore, the implications of abandoning the assumption that the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes are of equal intensity are examined.  
To account for the differences in size among the Ramey-Shapiro build-ups, a 
modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable whose values at the dates of the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes vary according to the size of the military build-ups that follows them. 
Then, a system identical to the alternative model except that it includes the modified 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is estimated.  
Moreover, in order to assess the exogeneity of the shocks identified using the 
narrative approaches, a methodology used by Leeper (1997) to study the exogeneity of 
Romers’ monetary shocks dummy variable is applied to the dummy variables constructed 
using the narrative approaches. First, a logit equation is estimated, and the probability the 
dummy variables constructed using the narrative approaches take the value one at the 
dates selected for the shocks is computed. Then, VAR systems in which the dummy 
variables constructed using the narrative approaches are treated symmetrically with the 
other endogenous variables included in the alternative model are estimated, and the IRFs 
computed for a shock to the dummy variables within this framework and for the 
alternative model are compared.  
Finally, as was mentioned before, it has been argued that the changes in defense 
purchases recorded in quarterly data capture not only policy shifts but also developments 
in the private sectors such as strikes or changes in delivery schedules. As a result, when a 
VAR-based approach is used to identify shocks to defense purchases, the shocks 
identified may not be truly exogenous. Furthermore, since economic agents may know of 
changes in defense purchases before they are recorded in the data, it has been argued that 
shocks identified using a VAR-based approach may have been anticipated. 
Therefore, a model in which defense purchases are replaced by new orders of 
defense products is estimated when the implications of the Choleski decomposition and 
long-run restrictions are examined. It is argued that new orders of defense products may 
yield a better measure of exogenous shocks to government purchases than defense 
purchases because new orders of defense products are recorded earlier in the data and are 
less likely to reflect shocks to the private sector than defense purchases.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE NARRATIVE APPROACH  
2.1 Introduction 
In 1989, more than 40 years after Friedman and Schwartz published A Monetary 
History of the United States (1953), Romer and Romer re-introduced the narrative 
approach in the study of monetary policy. In 1997, Ramey and Shapiro used the narrative 
approach to identify exogenous shocks to government purchases, specifically exogenous 
increases in defense purchases. 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) identify 
three exogenous increases in defense purchases during the post-World War II era in the 
United States. These exogenous increases in defense purchases, which are hereafter 
referred to as the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, correspond to the onsets of the Korean War, 
the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan military build-ups. They are dated as beginning 
in the third quarter of 1950, the first quarter of 1965, and the first quarter of 1980, 
respectively.  
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) use the episodes they identified to construct a dummy 
variable that has the value one at the dates of the episodes, and zero otherwise. For each 
variable under investigation, they estimate a univariate equation that includes eight 
lagged values of this variable as well as the contemporaneous and eight lagged values of 
their dummy variable. Finally, they compute impulse response functions (IRFs) that 
present the effects of a unit shock to their dummy variable.  
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) include the Ramey-Shapiro dummy as 
an exogenous variable in VAR systems. They estimate a benchmark model and a series 
of extended models with four lagged values of the endogenous variables as well as the 
contemporaneous and four lagged values of the dummy variable. Then, they compute 
IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable on 
macroeconomic variables. The results presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999) have served as references in all the recent empirical studies of the effects of 
shocks to government purchases.  
This chapter presents further evidence on the implications of the narrative 
approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for estimating the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policy. It focuses on two VAR systems that include the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable, defense purchases, real GDP, the net three month interest rate on Treasury bills 
(RTB), and the GDP deflator.  
The first system, which is hereafter referred to as the benchmark model, is 
identical to the benchmark model presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) 
except that the GDP deflator is substituted for the producer price index (PPI) for crude 
fuel. The second system, which is hereafter referred to as the alternative model, is 
selected based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). It includes the same variables 
as the benchmark model but the specification of the equations in the system is different.    
Although several issues have emerged with regard to the narrative approach of 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997), they have not been examined in great detail. First and 
foremost, as Fatas and Mihov (2000) argue, “Robustness is an issue when policy shifts 
are measured only with three dummies” (Fatas and Mihov 2000, p. 7). Several exercises 
experiments are carried out hereafter to examine the robustness of the results reported 
using the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable.  
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First, after the IRFs computed for the benchmark model are presented, the 
sensitivity of these IRFs to adding a time trend and changing the lag length is 
investigated. Second, after the IRFs computed for the alternative model are presented, the 
sensitivity of these IRFs to perturbations in the list of variables and the sample period 
used is investigated. 
Furthermore, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999) assume that no other major shock to the economy occurred during the periods of 
the Ramey-Shapiro build-ups. However, as Perotti (2000) points out, other major 
macroeconomic shocks did occur at periods close to the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, in 
particular the Carter-Reagan episode. Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) identify a major 
exogenous monetary contraction the quarter before the date selected by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) for the onset of the Carter-Reagan episode. Moreover, Hamilton (1983) 
identifies a large exogenous increase in oil price the same quarter.  
Since other macroeconomic shocks occurred at periods close to the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes, the evidence reported using the episodes may reflect, at least partially, 
the effects of these other shocks. To address this issue, the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes in models that alternatively include Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable and 
the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable are examined.1  
Similarly, since the Ramey-Shapiro build-ups may coincide not only with 
increases in government purchases but also changes in other components of fiscal policy 
or changes in monetary policy, the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes in models that 
alternatively include additional monetary or fiscal variables are examined.   
Next, the increases in defense and government purchases that follow the episodes 
identified by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) differ greatly in size and shape. However, the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable has an identical value at the dates of the episodes. To 
control for the differences in the size of the episodes, a model is estimated in which the 
intensity of the shocks included in the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is proportional to 
the increases in defense purchases that follow them.  
 Finally, although Ramey and Shapiro (1997) argue that the episodes they identify 
are exogenous, there is little evidence in the recent literature to support this claim. 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) show that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are 
special relative to other dates in their sample periods and conclude, “In our view what is 
special is that [the military build-ups] coincide with the onset of exogenous increases in 
government purchases” (Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 1999, p. 17).  
 However, the methodology presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999) does not necessarily imply that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are exogenous and 
further evidence on this issue is needed. In this chapter, a statistical methodology used by 
Leeper (1997) to study the exogeneity of the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable is 
applied to thoroughly investigate whether the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are exogenous. 
 The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2.2 of this chapter presents a cursory 
analysis of the evolution of defense purchases in the post World War II era. Section 2.3 
                                                           
1The Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable has the value one at the dates of exogenous monetary policy 
contractions and zero otherwise. The dates for the monetary policy shocks correspond to the ones identified by 
Romer and Romer (1989, 1994). Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable has the value one at the dates of oil shocks 
and zero otherwise. The dates selected for the oil shocks are the ones used by Ramey and Shapiro (1997). They 
correspond to the dates identified by Hamilton (1983) and Hoover (1994) and updated for the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait.   
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reproduces the results from Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) and presents the 
results computed for the benchmark model. Section 2.4 discusses the robustness of the 
results computed for the benchmark model to adding a time trend and changing the lag 
length. Section 2.5 presents the results computed for the alternative model.  
Sections 2.6 and 2.7 discuss the robustness of the results computed for the 
alternative model to perturbations in the list of variables and the sample period used, 
respectively. Section 2.8 presents the results computed for a model in which the 
assumption that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are of equal intensity is abandoned. Section 
2.9 presents evidence on the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. Finally, 
Section 2.10 provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
2.2 Casual Empiricism 
The first panel of Figure 2.1 presents the evolution of defense purchases, which 
are defined as real military consumption and investment by the federal government, over 
the period 1947:1 to 1999:2.2 Since Ramey and Shapiro (1987) include eight lagged 
values of their dummy variable in the equations they estimate, eight quarters after the 
onsets of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are highlighted. A cursory examination of this 
panel suggests that the evolution of defense purchases is characterized by the existence of 
three major cycles in the post-World War II era.  
The onsets of the first two cycles appear to begin in 1950:3 and 1965:1, 
respectively. They correspond to the dates selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997). The 
onset of the last cycle appears to begin several years before 1980:1, the date selected by 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997). Quarterly defense purchases reached their lowest value since 
the breakout of the Korean War in 1977:4. However, it seems sensible to date the onset of 
the Carter-Reagan build-up in 1980:1 since defense purchases increase only modestly and 
intermittently in 1978 and 1979.  
Although defense purchases increase steadily after the onset of every episode, the 
magnitude of the change in defense purchases appears to be greatly reduced with each 
episode. The maximum increase in defense purchases within eight quarters after the onset 
of the Korean War episode is $232 billion. The maximum increases after the Vietnam 
War and Carter-Reagan episodes are $56 and $29 billion, respectively. Moreover, the 
increases in defense purchases appear shallower with each episode. In particular, the 
increase in defense purchases during the Carter-Reagan build-up is much more gradual 
than during the Korean and Vietnam build-ups.  
A potential explanation for the difference in the behavior of defense purchases 
after the onset of the Carter-Reagan build-up is the difference in the political and strategic 
circumstances surrounding the episodes. The Korean and Vietnam buildups were driven 
by a massive U.S. military intervention abroad. The Carter-Reagan build-up was driven 
by the tense but peaceful arms race with the Soviet Union.  
The second panel of Figure 2.1 presents the evolution of the ratio of defense purchases to 
real GDP. This ratio increases rapidly and greatly during the Korean War build-up. In 
comparison, the Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan buildups are modest. In fact, the 
increase in the ratio of defense purchases to real GDP during the Carter-Reagan  
                                                           
2 Most variables are in billions of chained (1992) dollars and seasonally adjusted. The real federal government 







































Figure 2.1: Real Federal Government Purchases in the Post-World War II Era 
Sample period: 1947:1-1999:2 
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build-up is very similar in magnitude to the increases that occurred in the middle of the 
1950s and early 1960s. 
Since the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are used to investigate the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policy in this chapter, it is of interest to present the evolution of federal government 
purchases, which are defined as real non-military and military consumption and 
investment by the federal government. Like the increase in defense purchases, the 
increase in government purchases following the Korean War episode is very large; 
however, the increases after the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes are relatively 
modest.3  
 
In conclusion, the evolution of defense purchases in the post-World War II era is 
characterized by three large and sustained military build-ups, which correspond to the 
Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan build-ups. These military build-ups 
are followed by military retrenchments, which are not included in the study by Ramey 
and Shapiro (1997) because they are more gradual than the military build-ups (see Ramey 
and Shapiro (1997), fn. 14, p. 39).   
Although the military build-ups appear to coincide with large increases in defense 
purchases and government purchases, it should be noted that the increases in defense 
purchases and government purchases are considerably smaller and shallower with each 
Ramey-Shapiro episode. In fact, the Korean War build-up appears much larger than the 
following build-ups identified by Ramey and Shapiro (1997).  
2.3 Benchmark Model 
This section presents the IRFs computed for Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s 
benchmark model and the benchmark model selected for this chapter, which is almost 
identical to Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s benchmark model. First, Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s benchmark model is estimated over the sample period from 
1948:1 to 1999:2,4 and IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable are computed for the endogenous variables included in the system.  
Following Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), four lagged values of 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the PPI for crude fuel are included as 
endogenous variables. A constant and four lagged values of the endogenous variables are 
included in each equation of the system. The contemporaneous value and four lagged 
values of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy are entered as exogenous variables. The logarithmic 
values of the variables are used except for interest rates. Data from 1947:1 to 1947:4 are 
used as pre-sample data.  
The reduced form of the VAR systems estimated when the narrative approach of 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) is used to identify shocks to government purchases has the 
following general specification:  
Xt = A(L) Xt-1 + B(L) Dt + Ut  (1) 
 
 
                                                           
3 Non-defense purchases do not exhibit a consistent pattern in the periods following the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. 
They drop the quarter of the outbreak of the Korean War, and then they exhibit an upward trend for three years. 
Non-defense purchases do not exhibit a clear trend during the Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan build-up. 
4 The sample period ends in 1999:2 because some data such as federal government receipts and deficit were not 
available after 1999:2 when the dissertation was begun. 
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Xt is a vector that includes the endogenous variables and Dt is the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. A(L) and B(L) are finite-order vector polynomials in non-negative 
powers of L. Ut is the vector of reduced form residuals. 
Since the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is added as an exogenous variable, it is 
possible to estimate the effects of shocks to government purchases when the reduced 
form VAR systems are estimated. More specifically, consistent point estimates of the 
IRFs for the endogenous variables at time t + k are given by an estimate of the coefficient 
on Lk in the expansion of [I-A(L)]-1 B(L).  
In Figure 2.2, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the PPI for crude fuel computed when Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s benchmark model is estimated. The dashed lines display the 
lower and upper bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence intervals.5 The IRFs computed 
for defense purchases and real GDP are nearly identical to the IRFs reported by Edelberg,  
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), who estimate their model over the period from 1948:1 to 
1996:4. 
Following a Ramey-Shapiro episode, the IRF for defense purchases increases 
sharply for about two years, and then it slowly returns to its original level. It is still 
significantly different from zero four years after an episode. Immediately after the onset 
of a Ramey-Shapiro episode, the IRF for real GDP rises significantly for a quarter. After 
two quarters, it rises significantly for two years. 
The IRF for RTB is similar to the IRFs for various measures of interest rates 
reported by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). Following an exogenous shock to 
the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables, it drops significantly for several periods, then it 
quickly increases for several periods, and finally it slowly returns toward its initial value. 
Overall, the delayed rise in RTB is significant for more than a year.  
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) argue 
that the IRF for RTB is consistent with the response of interest rates to a positive shock to 
government purchases in their two-sector neoclassical macroeconomic models that were 
presented in the previous chapter. However, the IRF for the PPI for crude fuel reported in 
Figure 2.2 is inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector models of Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional 
theoretical IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models.  
Within most theoretical models of fiscal policy, the price level is expected to rise 
following a persistent increase in government purchases; however, the IRF for the PPI for 
crude fuel is negative at all horizons following a Ramey-Shapiro episode, and it is 
significant after three years. It is possible that the anomalous response of the price level 
may be caused by the inclusion of a measure of a fuel price instead of a more aggregative 





                                                           
5 The lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals represent the 80th lowest and 420th highest values 
across 500 impulse response coefficients computed using a bootstrap Monte Carlo procedure identical to the one 
































































Figure 2.2: Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s  Model 
Sample period: 1948:1 to 1999:2 
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the PPI for crude fuel is determined in world oil markets, and it is unlikely to be affected 
by movements in defense purchases.6  
Therefore, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s model is re-estimated using more 
aggregative measures of the price level. The consumer price index for all urban 
consumers (CPI), the producer price index for commodities (PCOM), the producer price 
index for finished goods (PPI for finished goods), and the GDP deflator are substituted, in 
turn, for the PPI for crude fuel in the model estimated. Then, IRFs that present the effects 
of a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are computed.    
In Figure 2.3, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs computed 
when the systems with the CPI, PCOM, and the PPI for finished goods are estimated. In 
Figure 2.4, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs computed when the 
system with the GDP deflator is estimated. In both figures, the dashed lines display the 
lower and upper bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence intervals. When alternative 
measures of the price level are used, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, and RTB 
are similar to the ones reported for Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s model.  
However, the IRFs for all four measures of the price level are very different from 
the IRF computed for the PPI for crude fuel. The IRFs for the CPI, PCOM, the PPI for 
finished goods, and the GDP deflator rise sharply for several periods after the onset of an 
episode, and then they slowly return to their original values. In each case, they are 
significantly different from zero for roughly two years after the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro 
episode. 
Overall, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, and RTB reported when 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s benchmark model is estimated over the period from 
1948:1 to 1999:2 are similar to the IRFs presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999). Following a Ramey-Shapiro episode, defense purchases rise very persistently, 
output rises temporarily, and interest rates initially fall and then they rise significantly.  
In conclusion, the IRF for the PPI for crude fuel reported for Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s benchmark model, which decreases persistently and 
significantly after a Ramey-Shapiro episode, is inconsistent with most theoretical models 
of the effects of fiscal policy. When more aggregative measures of the price level are 
substituted for the PPI for crude fuel in the system estimated, the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, and RTB are left unaffected. However, the IRFs for the different 
measures of the price level are positive and persistently significant.  
This chapter focuses on the implications of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes for 
estimating the effects of fiscal policy within a VAR system that includes the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy, defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, the GDP deflator, which is referred 
to as the benchmark model, for two reasons. First, if the study that follows is carried out 
using the PPI for crude fuel, the various IRFs computed for the PPI for crude fuel remain 
as problematic as, if not more problematic than, the IRF reported in Figure 2.2. Second, 
since real GDP is included in the model, it is more natural to include the GDP deflator 
than other measures of the price level.  
                                                           
6 Hamilton (1983) identifies the major exogenous increases in crude oil price in the post-World War II era and 
investigates their causes. He does not identify any of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, or the ensuing increases in 

























































































































































































Figure 2.3: Models With Different Measures of the Price Level 

















































Figure 2.4: Point Estimates from Benchmark Model 
Sample period: 1948:1 to 1999:2 
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2.4 Alternative Time Trends and Lag Lengths 
This section presents statistical evidence on the selection of an appropriate time 
trend and an adequate lag length for the variables included in the VAR system under 
study. Furthermore, it examines the sensitivity of the results reported for the benchmark 
model to adding a time trend and changing the lag length used.  
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) do not include a time trend in the VAR 
systems they estimate. In contrast, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) include a “Perron-type” 
time trend in the equations they estimate, which means they include two linear time 
trends. The first trend starts in the first quarter of 1947 and ends in the last quarter of their 
sample period. The second trend starts in the second quarter of 1973 and also ends in the 
last quarter of their sample period.  
By including a “Perron-type” time trend, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) presume that 
the series they used are trend stationary processes, and they allow the growth rates of the 
series to change in 1973:2 since the trend in productivity growth changed at this point 
(Perron (1990)). Neither Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) nor Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) present evidence to support their selection.  
Furthermore, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) estimate VAR systems in 
which they include four lagged values of the endogenous and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variables.7 In contrast, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) estimate equations in which they 
include eight lagged values of the endogenous variables and their dummy variable. 
Neither study discusses the selection of the lag lengths used. 
As is well known by now (Enders (1995) p. 313; Lutkepohl (1993), p. 118), 
selecting an adequate lag length for the variables included in any VAR system is an 
important issue. If the lag length selected is too long, degrees of freedom are wasted. If 
the lag length selected is too short, the system is mis-specified and yields biased 
coefficient estimates. Furthermore, even though the variables included in a VAR system 
may be non-stationary or cointegrated, maximum likelihood estimation yields consistent, 
although not efficient, estimates of all the parameters, provided that variables in levels 
and long enough lags are used (see Hamilton (1994), pp. 561-562, pp. 579-580; Weise 
(1996), p. 28).  
VAR systems in which the variables are in levels rather than in differences are 
estimated even though the series may be non-stationary for three reasons.8 First, it is 
difficult to distinguish between a unit root and an autoregression parameter close to one 
using unit root tests, and it may be concluded that the variables are non-stationary even 
though they are in fact stationary. In this case, a VAR system in which a unit root is 
imposed, and hence the variables are in first differences, is estimated; however the 
system is mis-specified and yields biased coefficient estimates (Hamilton (1994), p. 562, 
Weise (1996), p. 28). 
                                                           
7 Ramey and Shapiro (1997) also include the contemporaneous value of their dummy variable in the equations 
they estimate. Throughout this section, only the number of lagged values of the variables in the systems 
estimated is mentioned. It is understood that the contemporaneous value of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, 
and other dummy variables, is also included.  
8 When first differences are used to estimate the benchmark model, the IRF for RTB is inconsistent with the two-
sector models of Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) and Ramey and Shapiro as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one sector neo-classical models. It decreases significantly and briefly immediately after a 
Ramey-Shapiro episode, then it never rises significantly. 
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Second, even though the variables may be non-stationary, maximum likelihood 
estimation of a VAR system in levels yields consistent coefficient estimates of all the 
parameters. Third, the variables may not only be non-stationary but also may be 
cointegrated. In this case, a VAR system in first differences is also mis-specified and 
yields inconsistent coefficient estimates. However, as was mentioned above, a VAR 
system in levels yields consistent coefficient estimates, provided that long enough lags 
are used (Hamilton (1994), pp. 561-562, pp. 579-580, Weise (1996), p. 28). 
2.4.1 Time Trend 
To select an appropriate time trend for the VAR system under study, models in 
which different types of time trend are added, in turn, to each equation of the benchmark 
model are estimated, and the corresponding AIC and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) 
values are computed. Systems with no time trend, a linear trend only, linear and quadratic 
trends, and a “Perron-type” time trend are considered. The preferred specification is the 
one that minimizes the AIC and SBC values. 
Then, a series of likelihood ratio test statistics is computed. First, the null 
hypothesis of no time trend is tested against the alternatives of a linear trend only, linear 
and quadratic trends, and a “Perron-type” trend. Second, the null hypothesis of a linear 
trend only is tested against the alternatives of linear and quadratic trends and a “Perron-
type” trend. 
In order to test the null hypothesis of no time trend against the alternative of a 
linear trend only, a restricted model, which corresponds to the benchmark model, is 
estimated. Then, an unrestricted model, in which a linear trend is added to each equation 
of the benchmark model, is estimated. Finally, following Sims (1980), the likelihood ratio 
statistic is computed.9   
This likelihood ratio statistic has an asymptotic χ2 distribution with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of restrictions in the system, which is four for this test. If, 
for the 5 percent significance level, the likelihood ratio statistic computed exceeds the 
critical value for the χ2 distribution, the null hypothesis of no time trend can be rejected. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the model with a linear trend only is preferred. The same 
procedure is followed to carry out the other likelihood ratio tests.  
The null hypothesis of a “Perron-type” trend against the alternative of linear and 
quadratic trends (or vice versa) cannot be tested using a likelihood ratio test because the 
unrestricted model would be constructed by substituting the quadratic trend for the 
second time trend included in a ”Perron-type” trend, which starts in 1973:2. However, to 
carry out a likelihood ratio test, it is necessary to add a variable to the restricted model to 
construct the unrestricted model. 
Table 2.1 reports the AIC and SBC values computed when the benchmark model 
is estimated under the alternative assumptions for the time trend. Both the AIC and SBC 
criteria imply that it is better to include a “Perron type” time trend in the VAR system 
under study.  
                                                           
9 Following Sims (1980), the formula used to compute the likelihood ratio statistic is  
(T-c) (log |Σr| -log |Σu |) where T is the number of usable observations, c is the number of parameters estimated in 
each equation of the unrestricted model, |Σr| and  |Σu| are the natural logarithm of the determinants of the 




Table 2.1: AIC and SBC Values for Time Trend 
Benchmark Model (1948:1-1999:2) 
Type of time trend Aikaike’s Information  
Criterion 
Schwarz’s Criterion 
No trend -5885.04 -5592.19 
Linear trend only -5895.52 -5589.36 
“Perron-type” -5906.12 -5586.65 
Linear and quadratic trend -5848.50 -5556.07 
 
Table 2.2 reports the results of the likelihood ratio tests carried out. In each case, 
the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, it is concluded that including any type of time trend 
is better than including no time trend. Furthermore, it is concluded that including linear 
and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend is better than including a linear trend only. 
 
Table 2.2: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Time Trend 
Benchmark Model (1948:1-1999:2) 
Null hypothesis  Alternative  Test value P-value 
No time trend Linear trend 16.42* 0.0025 
No time trend Linear and Quadratic trend 32.76** 0.0000 
No time trend “Perron-type” trend 38.72** 0.0001 
Linear trend only Linear and Quadratic trend 16.43* 0.0025 
Linear trend only “Perron-type” trend 22.39* 0.0002 
* 4 restrictions are imposed. The critical value at a 5% significance level for a chi-square distribution with 4 
degrees of freedom is 9.49. 
** 8 restrictions are imposed. The critical value at a 5% significance level for a chi-square distribution with 8 
degrees of freedom is 15.51. 
 
While the statistical evidence reported above implies that it is better to include 
linear and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend to the VAR system under study, the 
addition of time trends may not significantly affect the results reported for the benchmark 
model. In order to examine the effects of adding a Perron-type trend or linear and 
quadratic trends to the benchmark model on the results reported for the benchmark 
model, a methodology in the spirit of McMillin (2001) is applied. 
If the results reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to the addition of 
time trends, the IRFs computed for the models with time trends ought to lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals reported for the benchmark model. In Figure 2.5, the 
solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, 
and the GDP deflator computed when linear and quadratic trends and a “Perron-type” 
trend are added, in turn, to the benchmark model. The dashed lines display the confidence 
intervals computed for the benchmark model.  
When linear and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend are added to each 
equation of the benchmark model, all the IRFs computed lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals reported for the benchmark model at all horizons. Therefore, it is 







































































































































Figure 2.5: Point Estimates from Models with Alternative Time Trends 
Confidence Intervals from Benchmark Model 
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2.4.2 Lag Length  
To select an adequate lag length for the variables included in the VAR system 
under study, models identical to the benchmark model except for the lag length used are 
estimated, and the corresponding AIC and SBC values are computed. Systems with one 
to eight lags of the endogenous and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables are 
considered.10 The preferred lag length is the one that minimizes the AIC or SBC values. 
A sequence of likelihood ratio tests is also computed. The null hypothesis of seven lags 
versus the alternative of eight lags, then the null hypothesis of six lags versus the 
alternative seven lags, and so on, are tested.  
In order to test the null hypothesis of seven lags versus the alternative of eight 
lags, a restricted model that includes seven lagged values of the variables is estimated. 
Then, an unrestricted model that includes eight lagged values of the variables is 
estimated. Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic is computed. It has an asymptotic 
χ2 distribution with 20 degrees of freedom.  
If, for the 5 percent significance level, the likelihood ratio statistic exceeds the 
critical value for the χ2 distribution, the null hypothesis of seven lags can be rejected, and 
the model with eight lags is preferred. Otherwise, the null hypothesis of seven lags cannot 
be rejected, and the null hypothesis of six lags against the alternative seven lags is tested. 
The same procedure is repeated until a null hypothesis can be rejected.  
Table 2.3 reports the AIC and SBC values computed for the VAR systems in 
which one to eight lagged values of the variables are included.11 According to the AIC 
criterion, it is better to include six lagged values of the variables. In contrast, the SBC 
values reported imply that including two lagged values of the variables is better.12 
 
Table 2.3: AIC and SBC Values for Lag Length 
Benchmark Model (1949:1-1999:2) 
Number of lags Aikaike’s Information  
Criterion 
Schwarz’s Criterion 
1 -5578.63 -5459.54 
2 -5771.51 -5586.25 
3 -5801.00. -5549.57 
4 -5814.30 -5496.71 
5 -5813.93 -5430.17 
6 -5861.80 -5411.87 
7 -5844.52 -5328.43 
8 -5833.64 -5251.38 
 
Table 2.4 reports the results of the likelihood ratio tests carried out. It indicates 
that the null hypotheses of seven and six lags cannot be rejected; however, the null 
                                                           
10 Only models for which the lag length used for the endogenous variables and the dummy variable are identical 
are considered.  
11 For comparison’s sake, the AIC and SBC values and the likelihood ratio statistic are computed when the 
corresponding systems are estimated over the period from 1949:1 to 1999:2. 
12 In some circumstances, using a criterion such as the AIC, the SBC, or likelihood ratio tests to select the lag 
length may yield a model in which serial correlation of the residuals may be problematic. However, the q-statistic 
computed when the benchmark model is estimated with two, four, and six lags of the endogenous and dummy 
variables suggest that the residuals are serially uncorrelated for all lag lengths. 
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hypothesis of five lags can be rejected. Therefore, according to the likelihood ratio tests, 
it is better to include six lagged values of the variables.  
 
Table 2.4: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Lag Length 
Benchmark Model (1949:1-1999:2) 
Null hypothesis  Alternative  Test value* P-value 
Lag length = 7 Lag length =8 21.71 0.3561 
Lag length = 6 Lag length = 7 26.30 0.1561 
Lag length = 5 Lag length = 6 66.84 0.0000 
* For every test we impose 20 restrictions. The critical value at a 5% significance level for a chi-square 
distribution with 20 degrees of freedom is 31.41. 
 
While the statistical evidence reported above implies that it is better to include 
either two or six lagged values of the variables in the VAR system under study, altering 
the lag length used may not affect the results reported for the benchmark model. 
Therefore, the effects of using two and six lagged values of the variables on the results 
reported for the benchmark model is examined.  
If the results reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to the lag length 
used, the IRFs computed for the models with two and six lags ought to lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the benchmark model. In Figure 2.6, the solid 
lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator computed for the models with two and six lagged values of the 
endogenous and dummy variables. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals 
computed for the benchmark model.  
 Beginning several periods after the onset of an episode, the IRF for RTB 
computed for the model with two lags lies below the lower bound of the confidence 
interval from the benchmark model for two and a half years and is negative. Therefore, 
the IRF for RTB computed for the model with two lags is significantly different from the 
one reported for the benchmark model. The IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP and the 
GDP deflator computed for the model with two lags lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the benchmark model at all horizons. However, the IRF for real 
GDP exhibits a pattern very different from the one reported for the benchmark model. It 
does not exhibit a hump-shaped pattern but a very flat pattern.13  
The IRF for RTB computed for the model with six lags is significantly different from the 
one reported for the benchmark model. Two years after the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro 
episode, the IRF for RTB computed for the model with six lags lies above the upper 
bound of the confidence interval from the benchmark model. The IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, and the GDP deflator computed for the model with six lags lie on or 
within the confidence intervals from the benchmark model at all horizons, although the 
point estimate for defense purchases is consistently near the lower bound of the 
corresponding confidence interval. 
 
                                                           
13Furthermore, when confidence intervals are computed for the model with two lags, the IRF for RTB is negative 
and significant in the first year and in the fourth year after a Ramey-Shapiro episode. It is not significantly 








































































































































Figure 2.6: Point Estimates from Models with Alternative Lag Lengths 
Confidence Intervals from Benchmark Model 
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Overall, the statistical evidence reported in this section imply that it may be more 
appropriate to estimate a VAR system in which each equation includes a “Perron-type” 
time trend. However, the IRFs presented when linear and quadratic time trends or a 
“Perron-type” trend are added to the benchmark model are not significantly different 
from the IRFs reported for the benchmark model.  
Moreover, the statistical evidence reported in this section yield different 
conclusions with regard to the best lag length to use to estimate the VAR system under 
study. Based on the SBC criterion, it appears better to include only two lagged values of 
the endogenous and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables in each equation of the VAR 
system under study. However, the AIC criterion and the likelihood ratio tests carried out 
imply that it is better to include six lagged values of the variables.  
The IRFs presented when two or six lagged values of the variables are used to 
estimate the VAR system under study indicate that altering the lag length affects the 
results reported for RTB, and to a lesser extent, defense purchases and real GDP. In 
particular, the IRFs for real GDP and RTB computed for the model with two lags are 
inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. 
In conjunction with the statistical evidence reported above, the IRFs presented for 
the models with two or six lagged values of the variables suggest that the model with six 
lags is preferred. Furthermore, the appropriateness of estimating the model with six lags 
is reinforced by the evidence from a study by Kilian (2000), who examines the 
implications of using the AIC and other criteria for selecting the lag length used to 
estimate VAR systems.  
Kilian (2000) presents a Monte Carlo study in which he shows that the AIC has 
better finite-sample properties than more parsimonious lag order selection criteria such as 
the SBC. He also provides evidence that the costs associated with underfitting a VAR 
system are disproportionately larger than the costs associated with overfitting the system. 
As a result, he argues, “… Less parsimonious lag order selection criteria such as the AIC 
may result in more accurate impulse response estimates compared to the highly 
parsimonious [SBC]” (Kilian 2000, p. 2). 
2.5 Alternative Model 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) include four lagged values of the 
variables in the equations of the VAR systems they estimate. Furthermore, they do not 
include a time trend. The evidence reported in the last section suggests that the 
specification of the equations selected by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) may 
not be the best for the VAR system under study.  
To select the best specification for the VAR system under study, AIC values are 
computed when twelve models that include defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the 
GDP deflator are estimated using with different lag lengths and time trends. Models with 
two, four, six and eight lagged values of the variables are considered as well as with no 
time trend, linear and quadratic trends, and a “Perron-type” trend.14 The model that yields 
the lowest AIC value is selected as the alternative model.  
The AIC values computed for the different models are reported in Table 2.5. They 
indicate that the model with six lags and a “Perron-type” time trend represents the best 
                                                           
14 For comparison’s sake, all the systems are estimated over the period from 1949:1 to 1999:2. 
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specification for the VAR system under study.  This model is hereafter referred to as the 
alternative model. In the first column of Figure 2.7, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed for a unit shock to defense purchases when the alternative model is estimated. 
The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence 
intervals.  
 
Table 2.5: AIC Values for Various Time Trends and Lag Lengths 





Linear and Quadratic 
Trend  
“Perron-type” Trend 
2 -5743.73 -5572.04 -5771.51 
4 -5784.08 -5805.34 -5814.30 
6 -5830.51 -5858.14 -5861.79 
8 -5807.84 -5832.64 -5833.64 
 
For all the variables, especially RTB and the GDP deflator, the confidence 
intervals computed for the alternative model are narrower than the ones reported for the 
benchmark model, and it may be argued that the IRFs computed for the alternative model 
are more precisely estimated than the ones reported for the benchmark model. 
Furthermore, the patterns of the IRFs computed for the alternative model appear to differ 
only moderately from the ones reported for the benchmark model. The IRF for defense 
purchases exhibits a pattern similar to the one reported for the benchmark model; 
however, the peak effect of a Ramey-Shapiro episode on defense purchases computed for 
the alternative model is three-fourths of the peak effect reported for the benchmark 
model. 
The IRFs for real GDP and RTB computed for the alternative model appear 
similar, but somewhat larger, than the ones reported for the benchmark model. 
Furthermore, the delayed increase in RTB reported for the alternative model is significant 
for more than two and a half years, compared to a year for the benchmark model. Finally, 
the IRF for the GDP deflator computed for the alternative model appears similar to the 
one reported for the benchmark model; however, it is more persistent. It increases 
significantly for four years after a Ramey-Shapiro episode, compared to two years for the 
benchmark model. 
To further compare the results reported for the benchmark and alternative models, 
the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the 
benchmark model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
alternative model, which is the preferred model. If the IRFs computed for the benchmark 
model are not significantly different from the IRFs reported for the alternative model, 
they ought to lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model. In the second column of Figure 2.7, the solid lines display the point estimates of 
the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the 
benchmark model. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals computed for the 
alternative model.  
The IRF for defense purchases computed for the benchmark model is 


































































































































Figure 2.7: Point Estimates from Alternative Model and Benchmark Model 
Confidence Interval from Alternative Model 
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the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode, it lies slightly above the upper bound of the 
confidence interval reported for the alternative model. The IRF for real GDP computed 
for the benchmark model is marginally different from the IRF reported for the alternative 
model. In the second year after the onset of an episode, it lies very slightly below the 
lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model for a single period. 
Three years after the onset of an episode, it lies slightly above the upper bound of the 
confidence interval. 
The delayed rise in RTB computed for the benchmark model is significantly 
smaller than for the alternative model. A year after the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode, 
it lies slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative 
model for roughly two years. The IRF for the GDP deflator computed for the benchmark 
model is never significantly different from the IRF reported for the alternative model. 
In conclusion, according to the AIC criterion, it appears preferable to estimate a 
VAR system with a “Perron-type” trend as well as six lagged values of the endogenous 
and dummy variables; this specification is referred to as the alternative model. The IRFs 
reported for the alternative model have narrower confidence intervals than the IRFs 
reported for the benchmark model, which corresponds to the specification of the systems 
estimated by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999).  
Furthermore, the patterns of the IRFs computed for the alternative model are 
fairly similar to the ones reported for the benchmark model. However, the magnitudes of 
the effects of a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable on defense purchases and 
RTB, and to a lesser extent real GDP, computed for the alternative model differ from the 
ones reported for the benchmark model.  
2.6 Extended Models 
Based on a study by Christiano (1990), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) 
argue against using VAR-based identification schemes such as the Choleski 
decomposition to identify exogenous shocks to government purchases. They claim that 
inference reported using VAR-based innovations appears fragile to perturbations in the 
list of variables used (see Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), p. 3). Neither 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) nor Ramey and Shapiro (1997) present 
evidence on the sensitivity of the results computed with the Ramey-Shapiro episodes to 
perturbations in the list of variables included in their models.  
This section investigates the sensitivity of the results reported for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator to adding an additional endogenous 
variable or an additional exogenous dummy variable to the alternative model. Overall, 
seventeen variables are considered. To assess the sensitivity of the results reported for the 
alternative model to the addition of any given variable, an extended version of the 
alternative model is estimated that includes the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, the GDP deflator, and the variable under consideration. Six 
lagged values of the additional variable under consideration are included if it is 
endogenous. The contemporaneous and six lagged values are included if it is an 
exogenous dummy variable.  
 Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are 
computed for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. Finally, the point 
estimates of the IRFs computed for the extended model are plotted against the 
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corresponding confidence intervals reported for the alternative model. If the results 
reported for the alternative model are not sensitive to perturbations in the list of variables 
used, the IRFs computed for the extended model ought to lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals reported for the alternative model.  
First, the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are examined in models that 
alternatively include non-defense purchases, real federal government receipts, and the 
real federal government deficit. Then, the effects of the episodes in models that 
alternatively include consumption of non-durables and services, consumption of durables 
plus residential investment, and non-residential investment are considered.  
Next, the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are examined in models that 
alternatively include total private employment, employment in the non-durables 
manufacturing sector, employment in the durables manufacturing sector, real wages in 
private industry, real compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real compensation in 
the business sector. Finally, the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes in models that 
alternatively include the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable, the monetary base, 
Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and a measure of long-term 
interest rates are presented. 
2.6.1 Additional Fiscal Variables 
The Ramey-Shapiro episodes may be characterized not only by an increase in 
defense purchases but also by systematic changes in other dimensions of fiscal policy. If 
relevant dimensions of fiscal policy are not included in the VAR systems estimated in the 
previous sections, the point estimates of the IRFs reported might be biased. They may 
present not only the effects of an increase in defense purchases but also the effects of 
changes in other dimensions of fiscal policy.  
Therefore, this sub-section presents evidence on the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes in models that alternatively include non-defense purchases, real federal 
government receipts, and the real federal government deficit. The logarithmic values of 
the fiscal variables are used except for the deficit, which takes negative values. To 
construct the measures of the real federal government deficit and real federal government 
receipts, the current values of these variables in billions of dollars are deflated by the 
CPI. Non-defense purchases are in billions of chained (1992) dollars. 
In Figure 2.8, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the fiscal variables listed above are added, in 
turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals 
from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs. The 
dashed lines display the confidence intervals, which were presented in the previous 
section.  
Except for the IRF computed for RTB when the model with the real federal 
government deficit is estimated, the IRFs reported for the models with a fiscal variable lie 
within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. 
The IRF for RTB reported for the model with the real federal government deficit lies 
within the confidence interval from the alternative model for more than three years, and 
then it lies very slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval. 
Overall, eleven out of twelve IRFs computed when the fiscal variables are added, 
in turn, to the alternative model are not significantly different from the corresponding 






























































































































































































Figure 2.8: Point Estimates from Models with a Fiscal Variable.  
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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computed for the model with the real federal government deficit is only marginally 
different at long horizons from the IRF reported for the alternative model. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the results reported for the alternative model are not sensitive to the 
addition of fiscal variables.  
2.6.2 Additional Sectoral Variables 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, theoretical models differ on their 
predictions about the effects of a shock to government purchases on consumption, 
investment, employment and real wages. To present the effects of exogenous shocks to 
government purchases on these variables, many VAR systems in which they are included 
have been estimated in recent studies (Ramey and Shapiro (1997), Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Perotti (2000), Fatas and Mihov (2000)).  
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes 
on defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator in models that alternatively 
include components of consumption and investment. Following Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher (1999), consumption and investment are broken down into three components: 
consumption of non-durables and services, residential investment plus consumption of 
durables, and non-residential investment.  
 This sub-section also presents evidence on the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes on defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator in models that 
alternatively include measures of employment, real wages, and real compensation. First, 
employment in the private sector, employment in the non-durables sector and 
employment in the durables manufacturing sector are examined. Then, real wages in 
private industry, real compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real compensation in 
the business sector are considered. The logarithmic values of sectoral variables are 
included in the models estimated. To construct the measures of real compensation and 
real wages, the nominal values of these variables are deflated by the CPI. The other 
additional sectoral variables are in billions of chained (1992) dollars 
A later chapter examines the effects of exogenous shocks to defense purchases on 
the sectoral variables considered in this section, which are interpreted in the context of 
the models discussed in the first chapter. However, in this chapter, only the robustness of 
the results for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator with respect to 
the addition of the consumption, investment, and labor markets variables to the 
alternative model is examined.  
In Figure 2.9, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the consumption and investment variables 
listed above are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the 
point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals. All the 
IRFs reported for the models with a component of consumption and investment lie within 
or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons.  
In Figure 2.10, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when employment in private industry, employment 
in the non-durables manufacturing sector, and employment in the durables manufacturing 
sector are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point 





























































































































































































Figure 2.9: Point Estimates from Models with a Consumption or Investment 
Variable.  






























































































































































































Figure 2.10: Point Estimates from Models with an Employment Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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Except for the IRF computed for RTB when the model with employment in the 
durables manufacturing sector is estimated, the IRFs reported for the models with a 
measure of employment lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
alternative model at all horizons. The IRF for RTB reported for the model with 
employment in the durables manufacturing sector lies on the upper bound of the 
confidence interval from the alternative model for a year, and then it lies very slightly 
above the upper bound for one and a half years  
In Figure 2.11, the point estimates of the IRFs computed when real wages in 
private industry, real compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real compensation in 
the business sector are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the 
point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals.  
Since the series for compensation in the manufacturing sector is not available 
before 1949:1, the model with real compensation in the manufacturing sector is estimated 
from 1950:3 to 1999:2. Thus, the IRFs computed for this model are plotted against the 
confidence intervals computed for the alternative model estimated over the same sub-
sample period. All the IRFs reported for the models with a measure of real wages or real 
compensation lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model at all horizons.  
Overall, thirty-five out of thirty-six IRFs computed when consumption, 
investment, employment, real wages, and real compensation variables are added, in turn, 
to the alternative are not significantly different from the corresponding IRFs reported for 
the alternative model at any horizon. Furthermore, the IRF for RTB computed for the 
model with employment in the durables manufacturing sector is only marginally and 
temporarily different from the IRF reported for the alternative model. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the results reported for the alternative model are not sensitive to the 
addition of sectoral variables.  
 2.6.3 Additional Macroeconomic Variables 
The recent literature on the effects of government purchases essentially ignores 
monetary policy. However, it has been recently argued that wars and military build-ups 
may be associated not only with expansionary fiscal policy but also with expansionary 
monetary policy. For instance, using a data set of 66 countries over the period from 1950 
to 1992 and a data set of 15 countries over the from 1881 to 1988 period, Caplan (1999) 
shows that the money supply grows during wartime. Therefore, the IRFs computed using 
the Ramey-Shapiro episodes may appear to have real effects when they reflect, at least in 
part, the effects of monetary policy. 
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes 
in models that alternatively include the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable and the 
monetary base. The Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable is considered since it 
provides a crude way to control for the effects of monetary policy shocks, specifically 
monetary contractions, on the economy. The monetary base is considered because it 
responds quickly to monetary policy actions; however, it should not be interpreted as a 
measure of monetary policy.15  
                                                           
15 Although the federal funds rate is often used as a monetary policy variable, it is not included in the analysis of 
the sensitivity of the alternative model to adding monetary policy variables because, like RTB, it represents a 



























































































































































































Figure 2.11: Point Estimates from Models with a Measure of Real Wages or Real 
Compensation 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
                                                                                                                                                                             
alternative model, the IRFs computed are very similar to the ones reported for the alternative model. 
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Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) use a narrative approach to identify episodes in 
which the Federal Reserve attempted to exert a contractionary influence on the economy 
in order to reduce inflation. In the post-World War II era, the episodes are dated in 
1947:4, 1955:3, 1968:4, 1974:2, 1978:3, 1979:4, and 1988:4. The Romers’ monetary 
policy dummy variable has the value one at the dates of the episodes, and zero otherwise.  
To examine the effects that exogenous supply shocks may have on the results 
reported for shocks to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, this sub-section also presents 
evidence on the effects of the episodes in a model that includes Hamilton’s oil price 
dummy variable and the PPI for crude fuel. Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable 
provides a crude way to control for the effects of major oil price increases on the 
economy. Hamilton (1983) uses a narrative approach to identify exogenous increases in 
oil price. The dates of the shocks identified by Hamilton (1983) and subsequently 
updated by Hoover and Perez (1994) and Ramey and Shapiro (1997) are 1947:4, 1953:2, 
1957:1, 1969:1, 1970:4, 1974:1, 1979:3, 1981:1, and 1990:3. Hamilton’s oil price dummy 
has the value one at the dates of the shocks, and zero otherwise. 
Finally, the interest rate channel is an important channel of transmission of fiscal 
policy, and long-term interest rates are considered a main determinant of interest 
sensitive expenditures. Therefore, this sub-section presents evidence on the effects of the 
Ramey-Shapiro episodes in a model that includes the constant maturity ten-year Treasury 
bond yield (LTR) in addition to RTB.  
As was mentioned before, the contemporaneous and six lagged values of the 
additional dummy variables are entered as exogenous variables in the models with the 
Romers’ monetary policy and Hamilton’s oil price dummy variables. Six lagged values 
of the additional endogenous variables are entered in the models with the monetary base, 
the PPI for crude oil, and LTR. Furthermore, the logarithmic values of the monetary base 
and the PPI for crude fuel are included in the model with these variables.  
 In the first and second columns of Figure 2.12, the point estimates of the IRFs for 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the monetary 
variables listed above are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the 
point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals. 
 All the IRFs computed for the model with the Romers’ monetary policy dummy 
variable lie well within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model 
at all horizons. Except for real GDP, the IRFs reported for the model with the monetary 
base also lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at 
all horizons. The IRF for real GDP computed for the model with the monetary base lies 
within or on the confidence interval from the alternative model for more than two and a 
half years after a Ramey-Shapiro episode, and then it lies very slightly above the upper 
bound of the confidence interval.  
In the third and fourth column of Figure 2.12, the point estimates of the IRFs for 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when Hamilton’s oil 
price dummy variable and the PPI for crude fuel are added, in turn, to the alternative 
model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display 






















































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.12: Point Estimates from Models with an Additional Macroeconomic 
Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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The IRF for defense purchases computed for the model with Hamilton’s oil price 
dummy variable lies within the confidence interval from the alternative model until the 
end of the fourth year after a Ramey-Shapiro episode. Then, it lies very slightly above the 
upper bound of the confidence interval. The IRF for real GDP lies within of the 
confidence interval from the alternative model for more than two and a half years after a 
Ramey-Shapiro episode. Then, it lies above the upper bound of the confidence interval.  
The IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator computed for the model with Hamilton’s 
oil price dummy variable lie within the confidence intervals from the alternative model at 
all horizons. Furthermore, all the IRFs computed for the model with the PPI for crude 
fuel lie within the confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons, and 
their patterns are similar to the ones reported for the alternative model. 
In the last column of Figure 2.12, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when LTR is added to the 
alternative model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
alternative model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed 
lines display the confidence intervals. All the IRFs reported for the model with LTR lie 
within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. 
Overall, seventeen out of twenty IRFs computed when the Romers’ monetary 
policy dummy variable, the monetary base, Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, and 
LTR are added, in turn, to the alternative model are not significantly different from the 
corresponding IRFs reported for the alternative model at any horizon.  
The IRF for defense purchases computed for the model with Hamilton’s oil price 
dummy variable differs significantly, although marginally, from the corresponding IRF 
reported for the alternative model at the end of the fourth year after a shock to the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. Moreover, the IRF for real GDP computed for the 
model with Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable differs significantly and persistently 
from the corresponding IRF reported for the alternative model.  
Therefore, it is concluded that the results reported for the alternative model are 
not sensitive to the addition of the macroeconomic variables examined in this sub-
section, except for Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable. In this case, the magnitude of 
the effect of a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable differs significantly from the 
one reported for the alternative model at long horizons for defense purchases and real 
GDP, but the pattern of the effect is the same.  
As was mentioned before, Perotti (2000) argues that the results reported using the 
Ramey-Shapiro episodes as measures of shocks to government purchases may be affected 
by other macroeconomic shocks occurring at periods close to the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes. The sensitivity of the results reported for the model with Hamilton’s oil price 
dummy may be attributed to the fact that a major shock to the price of oil took place the 
period before the date selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for the onset of Carter-
Reagan build-up.  
Furthermore, the IRFs computed for the model with the Romers’ monetary policy 
dummy indicate that the results reported for the alternative model do not reflect the 
effects of monetary policy actions,16 and the addition of the monetary base to the 
                                                           
16 The sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative model to the addition of other monetary variables was 
also examined. However, due to data availability, it was done over the sub-sample period from 1960:3 to 1999:2, 
which only includes the last two Ramey-Shapiro episodes. First, the sensitivity of the results reported for the 
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alternative model appears to marginally affect the results reported for a shock to the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. Thus, it does not appear the inclusion of monetary 
proxies alters the results to any substantial degree.  
2.6.4 Responses of Fiscal and Monetary Variables  
Previous sub-sections examined the sensitivity of the effects of a shock to the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable on defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP 
deflator to adding alternative fiscal variables and the monetary base to the alternative 
model. The results reported indicate that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes have a significant 
and persistent effect on defense purchases. It is of interest to determine whether the 
Ramey-Shapiro episodes altered dimensions of fiscal policy other than defense purchases 
or the monetary base.  
This sub-section presents the effects of a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable on non-defense purchases, real federal government receipts, the real federal 
government deficit, and the monetary base. Figure 2.13 displays the point estimates and 
the confidence intervals of the IRFs computed for the alternative fiscal variables and the 
monetary base when the extended models that include these variables are estimated. The 
solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs. The dashed lines display the lower and 
upper bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence intervals. 
The IRF for non-defense purchases is small and not significantly different from 
zero at any horizons. The IRF for real federal government receipts exhibits a hump 
shaped pattern. It increases significantly for almost two and a half years after an episode. 
It is consistent with the IRFs reported for real GDP and the GDP deflator. Indeed, as 
aggregate income and the price level rise persistently after a shock to defense purchases, 
government receipts are also expected to increase.  
The IRF computed for the real federal government deficit is small and not 
significantly different from zero for two and a half years after the onset of a Ramey-
Shapiro episode. Then, it deteriorates significantly and persistently. The pattern of the 
results computed for the real federal government deficit appears consistent with the 
evidence reported for federal government purchases and receipts.  
Following a Ramey-Shapiro episode, government receipts increase significantly 
for more than two years, which allows the federal government to finance the military 
build-up without a significant deterioration of its deficit. In the third year after an 
episode, defense purchases remain very high but the increase in federal government 
receipts comes to an end and non-defense purchases are unchanged. Therefore, at longer 
horizons a portion of the military build-up is financed through a government deficit. 
At the end of the first year after a Ramey-Shapiro episode, the IRF for the 
monetary base increases significantly, although very marginally and for less than a 
quarter. It is not significantly different from zero at any other horizon. Therefore, it is  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
alternative model was investigated when the monetary aggregates M1 and M2 are added, in turn, to the 
alternative model. Second, the sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative model was investigated when 
a modified version of the VAR model presented by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994) is estimated. The 
modified Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans’ model includes real GDP, RTB, PCOM, the GDP deflator, non-
borrowed reserves, total reserves, defense purchases, and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy. The IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the models estimated over the sub-sample period 
from 1960:3 to 1999:2 lie within the corresponding confidence intervals computed for the alternative model over 
the same sub-sample period.  
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Figure 2.13: Point Estimates of the IRFs for Fiscal and Monetary variables 
Sample Period: 1948:3-1999:2 
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argued that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes appear to have a very marginally significant and 
transitory effect on the monetary base. 
Overall, the IRFs reported for the fiscal and monetary variables presented in this 
sub-section indicate that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes do not coincide with significant 
and persistent changes in non-defense purchases and the monetary base. It also implies 
that the government is initially able to finance the military build-up through an increase 
in revenues. However, once the increase in revenues comes to end, the government needs 
to finance the military build-up through a deficit.  
2.7 Alternative Sample Periods 
 Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) claim that inference reported using 
VAR-based innovations to real defense purchases appears fragile to perturbations in the 
sample period used. However, neither Ramey and Shapiro (1997) nor Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) present evidence on the sensitivity of the results reported 
with the Ramey-Shapiro episodes to using different sample periods.  
This section provides evidence on the sensitivity of the results reported for the 
alternative model to perturbations in the sample period used. First, the alternative model 
is estimated over four sub-sample periods that includes either two or three Ramey-
Shapiro episodes. Then, the point estimates of the IRFs computed for defense purchases, 
real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator for the sub-sample periods are plotted along with 
the corresponding confidence intervals for the whole sample period. If the results 
reported for the alternative model are not sensitive to perturbations in the sample period 
used, the IRFs computed for the sub-sample periods ought to lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the whole sample period. 
First, the sensitivity of the alternative model to perturbations in the sample period 
used is examined for two sub-sample periods that include only two Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes. The first sub-sample period selected is 1948:1 to 1973:1, and is referred to as 
the early sub-sample period. It corresponds to the first half of the whole sample period 
and includes the first two Ramey-Shapiro episodes. It ends before the oil crisis of 1973-
1974, which may have affected the structural relations among the variables in the VAR 
system under study. The second sub-sample period selected is 1960:1 to 1999:2, and is 
referred to as the late sub-sample period. It includes the last two Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes, and its’ beginning coincides with a major turn in the Cold War brought about 
by the emergence of the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (Ball (1980)).  
The sensitivity of the alternative model to perturbations in the sample period used 
is also examined for two sub-sample periods that include all three Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes. The next sub-sample period selected is 1950:1 to 1999:2 and the final one is 
1948:3 to 1989:4. In his extensive study of the defense budget for fiscal year 1950 (FY 
1950), Schilling (1962) argues that no defense budget was designed from beginning to 
end through the organizations and institutions set up by the National Security Act of 1947 
until FY 1950, and most decisions with regard to defense purchases were taken on an ad 
hoc basis until then. Therefore, it may beneficial to exclude the first one and a half years 
of data from the sample period used to estimate the alternative model. Furthermore, after 
the fall of the Soviet Empire, the U.S strategic environment, and hence U.S foreign and 
defense policy, dramatically changed. Therefore, it may be beneficial to exclude the data 
for the post-Cold War era, which began in the fall 1989, from the sample period used to 
estimate the alternative model. 
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In the first and second columns of Figure 2.14, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed for a unit shock to defense purchases when the alternative model is estimated 
over the early and late sub-sample periods. The dashed lines display the confidence 
intervals reported for the whole sample period.  
The IRFs for defense purchases and the GDP deflator computed for the early sub-
sample period are marginally different from the ones reported for the whole sample 
period. After several quarters, the IRF for defense purchases lies very slightly above the 
upper bound of the confidence interval from the whole sample period for a year, and then 
it lies within the confidence interval. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies within the 
confidence interval from the whole sample period until the fourth year after a Ramey-
Shapiro episode, and then it lies slightly above the upper bound of the confidence 
interval.  
The IRFs for real GDP and RTB computed for the early sub-sample period are 
significantly and persistently different from the ones reported for the whole sample 
period. Except for two quarters, the IRF for real GDP lies above the upper bound of the 
confidence interval from the whole sample period at all horizons. The IRF for RTB is 
very small. Three quarters after a Ramey-Shapiro episode, it lies below the lower bound 
of the confidence interval from the whole sample period for three years.  
 The IRFs for defense purchases and the GDP deflator computed for the late sub-
sample period are significantly and persistently different from the ones reported for the 
whole sample period. The IRF for defense purchases lies below the lower bound of the 
confidence interval from the whole sample period for two and a half years after a Ramey-
Shapiro episode. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies below the lower bound of the 
confidence interval from the whole sample period for almost two years. 
The IRF for real GDP computed for the late sub-sample period is not significantly 
different from the one reported for the whole sample period. The IRF for RTB is only 
marginally different from the one reported for the whole sample period. The IRF for real 
GDP lies within the confidence interval from the whole sample period at all horizons. 
The IRF for RTB lies very slightly and intermittently above the confidence interval from 
the whole sample period for three years, and then it lies within the confidence interval.  
In the third and fourth columns of Figure 2.14, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed for a unit shock to defense purchases when the alternative model is estimated 
over the sub-sample period from 1950:1 to 1999:2 and the Cold War era. The dashed 
lines display the confidence intervals reported for the whole sample period. The IRFs for 
defense purchases, real GDP, and RTB computed for the sub-sample period from 1950:1 
to 1999:2 and for the Cold War era are not significantly different from the ones reported 
for the whole sample period. They lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from 
the whole sample period at all horizons.  
However, the IRFs for the GDP deflator computed for the sub-sample period from 
1950:1 to 1999:2 and for the Cold War era differ significantly from the IRF reported for 
the whole sample period. A year after the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode, the IRF for 
the GDP deflator computed for the sub-sample period from 1950:1 to 1999:2 begins to lie 
slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the whole sample period. 






































































































































































































































Figure 2.14: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods 
Confidence Intervals from Whole Sample Period 
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computed for the Cold War era lies slightly above the upper bound of the confidence 
interval from the whole sample period. 
The sensitivity of the IRF for the GDP deflator to the subtraction of a small 
number of data at the beginning of the whole sample period may be explained by the 
unusual behavior of the GDP deflator during the period from 1948:3 to 1949:4. It 
increased by more than two percent in 1948:3. Such an increase only took place three 
other times from 1947:2 to 1974:2. Furthermore, it decreased three times consecutively 
from 1949:1 to 1949:3. It represents the only instance of consecutive decreases in the 
GDP deflator in the whole sample period.  
To further examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative model 
to perturbations in the sample period, Figure 2.15 presents the point estimates and 
confidence intervals of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP 
deflator computed for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable when the 
alternative model is estimated over the early and late sub-sample periods. The solid lines 
display the point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the lower and upper 
bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence intervals.  
As the evidence presented in Figure 2.14 implies, the results computed for the early sub-
sample period are very different from the ones reported for the whole sample period. In 
particular, the IRF for real GDP increases significantly at all horizons after a Ramey-
Shapiro episode, compared to two and a half years for the whole sample period. 
Furthermore, the IRF for RTB is not significantly different from zero at any horizon. 
 Except for real GDP, the results computed for the late sub-sample period are 
different from the ones reported for the whole sample period. Specifically, the IRF 
computed for defense purchases increases much more gradually than for the whole 
sample period. The initial drop in RTB is not significantly different from zero. The IRF 
for the GDP deflator increases significantly after a delay of two years, although 
marginally and temporarily.   
Overall, the results computed when the alternative model is estimated over sub-
sample periods that include two Ramey-Shapiro episodes are very different from the ones 
reported for the whole sample period. They imply that the IRFs computed for the 
alternative model are sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used. Except for the 
GDP deflator, the results computed when the alternative model is estimated over sub-
sample periods that include all three Ramey-Shapiro episodes are similar to the ones 
reported for the whole sample period. They imply that the IRFs computed for the 
alternative model are not very sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used. 
The result computed for the alternative model may be expected to be sensitive to 
the exclusion of any episode from the sample period used since Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997) identify only three exogenous shocks to defense purchases. Furthermore, the 
results computed for the early and late sub-sample periods may differ because, as 
Blanchard and Perotti (1999) argue, “…The 1950s, with their large spending and tax 
shocks, do not appear generated by the same stochastic process as the post-1959 data” 
(Blanchard and Perotti 1999, p. 19). 
2.8 Accounting for the Differences Among the Ramey-Shapiro Episodes 
Following Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999), the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable has an identical value of one at the onsets of 
























































































































Figure 2.15: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Sample Periods 
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mentioned before, the increases in defense purchases and government purchases that 
follow the Ramey-Shapiro episodes differ greatly in size and shape. In particular, the 
Korean War build-up is much larger than the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan build-ups.  
To account for the differences in the size of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, 
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2000) construct a dummy variable that has the value 
one at the date of the Korean War episode, and the values 0.20 and 0.38 at the dates of 
the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes, respectively. They indicate that the values 
of the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes are proportional to the relative 
intensities of these episodes; however, they do not explain specifically why the values 
0.20 and 0.38 are selected.  
Furthermore, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2000) limit their analysis to the 
effects of Ramey-Shapiro episodes on fiscal and labor market variables, and they do not 
discuss the implications of using identical or different values for the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes. Therefore, it is of interest to examine the results reported for the alternative 
model when the values of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes differ according to the size of the 
military build-ups that follow them. 
 Following Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2000), an alternative Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable is constructed that has the value one at the date of the Korean 
War episode. Then, the values of the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes are 
assigned according to the maximum increase in defense purchases within six quarters 
after the onsets of these episodes relative to the maximum increase after the onset of the 
Korean War episode.17 The Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes have the values 
0.26 and 0.12, respectively. 
Finally, a system identical to the alternative model except that it includes the 
modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is estimated, and the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to the 
modified dummy variable. While the IRFs computed using the modified dummy variable 
reflect the differences in size among the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, it should be noted that 
the dynamics effects of the episodes on the variables under consideration are assumed to 
be identical, up to a scale factor.  
In the first column of Figure 2.16, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs computed for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator using the 
modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. The dashed lines display the lower and upper 
bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence intervals. Except for RTB, the patterns of the 
IRFs computed for a shock to the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are similar 
to the ones reported for the alternative model; however, their magnitudes are very 
different. The peak effects computed for defense purchases and the GDP deflator using 
the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are more than twice as large as the ones 
reported for the alternative model.  
The IRF for RTB computed for the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable 
declines significantly for almost three quarters after a Ramey-Shapiro episode, and then it 
is not significant from zero. It is inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical  
 
                                                           
17 The maximum increases in defense purchases within six quarters after each Ramey-Shapiro episode are 
considered because six lagged values of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are included in the alternative 






























































































































Figure 2.16: Point estimates from Models with Different Values for Each Ramey-
Shapiro Episode 
Modified Ramey-Shapiro Dummy Variable and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s 
Dummy Variable 
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models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models.  
 Since the values of the episodes selected for the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable described above differ substantially from the values selected by Burnside, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2000), it is of interest to examine whether the results reported 
for the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are sensitive by substituting the values 
of the episodes selected by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2000) for the values 
selected above.  
Therefore, an alternative dummy variable is constructed that has the values 
selected by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2000) for the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. It 
is hereafter referred to as the Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s dummy variable. Then, 
a system identical to the alternative model except that it includes the Burnside, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s dummy variable is estimated, and the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to the 
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s dummy variable.  
In the second column of Figure 2.16, the solid lines display the point estimates of 
the IRFs computed for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator using 
the Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s dummy variable. The dashed lines display the 
lower and upper bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence intervals. The IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, and the GDP deflator are generally similar to the ones reported for 
the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
The IRF for RTB computed for the Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s dummy 
variable declines significantly for more than two quarters after the onset of a Ramey-
Shapiro episode. Then, unlike the IRF for RTB computed for the modified Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable, it is positive. However, it does not increase significantly at any 
horizon, although it is close to being significant. 
Overall, since the increases in defense purchases and government purchases that 
follow the Ramey-Shapiro episodes differ, it could be argued that it is better to estimate a 
VAR system in which the assumption that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are of equal 
intensity is abandoned. However, the IRFs computed when the modified Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable or Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher’s dummy variable is included in 
the alternative model are troublesome, in particular the IRF for RTB.   
2.9 The Exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro Episodes 
In order to investigate the macroeconomic effects of government purchases, 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) focus on military build-ups because they are unlikely to be the 
result of feedback from the domestic economy. Similarly, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and 
Fisher (1999) claim that the narrative approach is superior to VAR-based identification 
schemes because the Ramey-Shapiro episodes represent truly exogenous shocks to 
defense purchases.  
 Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) provide evidence that the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes are special relative to other dates in their sample period. More 
specifically, they show that IRFs computed using the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are 
significantly different from IRFs computed using randomly selected episodes.  
They conclude, “In our view what is special is that [the military build-ups] coincide with 
the onset of exogenous increases in government purchases” (Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and 
Fisher 1999, p. 17). 
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Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) examine the IRFs reported for the 
following variables: real GDP, residential investment, non-residential investment, after- 
tax manufacturing wages, residential investment plus consumption of durables, and 
residential investment minus residential investment. To determine if the IRFs computed 
for these variables using the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are significantly different from the 
corresponding IRFs computed using randomly selected episodes, they randomly select 
three dates from their sample period, and construct a synthetic dummy variable that has 
the value one at the dates randomly selected and zero otherwise.  
Then, they estimate their benchmark model or an extended model in which the 
synthetic dummy variable is substituted for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. Finally, 
they compute IRFs that present the responses of the variables under investigation to a unit 
shock to the synthetic dummy variable relative to the response of government 
purchases.18 
For each variable under investigation, this procedure is repeated 500 times, and 
the 25th lowest and 475th highest values of the point estimates across the 500 IRFs are 
used to compute a synthetic confidence interval. If there is nothing special about the dates 
selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997), the IRFs computed for the variables under 
investigation using the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable ought to lie within the 
corresponding synthetic intervals.  
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) report that the IRF for non-residential 
investment lies within its synthetic interval after a delay of less than two quarters; 
however, all the other IRFs computed using the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are significantly 
and persistently different from the IRFs computed using randomly selected episodes. 
Therefore, they argue that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are special relative to other dates 
in their sample period and coincide with exogenous increases in government purchases. 
Leeper (1997), who presents a thorough study of the exogeneity of the Romers’ 
monetary policy dummy variable, argues that it is necessary to measure the feedback 
from the domestic economy to the dummy variable in order to determine if the shocks 
identified by Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) are exogenous. Similarly, it is useful to 
measure the feedback from the domestic economy to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable 
in order to determine if the shocks identified by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) are 
exogenous. 
The methodology presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) does not 
allow them to measure the feedback from the domestic economy to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable, and the evidence they present does not necessarily imply that the 
Ramey-Shapiro episodes are exogenous. In fact, even though the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes are special relative to other randomly selected dates, they may coincide, at least 
partially, with endogenous increases in defense and government purchases. 
In this section, the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes is investigated 
following the methodology used by Leeper (1997) to study the exogeneity of the Romers’ 
monetary policy dummy variable. First, a logit equation is estimated for the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable that includes macroeconomic variables. Then, the probability 
that the logit equation has the value one at the dates selected by Ramey and Shapiro 
                                                           
18 Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) focus on the responses of different variables relative to the response 
of government purchases “ to emphasize the conditional comovements with government purchases that are 
induced by the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode” (Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), p. 16). 
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(1997), i.e. the conditional expectations for the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, are computed. 
If the episodes are truly exogenous, they should not be predicted by macroeconomic 
variables, and their conditional expectations ought to be low.  
 Second, two VAR systems are estimated in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable is entered as an endogenous variable along with defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator. Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy episode. If 
the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are exogenous, the IRFs computed when the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable is entered as an endogenous variable or an exogenous variable ought to 
be similar.  
2.9.1 Logit Equations  
To examine the exogeneity of the monetary policy shocks identified by Romer 
and Romer (1989, 1994), Leeper (1997) estimates a logit equation for the Romers’ 
monetary dummy variable, which allows him to measure the feedback from the economy 
to the shocks. Similarly, a logit equation is estimated for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable and the conditional expectations for the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are computed. 
If xt represents the list of independent variables included in the logit equation 
estimated, the expectation for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable (dt) conditional on the 
information set Ωt is given by  
E(dt/Ωt) = F(al,β(L)xt) 
Where F(.) is specialized to be the logistic function, β(L)=β1L+…+βmLm, and al 
includes  a constant and a “Perron-type” time trend.19 xt includes real GDP, RTB, and the 
GDP deflator. Four lagged values of the independent variables are included in the 
equation, i.e., m is equal to four, because the coefficients estimated do not converge when 
more than four lagged values are included.20 The equation is estimated from 1948:1 to 
1999:2 using a non-linear maximum likelihood method. Data from 1947:1 to 1947:4 are 
used as pre-sample data. Table 2.6 reports the coefficients computed when the logit 
equation described above is estimated.  
None of the individual coefficients is significant at even the ten percent level of 
significance. Furthermore, when a Wald test statistic is computed to test the overall 
significance of the independent variables included in the equation estimated, the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the parameters in β(L) are equal to zero cannot be 
rejected at the ten percent level of significance. 
Since the logit equation estimated appears very imprecisely estimated, and the 
uncertainty about the values of the parameters in β(L) carry out to the conditional 
expectations, the logit equation is not expected to provide meaningful evidence on the 
exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes.  
 
                                                           
19 Whether a “Perron-type” time trend is included or not, the conditional expectation computed for the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes are very similar. 
20 Since lagged values of the variables are included in the alternative model, it may have been preferable to 
include six lagged values of the independent variables in the logit equation. However, the coefficients computed 
do not converge when six lagged values of the variables are included. Similarly, Leeper (1997) includes eighteen 
lags of the endogenous variables when he estimates monthly VAR systems; however, he includes only six lags of 
the independent variables when he estimates his logit equation. He does not explain why only six lags are used 
for the logit equation.  
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Table 2.6: Estimation Results from First Logit Equation (1948:1-1999:2)  
Variables Estimate Standard Error 
Constant -177.47 322.86 
Trend 1 -0.05 0.45 
Trend 2 -0.17 0.26 
RGDP{1} -60.58 102.67 
RGDP{2} -208.80 182.83 
RGDP{3}  -255.38 171.40 







GDP deflator{3} 320.85 561.64 
GDP deflator{4} -30.12 239.18 
RTB{1} 3.88 3.25 
RTB{2} -3.85 4.40 
RTB{3} 2.28 3.37 
RTB{4} -1.76 2.08 
 
The conditional expectations for the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 
Carter-Reagan episodes are 65.65 percent, 2.21 percent, and 8.62 percent, respectively. 
The result for the Korean War episode is puzzling. It implies that the outbreak of the 
Korean War, which is widely believed to have been unexpected and sudden (Stoessinger 
(1998)), was predicted by recent developments in the U.S economy. 
The logit equation estimated appears very imprecisely estimated and yields 
troublesome results; and therefore, a second logit equation is estimated for the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable in which defense purchases is added to the list of independent 
variables. This equation includes only two lagged values of the independent variables 
because the coefficients estimated do not converge when more than two lagged values are 
included. 
Table 2.7 reports the coefficients computed when the second logit equation is 
estimated. Overall, this equation also appears very imprecisely estimated. None of the 
individual coefficients is significant at even the ten percent level of significance. 
Furthermore, when a Wald test statistic is computed, the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the parameters in β(L) are equal to zero cannot be rejected at the ten 
percent level of significance. 
The conditional expectations for the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 
Carter-Reagan episodes reported for the second equation are 32.03 percent, 2.53 percent, 
and 9.80 percent, respectively. Although the conditional expectation reported for the 
Korean War episode is lower than the one reported for the previous logit equation 
previously estimated, it remains difficult to interpret.  
Other logit equations were also estimated for the Ramey-Shapiro in which the list 
of variables includes many different macroeconomic variables. In each case, the equation 
is very imprecisely estimated and the conditional expectation reported for the Korean 
War is puzzling. Therefore, it is concluded that estimating a logit equation does not 
provide meaningful evidence on the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes.   
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Table 2.7: Estimation Results from Second Logit Equation (1948:1-1999:2) 
Variables Estimate Standard Error 
Constant -63.11 363.45 
Trend 1 0.22 0.64 
Trend 2 0.19 0.24 
RGDP{1} -9.14 67.45 
RGDP{2} 15.78 52.02 
Defense{1}  1.52 24.52 
Defense{2} -14.14 29.22 
GDP Deflator{1} -129.10 137.61 
GDP Deflator{2} 88.91 138.44 
RTB{1} 2.17 1.37 
RTB{2} -0.95 0.93 
 
2.9.2 Linear Systems  
 To further investigate the exogeneity of the Romers’ monetary policy dummy 
variable, Leeper (1997) estimates a VAR system in which the dummy variable is entered 
as an endogenous variable. He argues, 
“If the Romers’ narrative approach has successfully separated endogenous policy 
responses from exogenous contractionary policy disturbances, then their results 
ought to be robust to embedding the dummy variable in a more general macro 
model that includes a behavioral equation for policy, which determines the 
dummy” (Leeper 1997, p.  2). 
Similarly, two VAR systems are estimated in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable is entered as an endogenous variable. These systems are identical to the 
alternative model except that in these models the dummy variable is not exogenous. They 
are hereafter referred to as the linear systems.  
The linear systems include defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, the GDP deflator, 
and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. Like the other equations in the linear systems, 
the equation for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable includes six lagged values of itself, 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator, plus a constant and a “Perron-
type” time trend. The linear systems are estimated using OLS, and the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator that present the effects of a unit shock 
to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are computed. If the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are 
truly exogenous, the IRFs computed for the linear systems and the alternative model 
should be similar. 
The Choleski decomposition is used to identify the shocks to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. For the first linear system, the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is 
ordered first, defense purchases are ordered second, real GDP is ordered third, RTB is 
ordered fourth, and the GDP deflator is ordered last. It is assumed that shocks to the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable may have a contemporaneous effect on the other 
variables included in the system; however, shocks to the other variables are constrained 
not to have a contemporaneous effect on the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. This is 
consistent with the view that the onsets the military build-ups identified by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) are independent from current macroeconomic conditions. 
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For the second linear system, real GDP is ordered first, RTB is ordered second, 
the GDP deflator is ordered third, the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is ordered fourth, 
and defense purchases are ordered last. It is assumed that shocks to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable may be contemporaneously affected by shocks to real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator. Furthermore, it is assumed that shocks to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable do not have a contemporaneous effect on real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator; 
however, they may have a contemporaneous effect on defense purchases.  
The assumptions underlying the second linear system may be difficult to justify. 
In particular, the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are likely to have a contemporaneous affect on 
macroeconomic variables. However, if the episodes are truly exogenous, the IRFs 
computed for the VAR systems in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is entered 
as an endogenous variable should not be sensitive to the ordering of the residuals in the 
Choleski decomposition used to identify shocks to the dummy variable.  
In Figure 2.17, the short dashed lines display the IRFs for defense purchases, real 
GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable when the first linear system is estimated. The long dashed lines display 
the IRFs computed when the second linear system is estimated. The solid lines display 
the confidence intervals reported for the alternative model. If the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes are truly exogenous, the IRFs computed for the linear systems ought to lie 
within corresponding confidence interval reported for the alternative model.  
All the IRFs computed for the first linear systems lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. Furthermore, they exhibit 
patterns very similar to the IRFs reported for the alternative model. After a delay of a 
year, the IRF for defense purchases computed for the second linear system lies slightly 
below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model for a year.  
The IRF for real GDP lies slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval from 
the alternative model for less than a year after a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable. The IRF for RTB lies within the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
alternative model at all horizons. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies slightly below the 
lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model for two and a half 
years after a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. Moreover, the patterns of the 
IRFs computed for the second linear system are similar to the ones reported for the 
alternative model, and except for the GDP deflator, the point estimates of the IRFs 
computed for the second linear system are close to the corresponding point estimates 
reported for first linear system. 
Overall, the IRFs reported for the linear systems are consistent with the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes being exogenous; however, they do not represent definitive evidence on 
the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. Indeed, if the bias introduced by failing to 
model the endogeneity of the episodes in the alternative model is small, the IRFs 
computed for the linear models would appear similar to the IRFs reported for the 
alternative model even though the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are endogenous.  
Furthermore, Leeper (1997) points out three additional potential problems with 
regard to the VAR system he estimates, which also apply to the VAR systems in which 
the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is endogenous. First, the predicted values for the 
Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable may lie outside the [0,1] interval. Second, the 
linear equation for the dummy variable does not respect the dichotomous nature of the  
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dummy. Finally, the relations between the dummy variable and the other variables 
included in the system may not be linear. 
To address these potential problems with regard to the Romers’ monetary policy 
variable, Leeper (1997) examines the sensitivity of the results reported for the linear 
system he estimates by substituting a logit equation for the linear equation for the 
Romers’ monetary policy variable. If the potential problems mentioned above do not 
significantly affect the results reported for the linear system, the responses computed for 
the VAR system and the non-linear system should be similar. 
To examine the first potential problem mentioned above with regard to the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, the predicted values for the dummy variable are 
computed when the two linear systems that include the Ramey-Shapiro dummy as an 
endogenous variable are estimated. For both linear systems, the predicted values lie 
within the [0,1] interval. 
Furthermore, it would be of interest to investigate the sensitivity of the results 
reported for the linear systems in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is included 
by substituting a logit equation for the linear equation for the dummy variable. However, 
as the statistical evidence reported earlier in this section indicated, logit equations for the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are very imprecisely estimated. Therefore, it would be 
difficult to make any meaningful inference from the estimation of a non-linear system in 
which a logit equation for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is included, and the 
responses computed for non-linear models are not presented in this chapter.    
In conclusion, following a methodology implemented by Leeper (1997) to 
examine the exogeneity of the Romers’ monetary dummy variable, this section provides 
mixed evidence on the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. The logit 
equations estimated for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are very imprecisely 
estimated, and the conditional expectation computed for the Korean War episode is 
puzzling. Therefore, it is concluded that the logit equations do not yield meaningful 
evidence on the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
However, when linear systems are estimated in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable is entered as an endogenous variable, the IRFs reported are consistent with the 
Ramey-Shapiro episodes being exogenous. These results should be regarded as only 
suggestive since there are potentially serious econometric problems when an equation 
with a dichotomous dependent variable is estimated using OLS. Furthermore, due to the 
lack of significance of the logit equations estimated for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable, the sensitivity of the results reported for the linear systems by substituting a 
logit equation for the linear equation for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is not 
presented.  
2.10 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter provides evidence on the implications of using the narrative 
approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for estimating the macroeconomic effects of 
exogenous shocks to government purchases. It focuses on two VAR systems in the spirit 
of Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999).  
The benchmark model includes the contemporaneous and four lagged values of 
the Ramey-Shapiro dummy that are entered as exogenous variables as well as four lagged 
values of defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator that are entered as 
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endogenous variables. The alternative model, which is selected according to the AIC 
criterion, includes six lagged values of the variables and a “Perron-type” time trend.  
The IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable on defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for 
the benchmark and alternative models. The IRFs reported for the benchmark model imply 
that defense purchases increase very persistently in response to a shock to the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable, output rises temporarily, the price level rises persistently, and 
interest rates initially fall and then they rise significantly. The IRFs reported for the 
alternative model are similar in pattern to the ones reported for the benchmark model; 
however, they are quantitatively different, especially for defense purchases and RTB. 
This chapter has also presented evidence on the robustness of the results reported 
using the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, which is a particularly important issue since 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) only identify three exogenous shocks to government 
purchases. First, the sensitivity of the results computed for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator to adding time trends and changing the lag length used in the 
benchmark model is examined. It is shown that the results reported for the benchmark 
model are not sensitive to adding time trends. However, the results reported for RTB, and 
to a lesser extent, defense purchases and real GDP appear sensitive to changing the lag 
length used.  
Then, the sensitivity of the results computed for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator to perturbations in the list of variables included in the 
alternative model is examined. Seventeen endogenous and exogenous variables are 
added, in turn, to the alternative model and the IRFs computed for the extended models 
and the alternative model are compared. It is concluded that, except for Hamilton’s oil 
price dummy variable, the results reported for the alternative model are generally robust 
to perturbations in the list of variables used. 
As was mentioned in the introduction, Perotti (2000) argues that the evidence 
reported using the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable may reflect not only the effects of 
exogenous increases in government purchases, but also the effects of other major macro-
economic shocks that took place in the post-World War II era. Therefore, it is particularly 
interesting to examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative model to 
adding the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable or Hamilton’s oil price dummy 
variable.   
The evidence presented for the extended model with the Romers’ monetary policy 
dummy variable indicates that the results reported for the alternative model are not 
significantly affected by the addition of major monetary policy shocks in the model. 
However, the evidence presented for the extended model with Hamilton’s oil price policy 
dummy variable reveals that the results reported for the alternative model are 
significantly affected by the addition of a variable designed to proxy for major supply 
shocks to the model.  
Furthermore, the IRFs reported when alternative fiscal variables and the monetary 
base are added, in turn, to the alternative model indicate that the Ramey-Shapiro build-
ups do not coincide with significant and persistent changes in non-defense purchases and 
the monetary base. Therefore, it is concluded that the results reported using the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable do not appear to reflect the effects of systematic changes in 
 65
other components of government purchases than defense purchases or monetary policy; 
however, they may reflect, at least partially, the effects of major supply shocks.       
Finally, the sensitivity of the results computed for the alternative model to 
perturbations in the sample period used is examined. The results computed for sub-
sample periods in which two Ramey-Shapiro episodes are included differ significantly 
from the results reported for the whole sample period. Except for the GDP deflator, the 
results computed for sub-sample periods in which all three Ramey-Shapiro episodes are 
included do not differ significantly from the results reported the whole sample period.  
In addition to presenting evidence on the robustness of the results computed for 
the benchmark and alternative models, this chapter investigates the implications of 
abandoning the assumption that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are of equal intensity. 
Furthermore, it examines the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes.  
To account for the differences in size among the Ramey-Shapiro build-ups, a 
modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable whose values at the dates of the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes vary according to the size of the military build-ups that follows them. 
Then, a system identical to the alternative model except that it includes the modified 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is estimated.  
Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are 
computed for a unit shock to the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. The IRF for 
RTB is inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the 
more traditional theoretical IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. 
To examine the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, a methodology used 
by Leeper (1997) to study the exogeneity of the Romers’ monetary policy dummy 
variable is implemented. First, a logit equation that includes macroeconomic variable is 
estimated for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, and the conditional expectations for 
the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are computed.  
The logit equation is very imprecisely estimated. Moreover, the result reported for 
the Korean War episode, which implies that the outbreak of the Korean War was 
predicted by recent developments in the U.S economy, is puzzling. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the logit equation does not appear to provide meaningful evidence on the 
exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. An alternative logit equation is also 
estimated; it yields the same conclusion. 
Second, two linear systems are estimated in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable is entered as an endogenous variable along with defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator. Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable within these 
linear systems are computed. They are generally similar to the ones reported for the 
alternative model; and therefore, it is concluded that the results reported for the linear 
systems are consistent with the Ramey-Shapiro episodes being exogenous.  
Two notable issues related to the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) 
have been left out of this chapter. First, the uncertainty about the actual dates of the 
Ramey-Shapiro episodes is not examined. Second, the implications of including military 
retrenchments and military build-ups for estimating the effects of shocks to government 
purchases is not investigated. These two issues are addressed in the next chapter using a 
more comprehensive narrative approach than Ramey and Shapiro (1997) that tries to 
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isolate exogenous reductions in defense purchases as well as exogenous increases in 
defense purchases. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE NARRATIVE APPROACH REVISITED            
3.1 Introduction 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) present the first and only study in which a narrative 
approach is used to identify exogenous shocks to government purchases. As was 
mentioned in the previous chapter of the dissertation, they identify the onsets of 
exogenous increases in defense purchase s during the post-World War II era. They argue 
that military build-ups are driven by “geo-political shocks” and “imperatives of foreign 
policy“ (Ramey and Shapiro 1997, p. 39); and therefore, military build-ups are truly 
exogenous. They do not consider military retrenchments because “[the] builddowns were 
much more gradual than the build-ups” (Ramey and Shapiro 1997, fn. 14, P. 39).  
The Ramey-Shapiro episodes correspond to the onsets of the Korean War, the 
Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan military build-ups. They are dated as beginning in 
the third quarter of 1950, the first quarter of 1965, and the first quarter of 1980, 
respectively. Ramey and Shapiro (1997) provide a brief explanation of the methodology 
they use to select the dates for the episodes. 
They indicate, “We use information from historical accounts, which give exact 
dates of events, and Business Week, which discusses relevant economic details of the 
events” (Ramey and Shapiro 1997, p. 40). Furthermore, they read “narratives around the 
time of the events” that provide information on the expectations of economic agents, 
which are critical to examine whether the episodes were unanticipated.    
More specifically, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) try to isolate the dates at which key 
events took place that led to significant and persistent changes in U.S foreign policy and 
defense purchases. All the events they mention are actions by foreign nations. The chain 
of events leading to the Korean War build-up is fairly simple, which makes it easy to 
isolate the date of the onset this episode. However, the chronology and the nature of the 
events leading to the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan build-ups are more complex, and it 
is more difficult to isolate the dates of the onsets of these episodes. 
The Ramey-Shapiro episodes have been used in several studies to provide 
evidence on the implications of the narrative approach for estimating the effects of fiscal 
policy (Ramey and Shapiro (1997), Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998), Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999)). However, there exist several potential problems with the 
narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) that have not been addressed yet.  
First, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) discuss only the build-ups they include in their 
measure of exogenous shocks to government purchases. They do not explain for instance 
why the Kennedy military build-up is not included, although its similarities to the Carter-
Reagan build-up have been often emphasized (U.S Defense Policy (1983), Kaufmann 
(1985), Cimbala (1986), Korb and Dagget (1988)).  
Second, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) identify only three exogenous shocks to 
government purchases. It is shown later in this chapter that the major military 
retrenchments that follow the major military build-ups in the post-World War II era are 
not much more gradual than the build-ups. Furthermore, there is no theoretical reason to 
expect that military retrenchments have different effects on the economy than military 
build-ups. Therefore, it is interesting to use a narrative approach to construct a measure of 
exogenous shocks to government purchases that includes military build-ups and military 
retrenchments. 
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Third, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) fail to recognize that the defense policy process 
is driven by imperatives of domestic policy as well as foreign policy. As Garnett (1997) 
argues, “It is not that the international situation is irrelevant; but internal factors are at 
least as important… Any adequate explanation of defense policy must take this into 
account” (Garnett 1987, p. 25). Therefore, it is interesting to re-examine the dates 
selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997). 
The first objective of this chapter is to introduce a more comprehensive narrative 
approach than the one of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) that tries to isolate exogenous 
reductions as well as exogenous increases in defense purchases. A second objective is to 
reproduce the study of the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) presented in 
the previous chapter for the more comprehensive narrative approach.  
The plan of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 briefly 
explains the narrative approach used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases 
in this chapter. It also presents evidence to support the dates selected for the onsets of the 
shocks. Finally, it provides a brief discussion of the shocks identified. Section 3.3 
examines the sensitivity of the results reported in the previous chapter to small 
perturbations in the dates of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. 
Section 3.4 presents the impulse response functions (IRFs) computed for the 
benchmark model introduced in the previous chapter of the dissertation when a defense 
purchases dummy variable is constructed using the narrative approach introduced in this 
chapter. Section 3.5 discusses the robustness of the results computed for the benchmark 
model to adding a time trend and changing the lag length used. Section 3.6 presents the 
results computed for the alternative model introduced in the previous chapter of the 
dissertation.  
Sections 3.7 and 3.8 discuss the robustness of the results computed for the 
alternative model to perturbations in the list of variables and the sample period used, 
respectively. Section 3.9 presents the results computed for a model in which the 
assumption that the shocks identified are of equal intensity is abandoned. Section 3.10 
presents evidence on the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. Finally, 
Section 3.11 provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
3.2 Defense Purchases Shocks in the United States from 1947 to 1999 
3.2.1 Methodology 
As is often done in the foreign and defense policy literature, Huntington (1981) 
describes the evolution of U.S. defense expenditures in the post-World war II era as a 
succession of “strategy-budget” cycles.1 According to Cimbala (1986), each cycle is 
characterized by five phases, which can be summarized as follows: 
1) Developing new strategic concepts and approaches (an upside strategy), in 
response to new perceptions of threat and needs; 
2) Triggering one or more events to create public support for, and apolitical 
environment favorable to, a larger defense effort; 
3) Initiating a defense build-up to reflect the concepts and priorities of the new 
strategy; 
4) Increasing concern about the impact of defense build-up on other social needs, 
followed by a leveling off and decline in the defense effort; and 
                                                           
1 See Ball (1980), Bobbit (1986), Cimbala (1986), Kaufmann (1990), and Williams (1987). 
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5) Formulating new strategic concepts (a downside strategy) appropriate for a 
reduced military effort (Cimbala 1986, p. 7). 
Within this framework, to select the dates of the onsets of exogenous shocks to 
defense purchases consists in identifying the dates that correspond to the beginnings of 
the third and fifth phases of the “strategy-budget” cycles in the post-World War II era. 
This is done through an examination of historical accounts that present the sequences of 
events driving the “strategy-budget” cycles and a systematic analysis of contemporaneous 
evidence.  
A key issue in selecting the dates of the exogenous shocks to defense purchases 
using a narrative approach is to find the dates at which the decisions to implement 
changes in defense purchases were taken and announced. Those dates do not necessarily 
correspond to the dates at which defense purchases actually began to change. 
Furthermore, it is possible that historical accounts presented in the foreign and defense 
policy literature are biased by the knowledge of the subsequent behavior of defense 
purchases.  
Therefore, it is important to use not only historical accounts but also 
contemporaneous evidence to identify the dates of the shocks to defense purchases. The 
contemporaneous evidence presented hereafter consists of excerpts from U.S. News and 
World Report. This particular weekly magazine was chosen because it has regularly 
featured articles on defense policy and defense spending. Furthermore, until the mid-
1980s, it featured a weekly newsletter entitled Tomorrow that presented forecasts on 
developing economic and political situations in the United States and abroad.  
3.2.2 March 1948: The March Crisis Build-up 
The first shock identify using the methodology described above marked the 
beginning of the Cold War and took place during the March Crisis of 1948. The events 
leading to this shock are presented by Shilling (1962), who provides an analysis of the 
events and developments that influenced U.S. foreign and defense policy from 1947 to 
1950 in The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950. 
3.2.2.1 Historical Account 
In the years following the end of World War II, U.S. foreign policy was greatly 
influenced by the strategic ideas of Defense Secretary James Forrestal, which are often 
referred to as “Forrestal’s strategy”. It emphasized the need for the United States to 
support the reconstruction of the Western European nations in order to restore the 
European balance of power.  
In the short run, “Forrestal’s strategy” implied a calculated risk for the United 
States. Even though the possibility of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union 
existed, U.S. defense spending was to be kept low in order to finance the economic and 
military recovery of Western Europe. At the beginning of 1948, it became increasingly 
apparent that the risks implied by “Forrestal’s strategy” were unacceptably high as the 
Communists tightened their grip over Eastern Europe.  
 By March 1948, Czechoslovakia had fallen to a Communist coup, and the risk of 
war with Soviet Union had unexpectedly and dramatically increased. Furthermore, a 
Communist victory in China appeared inevitable. As a result of these developments, there 
was a clear sense of emergency among policy-makers. On March 17, President Truman 
went before Congress to recommend the re-enactment of the draft and request universal 
military training.  
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The next day, Defense Secretary Forrestal presented to Congress a $3-billion 
supplementary budget bill to be added to the budget for fiscal year 1949 (FY 1949), 
which was to begin on July 1, 1948. After negotiations, the Truman administration, 
Congress, and the armed forces agreed on a $3.1-billion supplementary budget bill, 
which was presented to and approved by Congress in June 1948.  
The bill represented an addition of more than 30 percent to the original $10 billion 
defense budget for FY 1949 presented to Congress in January 1948. According to the 
figures from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments2 (CSBA), actual 
defense outlays in current dollars, which are hereafter referred to as actual defense 
outlays, increased from $9.1 billion in FY 1948 to $13.2 billion in FY 1949. They added 
to $13.7 billion in FY 1950, which ended four days before the onset of the Korean War.  
However, the evolution of defense purchases measured in billions of chained 
(1992) dollars, which are hereafter referred to as real defense purchases, implies that took 
place in March 1948 was much more modest that actual defense outlays suggest. Real 
defense purchases were $136.9 billion in 1948:2. They rise to $146.4 in 1949:2, but then 
they decline to $130.6 and $131.1 billion in 1950:1 and 1950:2, respectively.  
3.2.2.2 U.S. News and World Report 
In the newsletter Tomorrow published on March 12, 1948, a future increase in 
defense purchase s is mentioned for the first time. It is stated, “As a result of what’s 
happening in the world right now… dollar needs of military services are being revised 
upward.”   
On March 19, after President Truman’s address to Congress, an imminent and 
significant increase in defense expenditures—$ 4 billion—is reported. It is argued,  
“Under plans that U.S. is getting set, even now, to carry out: military services will 
get more money, maybe a good deal more. Air Force, in particular will be build-
up. Aviation industry will be assured of big new orders… It is possible that 
military costs will approach $15, 000, 000, 000 a year in the period ahead, instead 
of the $11, 000, 000, 000 officially budgeted. The situation is changing and 
Congress is more interested in defense.” (Italics mine). 
 The following week, an increase in military expenditures of an even larger 
magnitude is anticipated in the newsletter Tomorrow. It is stated,  
“These things are clear:… Rearmament, partial mobilization are being forced on 
U.S.… Armament costs, in any event, are due to skyrocket in the year ahead. 
Arms outlay, military spending, is scheduled at an $11, 000, 000, 000 rate. 
Spending to meet plans as now shaping will rise above $16, 000, 000, 000.” 
(Italics mine). 
On April 2, 1948, it is stated, “The developing situation shows this: military 
spending is to be raised at least $3, 000, 000, 000. That’s before any promised land-lease 
aid to Europe, before any expanded stockpiling”. On April 9, it is argued, “Armament 
spending on an expanding scale is coming, definitely.” Finally, in the newsletter 
Tomorrow published on April 16, 1948, the administration plans are announced. It is 
projected, “Rearmament will add $3, 375, 000, 000 to planned arms spending. That is the 
minimum addition of dollars spent or orders actually to be placed.” 
                                                           
2 The figures from CSBA presented for actual defense outlays and real defense purchases in this chapter are 
available online at http://www.csbaonline.org. 
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3.2.3 July 1950: The Korean War Episode 
Hammond (1962) provides an analysis of the events and developments that led to 
the U.S. rearmament taking place in the early 1950s in NSC-68: Prologue to 
Rearmament. Like Ramey and Shapiro (1997), he identifies the beginning of the Korean 
War in June 26, 1950 as the key event that led to the Korean War military build-up. 
Since the Korean War broke out only a few days before the end of June and the 
decision to commit U.S. troops in South Korea was not taken until the last day of June, 
the shock to defense purchase s is dated as beginning in July 1950. As a result, using 
quarterly data, the shock to defense purchase s would be dated as beginning in third 
quarter of 1950.3 
3.2.3.1 Historical Account 
In the days before the invasion of South Korea in June 26, 1950, the defense 
budget for FY 1951, which was to begin on July 1, was expected to remain under $14 
billion. In fact, the House of Representatives had just passed a bill that set defense 
expenditures to $13.8 billion. Four days after the invasion of South Korea, American 
troops were committed to the Korean peninsula, and it was widely believed at the time 
that President Truman would request a supplement of $5 billion to be added to the 
defense budget for FY 1951.  
In fact, between July 1950 and January 1951 the defense budget for FY 1951 
increased by more than $30 billion, most of which was added to the existing defense 
budget through two supplementary budget bills. Congress approved a first bill for a 
supplement of $10 billion in September 1950. It approved a second bill for nearly $17 
billion in January 1951.  
As Hammond (1962) emphasizes, the first supplement represented a “stopgap 
measure” that “would merely get things going while longer run requirements were being 
estimated” (Hammond 1962, p. 353). In contrast, the second supplement represented, 
“An attempt to schedule for the long pull and to keep the immediate imperatives 
of Korea properly placed in a larger strategic picture. Of the nearly $17 billion 
requested, $9 billion would be for major procurement items. Part of the latter sum 
would be for material expended in Korea, but much of it would be for general 
rearmament” (Hammond 1962, p. 356). 
According to the figures from CSBA, actual defense outlays increased less in FY 
1951 than projected in the defense budget; however, they increased dramatically 
relatively to the previous fiscal year. Actual outlays added to $23.6 billion in FY 1951 
compared to $13.7 billion in FY 1950. Then, they added to $46.1 billion in FY 1952 and 
$52.8 billion in FY 1953. The rise in real defense purchases is much sharper than the 
increase for actual defense outlays. Real defense purchases were $131.1 in 1950:2. They 
rose to $296.6 billion in 1950:3, and more than $382 billion in 1953:2. 
3.2.3.2 U.S. News and World Report 
 After President Truman announced the engagement of American forces in South 
Korea, it is stated in the newsletter Tomorrow published on July 7, 1950, “War in Korea, 
if contained, will be irritating but not very costly… Defense without war is costing 13.5 
                                                           
3 Stoessinger (1998) presents a detailed chronology of the decisions taken in the days after the invasion of 
South Korea. As Hammond (1962), he argues that the decision to commit U.S. troops in South Korea was 
taken on June 30, 1950 (see Stoessinger 1998, pp. 54-65). 
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billion dollars a year. War of the limited type is expected to add about 2 billions to that 
total, not much more.”  
The following week, a different outlook for the future is given. It is argued,  
“These things seem to be reasonably clear:… Cost of little war, any war, will be 
substantial. War cost of at least 3 to 4 billions additional is likely as a result of the 
war in Korea…. Military orders, rather small recently, will enter a sharp rise… 
Costs for the smallest kind of war run high.” 
  
In the newsletter Tomorrow published on July 21, a yearly increase in defense 
expenditures of more than $10 billion is anticipated in the future. It is stated, “Defense, 
permanently, will cost 25 to 30 billions a year, with no big war…. Arms, weapons output 
will skyrocket.” On July 28, it is projected, 
“Whatever happens, whether ‘peace’ returns or not: Military spending for U.S. 
defense will not drop below 25 billions dollars in the foreseeable future. Trend of 
military spending will be up… defense alone, in peacetime, will involve annual 
outlays of between 25 to 30 billions dollars.” (Italics mine). 
3.2.4 November 1952: The Eisenhower Retrenchment 
Snyder (1962) provides an analysis of the events and developments that led to the 
military retrenchment implemented by the Eisenhower administration in the “New Look” 
of 1953. In his analysis, Snyder (1962) identifies one shock to defense purchase s. It 
corresponds to the election of President Eisenhower in November 1952, which marked 
the beginning of the Eisenhower retrenchment. 
3.2.4.1 Historical Account 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower himself stated, “A bankrupt America [was] more 
the Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field of battle” (cited in Snyder 1962, 
p. 390). He also believed that government spending in general and defense spending in 
particular should be curbed for the United States to win the Cold War.  
During the presidential campaign of 1952, General Eisenhower—the Republican 
nominee—was very critical of the enormous growth in the federal budget that took place 
after the onset of the Korean War. He argued, ”overall government spending, especially 
defense spending should be drastically reduced” (Snyder 1962, p. 389), and he promised 
to achieve a balanced budget by FY 1955.  
As expected, as soon as President Eisenhower came to the White House, Budget 
Director Joseph M. Dodge ordered an extensive review of all government programs 
whose objective was to suggest reductions in government expenditures. Snyder (1962) 
notes, “It was clear that any substantial reduction would have to be taken very largely out 
of funds for national security” (Snyder 1962, p. 394).  
However, the results of the review of the Defense Department suggested only 
modest economies in defense expenditures. Therefore, another review was ordered, and a 
revised defense budget for FY 1954, which was to begin on July 1, 1953, was finally 
presented to Congress in May 1953. The revised budget called for a reduction in planned 
expenditures from $45.4 to 43.2 billion. Since the Korean War was coming to a 
conclusion, Congress approved additional cuts in the revised budget to reduce the 
government deficit.  
According to the figures from CSBA, the decrease in actual defense outlays was 
modest in FY 1954. They were $49.3 billion in current dollars, compared to $52.6 billion 
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in FY 1953. Then, they decreased to about $42 billion for two years. Real defense 
purchases kept rising for three quarters after the election of President Eisenhower. They 
were $367.6 billion in 1952:4 and 382.4 billion in 1953:2. Then, they declined 
continually for more than two years, and were $280.7 billion in 1956:1.   
3.2.4.2 U.S. News and World Report 
 After General Eisenhower’s electoral victory, the newsletter Tomorrow published 
on November 14, 1952, predicted that under an Eisenhower administration, 
“Armed forces, barring big war, will be reduced somewhat. A cut of 3.2 million, 
or even 3 million, from 3.6 million is probable. 
Armament must be reduced if Government finances are to be improved. 
Arms outlays will rise, budget troubles grow, during the first year of the 
Eisenhower Administration despite almost any cuts that can be tried. The money 
is committed, the orders placed, the wheels of industry rolling.” 
 In the newsletter Tomorrow published the following week, it is argued, 
“You can be quite sure of these things, among others: …Arms spending, in almost 
any event, will be stretched out further. Arm forces, probably, will be cut 
moderately in size… 
Last year, ended June 30, 1952, national security cost 46.3 billions. 
This year, ending June 30, 1953, security is to cost 56.2 billions. 
Next year, under a Truman budget, security costs will approach a 65-billion-dollar 
level. Ike’s advisors hope to cut it to 57 billions. 
It’s to be the year starting July 1, 1954, before the trend in spending for defense 
can really turn downward unless war is ended in Korea.” (Italics mine). 
In the newsletter Tomorrow published on December 5, 1952, it is stated, 
“The Eisenhower Administration actually is functioning right now…  
Charles E. Wilson is moving into the Defense Department six weeks before he 
will take office. The oath will be little more than a formality… 
You can definitely count on the new Congress to look closely at spending. These 
tips come from representative Taber, to be in charge of appropriations: 
Military spending is not running much above 42.5 billions a year. So the defense 
budget can be trimmed well below 50 billions.”(Italics mine). 
3.2.5 November 1960: The Kennedy Build-up 
Ball (1980) provides an analysis of the events and developments that led to the 
military build-up implemented by President Kennedy in Politics and Force Levels: the 
Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration. In his analysis, Ball (1980) 
identifies the presidential election of November 1960 as the key event that led to the 
Kennedy military build-up. 
3.2.5.1 Historical Account 
  In the fall 1960, defense and foreign policy was a central issue of the presidential 
campaign of Senator Kennedy—the Democratic nominee. At the time, Senator Kennedy 
had become “a major spokesman on matters relating to defense and foreign policy” (Ball 
1980, p. 15) who persistently criticized President Eisenhower’s defense policy. 
In August 1958, Senator Kennedy claimed that, given the Soviet technological 
and scientific prowess, “In the years 1960-1964, the deterrent ratio will in all likelihood 
be weighted very heavily against [the United States]” (cited in Ball 1980, p. 16). 
Similarly, in November 1959, he stated, “[The United States] have fallen behind the 
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Soviet Union in the development and production of ballistic missiles—both 
intercontinental and those of intermediate range” (cited in Ball 1980, p. 16). 
With regard to defense purchases, most of the public estimates of “what Kennedy 
would do” ranged from $2 to $4 billion a year according to Ball (1980). These estimates 
were based, among other things, on the specific requests he pledged to send to Congress, 
if elected, in a letter published in October 1960 by the magazine Missiles and Rockets. In 
this letter, Senator Kennedy stated among other things that he would act “in January” to 
accelerate “[the] Polaris, Minuteman and other strategic missile programs” (cited in Ball 
1980, p. 19). 
In his State of the Union message on January 30, 1961, President Kennedy 
announced his decision to double the number of Polaris submarines approved in the 
defense budget for FY 1961, which was to end on June 30, 1961. Then, he announced a 
series of decisions to strengthen both conventional and nuclear forces. Overall, Rearden 
(1984) notes, “Kennedy was compelled to seek increases in military spending that added 
$5 billion to the defense budget during his first year in office” (Rearden 1984, p. 18).  
Defense Secretary McNamara claimed that, in roughly three years, the Kennedy 
administration was able to build up “the most powerful force in American history” (cited 
in Ball 1980, introduction, p. xix). However, the actual increase in defense spending 
during the Kennedy build-up was less than implied by their verbal explanations.  
According to the figures from CSBA, actual defense outlays increased modestly 
from FY 1961 to FY 1963. They were $48.1 billion in FY 1960, $49.6 billion in FY 
1961, and $53.4 billion in FY 1963. Similarly, real defense purchases increased 
moderately from $301.5 billion in 1960:4 to $333.5 billion in 1962:2. However, they 
declined slightly in the following quarters, and were $324.5 billion in 1963:1.  
3.2.5.2 U.S. News and World Report 
 In the newsletter Tomorrow published on November 7, 1960, which preceded the 
presidential election, it is claimed that defense spending was about to increase whether 
Senator Kennedy or Vice President Nixon—the Republican nominee—won the election. 
It is stated, “More for Defense? Surely, No Matter Who Is Elected.”  
On November 14, after the electoral victory of Senator Kennedy, it is argued, 
“What you can be quite sure of, however, is this much: …Spending for defense will rise 
further.” The same week, in an article entitled “What the Election Means to You”, it is 
projected that, with the election of Senator Kennedy,  
“More money—at least 1.5 billions a year—will be spent on the defense 
establishment. Billions will be invested in years just ahead on defense against 
missile attack. Other billions will be put into antisubmarine defenses.” (Italics 
mine).  
In the newsletter Tomorrow published on November 21, 1960, it is stated, 
“Defense spending will be increased.” The same week, it is argued in an article entitled 
“What Kennedy Would Do as President”,  
“The Kennedy plan means the following: More for defense. Mr. Kennedy wants—
and a Democratic Congress also appears to want—a speed-up in the building of 
U.S. defenses. Congress will be asked to approve added spending of between 2.5 
and 3 billion dollars. Missile programs will be speeded and expanded. There will 
be more money to modernize the Army. Submarine programs will be speeded and 
enlarged.” (Italics mine). 
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3.2.6 December 1963: The Johnson Retrenchment 
Moise (1996) and LaFeber (1985) provide two studies of the U.S. defense policy 
during the 1960s in Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War and The Rise and 
Fall of American Power: 1963-1975, respectively. From their analyses, one exogenous 
shock to defense purchases is identified that took place in December 1963. It corresponds 
to the beginning of a retrenchment in defense purchases implemented when President 
Johnson came to the White House. 
3.2.6.1 Historical Account 
When President Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, it was apparent 
that the military build-up that began in the early 1960s was coming to a conclusion. For 
instance, the budget under preparation for FY 1965 projected the addition of only 50 new 
Minuteman silos to the existing nuclear forces. However, the retrenchment in defense 
purchases that took place as soon as President Johnson came to the White House was 
unexpected. 
As LaFeber (1985) argues, President Johnson “wanted to be the President who, 
through so-called Great Society programs, fulfilled the New Deal’s promises to the 
minorities, poor, elderly, and ill in America” (LaFeber 1985, p. 218). Therefore, as early 
as in December 1963, President Johnson attempted, with some success, to cut defense 
spending. Moise (1996) notes that, in fact, President Johnson was far more successful in 
his efforts to cut defense spending “than most people now remember” (Moise 1996, p. 
32).  
Moise (1996) points out, “[President Johnson] managed to cut more than a billion 
dollars in defense spending for what remained of FY 1964” (Moise 1996, p. 31), which 
ended on June 30, 1964. Moreover, he cut $3.8 billion from the budget for FY 1965 that 
had been almost entirely drafted during the Kennedy presidency. Eventually, the decline 
in defense purchases achieved by the Johnson administration was more modest than the 
President had expected because cuts in military expenditures became increasingly 
difficult to implement as American involvement in Vietnam grew. 
According to the figures from CSBA, actual defense outlays increased slightly in 
FY 1964. They were $54.8 billion, compared to $53.4 billion in FY 1963. However, 
actual defense outlays were reduced to $50.6 billion in FY 1965. Real defense purchases 
decreased continually, although moderately, from 1963:4 to 1965:1. They were $319.6 
billion in 1963:4 and $296.3 billion in 1965:1.  
3.2.6.2 U.S. News and World Report 
On November 18, 1963, the week preceding President Kennedy’s assassination, 
U.S. News and World Report published an article entitled “Coming Cuts in Defense 
Spending: How Big?” in which it is stated, 
“Defense spending, which has been rising steadily year after year, may soon begin 
to dip. 
Pentagon officials claim the U.S. is now well prepared, should be able to save as 
much as 5 billions a year… 
Spending on defense—scheduled at 50 billion dollars for the year ending next 
June 30—will rise slightly in the following year, then start downward. 
A cut of 5 billion dollars, to a level of 45 billion, is projected for the five years 
ahead. This is based on the assumption that there will be no major change in the 
world situation.” (Italics mine). 
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 However, in the same articles it is emphasized that no drastic cut in defense 
purchases would occur. The following statement from Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, is reported, 
“An area of low defense costs can hardly be said to lie ahead with military 
spending remaining on a level about 25 percent above that of the last Eisenhower 
year…As wee see things now, spending for defense will level off and then, 
perhaps, go down after a year or two.” 
In an article entitled “Where Johnson Stands on Financial Issues” published on 
December 9, 1962, it is argued, “President Johnson is a believer in a strong defense…The 
President’s attitude suggests that spending [in defense] will continue to be large.” Yet, in 
the Newsletter Tomorrow published on December 23, 1963, it is stated, ”Cost of defense 
gradually will be somewhat trimmed.” The same week, in an article entitled “Johnson’s 
First Budget—To Break All Records”, it is argued, 
“[President Johnson] has ordered all Government agencies and departments to 
make a last-minute examination of their own budgets and try to trim them. The 
Defense Department announced plans to close or reduce activities at 33 military 
installations.” 
Finally, in the newsletter Tomorrow published on December 30, 1963, it is 
claimed that a retrenchment in defense purchase s had already began. It is stated, “The 
session of Congress that just ended did much more than many think. Appropriations were 
cut about 6 billions below requests. Defense, space bore the brunt of the appropriation 
cuts made.” 
3.2.7 July 1965: The Vietnam War Build-up 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) argue that attacks against U.S. barracks by 
Communists at Pleiku in February 1965 represent the key event that led to the exogenous 
shock to defense purchases that marked the beginning of the Vietnam War military build-
up. Neither the foreign and defense literature nor the evidence from U.S. News and 
World Report supports the date they select. 
It appears that the decision to deploy a large number of ground combat forces in 
South Vietnam, which was taken in July 1965, should be considered as the key event that 
led to the Vietnam War military build-up. It did not only fundamentally changed the 
nature of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam but also dramatically raised its cost. 
Gibbons (1995) and Berman (1982) provide two detailed analyses of the 
escalation of the Vietnam War in The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV: 
July 1965-January 1968 and Planning a Tragedy: the Americanization of the War in 
Vietnam, respectively. In both analyses, the decision to deploy a large number of ground 
combat forces in South Vietnam is identified as the key event that led to the Vietnam War 
military build-up. 
3.2.7.1 Historical Account 
As was mentioned before, the decline in military spending envisioned by the 
Johnson became increasingly difficult to implement as American involvement in Vietnam 
grew. Finally, a significant and sustained increase in defense purchases became inevitable 
in July 1965, when President Johnson announced his decision to send a large number of 
U.S. combat ground troops in South Vietnam. 
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In the spring 1965, it became evident that the South Vietnamese army could not 
stop a Communist victory in Vietnam. Therefore, in June 1965, General Westmoreland, 
Commander of the U.S. Forces in South Vietnam, requested the deployment of a large 
number of U.S. combat ground troops. As Gibbons (1995) relates,  
“[General Westmoreland] concluding that there was imminent danger of a 
Communist victory, requested large-scale deployment of U.S. combat forces- the 
’44 battalion’ request-‘to take the war to the enemy.’ He recommended that U.S. 
ground forces be increased to 175,000 by the end of 1965 and to 275,000 in 1966, 
and be deployed on the coast as well as inland and used both offensively and 
defensively… 
In the following weeks, Westmoreland request was discussed by the President and 
his advisors. Papers were prepared summarizing major points of view, and a 
report was filed by McNamara after a trip which he and others made to Vietnam 
in mid-July… Between July 21 and 28, 1965, a numbers of meeting were held by 
the President to discuss McNamara report prior to a decision on Westmoreland’s 
request” (Gibbons 1995 p. 15). 
During a meeting on July 22, President Johnson himself emphasized that the 
deployment of a large number of U.S. troops would represent a true “change of policy.” 
He explained, “[The United States] have relied on the South to carry the brunt. Now 
[they] would be responsible for satisfactory military outcome” (cited in Berman 1982, p. 
115). The cost of a large-scale deployment of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam was also 
debated, and it was generally agreed that it would be high. President Johnson was 
presented the plan under consideration, and asked, “Do you have any ideas of what it will 
cost?” The answer from Defense Secretary McNamara was, “yes, sir, twelve billion 
dollars in 1966” (cited in Berman 1982, p. 114), almost a fourth of the actual defense 
outlays in FY 1965.  
There is some historical evidence that President Johnson had decided to commit a 
large number of ground forces in South Vietnam by mid-July 1965 (Gibbons 1995, p. 
15). In any case, he did not announce his decision until July 28, 1965. During a televised 
news conference, he stated that he was sending 50,000 more troops in South Vietnam, 
and that more troops would be needed and would be sent “as requested.”  
Berman (1982) points out that the press generally recognized the political 
significance of the decision announced by President Johnson and its implications for 
future defense purchases (see Berman 1982, preface, p. xi-xiv). An immediate and 
substantial increase in defense purchases took place. In August 1965, an emergency 
request was presented to Congress that added $12 billion to the defense budget for FY 
1966.  
According to the figures from CSBA, in the year following the decision to deploy 
a large number of U.S. troops in Vietnam, which corresponds to FY 1966, actual defense 
outlays increased from $50.6 billion to $58.1 billion. Real defense purchases increased 
sharply and continually for more than two years beginning in 1965:3. They were $300.7 
billion in 1965:2, they reached $397.3 billion in 1967:3, and more than $400 billion in 
1968:1.  
Two alternative dates were also considered for the onset of the Vietnam War 
military build-up. The first date corresponds to the attacks against U.S. destroyers in the 
Gulf of Tonkin, which took place in August 1964, and led to the Gulf of Tonkin 
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resolution. The second date corresponds to the attacks against U.S. barracks at Pleiku, 
which led to a campaign of systematic bombing in North Vietnam. Those dates are 
important because they coincide with the beginnings of new stages in the escalation of 
the conflict in Vietnam; however, they do not coincide with dramatic changes in U.S. 
policy and defense purchases (see Moise 1996, p. 254; LaFeber 1985, p. 218; Palmer 
1985, p.106).  
3.2.7.2 U.S. News and World Report 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) claim that Business Week began forecasting the 
Vietnam War build-up in March and April 1965 following the attacks at Pleiku. During 
this period, neither the escalation of the Vietnam War nor a future military build-up was 
mentioned as a certainty in U.S. News and World Report. It is stated in the newsletter 
Tomorrow published on February 22, 1965,   
“It’s well to face facts about Vietnam: What’s going on there could blow up into 
big war. The odds now seems against it, but it could happen… Officially, 
however, the belief is this: Nobody on either side wants big war; everybody will 
go to lengths to prevent it.” (Italics mine). 
In an article entitled “New Look at Defense—Why Congress Worries” published 
the following week President Johnson’s plan to cut defense expenditures in FY 1966, 
which was to begin in July 1, 1965 is discussed. It is argued, 
“With foreign problems looming larger, a showdown is taking shape between 
Congress and the White House over U.S. defenses. Ordered or on the way: troop 
reductions, more bomber cuts, slowdown in new weapons… Congress has before 
it the lowest defense budget in five years, calling for the scrapping of more 
nuclear bombers, a decrease in manpower, a slowdown in development of new 
weapons, other reductions in military strength…At this time, Mr. Johnson is firmly 
on the side of reducing defense costs. His aim is to pump military savings into 
domestic projects that will give meaning to his ‘Great Society.’” (Italics mine). 
  In the newsletter Tomorrow published on June 21, 1965, an escalation of the war 
is still described as uncertain even though the position of the South Vietnamese army had 
recently weakened. It is stated,  
“A note of doubt and uncertainty is influencing attitudes just now. War in 
Vietnam, expanding, raises question, creates uncertainty… Limited bombing in 
Vietnam is proving indecisive… War on the ground as now waged with U.S. in a 
limited role, is not making progress but is actually being lost. Large-scale action 
involving many U.S. troops may readily being forced by events.” 
Finally, U.S. News and World Report repeatedly announced the upcoming 
escalation of the Vietnam War and future increases in military expenditures in July 1965. 
In the newsletter Tomorrow published on July 5, 1965, it is stated, “War in Vietnam is to 
grow more costly in both lives and dollars.”  
The following week, it is argued, “War in Vietnam will go on, grow bigger. U.S. 
troop involvement will be expanded to 100, 000 and maybe a good deal beyond… Arms 
spending will rise as war costs go up.” In an article entitled “At Home: Growing Pressure 
to ‘Get Ready for Big War’” published on July 26, 1965, the following outlook for the 
future is given, 
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“President Johnson announced only July 13 he would make a new assessment of 
U.S. needs after the completion of the fact-finding tour to Vietnam by Defense 
Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Ambassador-designate Henry Cabot Lodge. 
Mr. Johnson warned that ‘new and serious steps’ may soon be necessary. The 
president’s words were taken as the forerunner of a sizable request for more 
defense money and for a call-up of some reserves. Congress was ready to move 
into action swiftly.” (Italics added). 
 In the newsletter Tomorrow published on August 9, 1965, a substantial increase in 
defense expenditures is projected, “Defense spending in months ahead will be raised 
about 4 billions… Later spending, if war goes on, will be increased sharply.” In an article 
entitled “In the Year Ahead: 143 Billions of Federal Spending” published on August 30, 
1965 it is anticipated that defense expenditures were to increase, at the least, by $7 billion 
in the following two years. It is claimed,  
“In these two years—mid-1965 to mid-1967—cash spending on defense is 
expected to increase about 7.6 billions, to a total of 53.8 billions for fiscal 1967. 
These figures on defense expenditures are conservative estimates made by the 
Economic Unit of ‘U.S. News and World Report.’ 
Actually, defense outlays may go up much more sharply than this, as key 
members of Congress freely predict.” (Italics mine) 
3.2.8 July 1969: The Nixon Retrenchment 
LaFeber (1985) provides an analysis of U.S. defense policy during the later stages 
of the Vietnam War in The Rise and Fall of American Power: 1963-1975. Schurmann 
(1987) and Bundy (1998) provide two studies of the U.S. defense policy during the Nixon 
Presidency in The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon: The Grand Design and A Tangled 
Web: the Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, respectively. According to 
LaFeber (1985), Schurmann (1987), and Bundy (1998), the announcement of the “Nixon 
doctrine” in July 1969 represents the key event that led to the retrenchment in defense 
purchases taking place in the early 1970s.  
3.2.8.1 Historical Account 
When President Nixon came to the White House in January 1969, Thorton (1989) 
argues, “The deterioration of the strategic, geopolitical, and economic positions brought 
about primarily by involvement in Vietnam combined to produce a crisis of strategy for 
the United States (Thorton 1989, p. 3). Similarly, Williams (1987) notes, “With the 
increasing unpopularity of the war [in Vietnam]…it became obvious that another 
reappraisal of American foreign and defense policy was called for” (Williams 1987, p. 
35). 
As Congress debated the defense budget for FY 1970, it pressured the Nixon 
administration not only to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam but also to drastically cut 
defense expenditures (see U.S. Defense Policy 1983, p. 7). In the first months of his 
administration, President Nixon refused to give in to popular and congressional pressures. 
He opposed a quick withdrawal from Vietnam because it would have undermined the 
credibility of the American commitment abroad (see LaFeber 1985, p. 281; Bundy 1998, 
p. 82). Furthermore, he opposed drastic cuts in defense expenditures that would have 
prevented the United States from maintaining a strong and credible military posture (see 
Nixon 1971, p. 162).  
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However, in March 1969, President Nixon announced a two-prong policy known 
as the “Vietnamization” to finally end the presence of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam. It 
led to a first withdrawal of 25, 000 troops in June 1969.Then, he announced what was to 
be known as the “Nixon doctrine” in July 1969 during an informal press conference in 
Guam. Bundy (1998) reports,   
“[President Nixon] defined future American policy under three headings: The 
United States would keep all his treaty commitments (but by implication be chary 
of new ones); it would ‘provide a shield‘ if a nuclear power threatened the 
freedom of an allied nation or of a nation whose survival was vital to American 
security or that of the ‘region a s a whole’; and it would furnish military and 
economic assistance against aggression but would expect the nation directly 
threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its 
own defense” (Bundy 1998, p. 68).  
At first, as Schurmann (1987) reports, President Nixon’s statement “appeared to 
be little more than a rationalization for pulling American troops out of Vietnam (to 
reduce casualties and costs)” (Schurmann 1987, pp. 36-37). However, in the weeks 
following the press conference in Guam, it became evident that the “Nixon doctrine” 
represented a dramatic turn in new U.S. foreign and defense policy, which implied a 
significant reduction in defense spending. 
According to the figures from CSBA, actual defense outlays decreased from 
$82.5 billion to $81.7 billion in the first year after the announcement of the Nixon 
doctrine, which corresponds to FY 1970. Then, they decreased modestly until FY 1973, 
when they were $76.7 billion. Real defense purchases also decreased steadily for more 
than two years after the announcement of the “Nixon doctrine.” They were $303.2 billion 
in 1971:4, compared to $383.3 in 1969:2.  
3.2.8.2 U.S. News and World Report 
In the newsletter Tomorrow published on January 27, 1969, no sudden cuts in 
government and defense expenditures are anticipated. It is stated, “Even if the war is 
slowed drastically, cost of Government will keep rising. Arms rebuilding in year ahead 
under present plans will go up 4 billions, more than offsetting a scheduled drop of 3.5 
billions in Vietnam spending.” 
In the newsletter Tomorrow published on July 7, 1969 modest cuts in defense 
expenditures are projected; however, it is emphasized that substantial cuts appeared 
unlikely. It is argued, 
“Continuing war means Congress will have trouble cutting military spending… 
Research, 7 billions, a favorite target, probably will be cut somewhat. Chief 
battleground, procurements at 22.5 billions, may provide future savings—but not 
much in 1970 because the money goes for Vietnam equipment. 
On the budget, as with everything else, Congress and Mr. Nixon cannot make big 
savings until the war ends.” (Italics mine).   
   The issue of U.S. News and World Report published on July 21, 1969 reports that, 
as the first American troops had pulled out of Vietnam, pressures from Congress to 
reduce U.S. defense expenditures were increasing. In the newsletter Tomorrow, it is 
stated,  
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“War in Vietnam is definitely in the downswing. Americans finally can foresee an 
end to major involvement. Official attention is turning to postwar… 
A start, long expected, is being made on cutting U.S. commitments and the 
numbers of Americans overseas. This pullback will expand.” 
The cover of the magazine published the same week features an article entitled 
“The New Pressure to Trim U.S. Defense” in which it is argued, 
“At the time when President Nixon is about to embark on a mission to shore up 
U.S. relations abroad, Congress appears more determined than at any time since 
the end of World War II to cut back America’s global commitment, and trim its 
defense as well.” 
In the newsletter Tomorrow published on August 18, 1965, after President Nixon 
returned from his trip abroad, it is argued, “Defense spending will take a big slash.” The 
following week, drastic cuts in procurements are announced, 
“It’s open season on defense. Take the purchases of new military hardware: 
Lyndon Johnson left behind a 23.1-billion-dollar procurement request. Mr. Nixon 
cut that to 21.9 before it got to Congress. Now the Senate has whittled the figure 
to below20 billion—and lawmakers are not finished. 
Main casualties so far: Navy shipbuilding, the Army’s new helicopter, Air Force’s 
man-in-space program, the FB-111 bomber, several missile projects.” (Italics 
mine). 
In the newsletter Tomorrow published on September 1, 1969, further cuts in 
defense expenditures are anticipated. It is claimed, “Slash of another 3 billions in 
Pentagon spending plans for this fiscal year, revealed August 21, probably isn’t the end. 
President’s opponents in Congress will take aim at research and new procurement plans.” 
3.2.9 December 1979: The Carter-Reagan Build-up  
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) content that the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet 
troops in December 27, 1979 represents the key event that led to the beginning of the 
Carter-Reagan build-up. Since this invasion took place very late in the month, they date 
the beginning of the Carter-Reagan build-up in the first quarter of 1980.  
U.S. Defense Policy (1983) edited by Wormser provides a very detailed account 
of the events and developments that led to the Carter-Reagan build-up. It implies that the 
Iranian crisis that began in November 1979 was the key event that led to a sudden 
increase in defense spending. At the beginning of December 1979, the decisions to 
implement a significant and sustained build-up were taken and announced. Therefore, it 
is argued that the Carter-Reagan build-up should be dated as beginning in the last quarter 
of 1979. 
3.2.9.1 Historical Account 
At the turn of 1979, President Carter insisted that the Senate hearings on the 
second stage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talk (SALT II), which were scheduled for 
the spring 1979, should focus on the impact of SALT II on the U.S.-Soviet military 
balance. In fact, they “became a forum for reviewing the U.S.-Soviet military balance and 
assessing the adequacy of Carter’s defense policies” (U.S. Defense Policy 1983, p. 22).  
It was reported that a “window of vulnerability” had opened up and that U.S. land 
based strategic missiles were vulnerable to Soviet aggressions. Then, reports that Soviet 
troops were stationed in Cuba emerged in August 1979. Finally, in November 1979, 
Iranian militants seized the U.S. embassy in Teheran. As U.S. Defense Policy (1983) 
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points out, “in the wake of these events, the American public backed a more assertive 
U.S. international posture” (U.S. Defense Policy 1983, p. 24).  
At the same time, a “congressional consensus favoring a ‘tougher’ defense stand” 
developed as “it was apparent that congressional alarm over the U.S.-Soviet balance of 
power had reach a new level of intensity” (U.S. Defense Policy 1983, p. 24). At the 
beginning of December 1979, the Senate approved a plan to increase defense 
expenditures by 5 percent a year beyond inflation in the next two years. On December 12, 
1979, President Carter announced a ten percent increase in defense spending for FY 
1980, which was to end in July 1980, and a plan to build up conventional and nuclear 
forces in the long run. As U.S. Defense Policy (1983) summarizes, 
“Carter and Congress had agreed on a fiscal 1980 defense budget of 
approximately $142.6 billion—an increase of almost $15 billion over the previous 
year. And Carter was forced to pledge that he would seek future and real increases 
for defense of 5 percent annually. The Senate had already approved a build-up at 
that rate.” (U.S. Defense Policy 1983, p. 21) 
According to U.S. Defense Policy (1983), the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet 
troops on December 27, 1979, did not lead “to a sudden change in the U.S. policy” as 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) claim. It merely ended the remaining hope, if any existed, that 
SALT II would be approved (see U.S. Defense Policy 1983, pp. 58-61).  
According to the figures from CSBA, actual defense outlays increased from 
$116.3 billion in FY 1979 to $134.0 billion in FY 1980. Then, they continually rise until 
FY 1983, when they reached $209.9 billion. Real defense purchases increased moderately 
in 1980, from $273.1 billion in 1979:4 to $280.8 billion in 1980:4. Then, they rise more 
steadily, and reached $327.5 billion in 1982:4. 
 By the end of 1982, congressional support for the military build-up was eroding; 
however, the Reagan administration was able to revitalize the American military effort 
after the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983. 
According to the figures from CSBA, actual defense outlays continually increased from 
FY 1983 to FY 1986, and reached  $273.4 billion in FY 1986. Real defense purchases 
increased moderately in 1983, and then they rose sharply for more than three years. In 
1986:3, they reached more than $400 billion for the first time in U.S. history.  
3.2.9.2 U.S. News and World Report 
Following the recent crises with Cuba and the Soviet Union, it is stated in the 
newsletter Tomorrow published on October 1, 1979,  
“More Americans are waking up to the possibility that the U.S. may be letting its 
military power slip too far behind the Soviets’. 
A new mood of toughness is developing. You see it in the Senate vote September 
18 for annual hikes of 5 percent after inflation in the 1981 and ’82 arms 
budgets… 
President Carter is committed to a 3 percent increase beyond inflation in the 1980 
arms budget. But that will do little more than replace used-up munitions and fund 
the stockpiling of arms and ammunition in Western Europe. 
So, the White House has opened the door for a bigger increase in 1981. 
Top Army commanders will meet late this month to decide which new, major 
weapons to push. Near the top: A new tank and a new antiaircraft missile. 
What about the direct threat of Soviet rockets aimed at the U.S. mainland? 
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Washington’s answer will be the MX-mobile-missile system and the airborne 
cruise missile. Now, it’s a full green light for both.” (Italics mine). 
Before the Iranian Crisis, in the newsletter Tomorrow published on November 5, 
1979, a significant increase in defense expenditures is already anticipated. It is argued, 
“Carter is about to commit himself to big new defense outlays: At least 143 billion in 
1981, up 16 billion from 1980.”  
On December 10, 1979, a sustained military build-up is again anticipated, 
“What will Carter do? For one thing, he will jump Pentagon spending no matter 
the effects on the economy. People are demanding a stronger America. 
Best bet: An increase above inflation of about 5 percent in each of the next five 
years, making 1981 military outlays about 145 billion dollars.” 
After President Carter announced the establishment of a RDF and the deployment 
of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, the newsletter Tomorrow published on 
December 24, 1979 announced, “It’s a turning point: America is going to strengthen its 
military forces to defend the country’s interest at trouble spots overseas.” It also warned, 
“Rebuilding Yankee military might will be expensive and take time. It will need the 
backing of Congress and of the voters.”  
3.2.10 November 1989: The Bush-Clinton Retrenchment 
American Defense Annual (1988-1989) edited by Knuzel provides an analysis of 
U.S. defense policy during the second term of President Reagan. The Brookings 
Institution, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) and RAND, provide further studies 
of U.S. defense policy since the end of the Cold War. They imply that although, defense 
purchases had been frozen since November 1987, a significant and sustained 
retrenchment in defense expenditures was not implemented until the Soviet Empire began 
collapsing in the fall 1989.   
3.2.10.1 Historical Account   
Korb and Daggett (1988), who wrote their study at the end of the second Reagan 
presidency, argued that the Reagan administration was facing a growing opposition to the 
military build-up that began at the end of the previous decade. They noted, “In November 
1987, the administration finally bowed to the inevitable and reached an agreement with 
Congress that virtually freeze military spending for the remainder of the president’s 
second term.” (Korb and Daggett 1988, p. 43). However, they did not anticipate any 
significant cut in defense spending in the near future.  
With respect to the upcoming presidential election of November 1988, Korb and 
Daggett (1988) state, “… It remains unlikely that the public will endorse a candidate who 
would drastically cut today’s level of military spending” (Korb and Daggett 1988, p. 60). 
Like most experts, they did not anticipate the reversal in defense purchases that began 
with the collapse of the Soviet Empire in the Fall 1989.  
The collapse of the Soviet Empire occurred quickly and unexpectedly. The Berlin 
Wall fell in November 1989. Two weeks later, the Velvet Revolution took place in 
Czechoslovakia. A month later, Nikolae Ceausescu was executed in Romania. By the end 
of 1990, no communist government remained in Europe. At this time, MacLaury, 
President of the Brookings Institution, already emphasized the impact of the collapse of 
the Soviet Empire on U.S. defense purchases. He stated,  
“The administration has reversed its position on spending for national defense. 
Only eight months ago, President Bush proposed a plan calling for an average 
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annual increase (after inflation) of 1.7 percent between fiscal years 1990 to 1994. 
Now in December 1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney is considering reductions 
that could amount to as much as $195 billion between fiscal 1991 and 1995” 
(MacLaury, in preface of Kaufmann 1990, p. vii). 
Despite the end of the Cold War, the Bush administration implemented a 
relatively limited retrenchment in defense purchases because of the possibility of a 
resurgent Russia and the need to deal with regional contingencies. Then, the Clinton 
administration continued to pursue a cautious retrenchment (see The Defense Monitor 
1997, pp. 1-4; Kugler 1994). 
 According to the figures of CSBA, actual defense outlays decreased very slightly 
in the first years after the end of the Cold War. They declined from $303.6 billion in FY 
1989 to $297.9 billion in FY 1990, and $296.7 billion in FY 1991. Then, they declined 
more steadily; however, they never fell below $265 billion a year. Real defense purchases 
remained stable during the first two years after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. They 
were $407.4 billion in 1989:3 and $405 billion in 1991:2. Then, they declined steadily. 
They were $376.8 billion when President Bush left the White House in 1992:4, and 
$335.1 billion in 1994:1. Finally, they fell below $300 billion in 1998:1.     
3.2.10.2 U.S. News and World Report 
In the mid-1980s, the format of the newsletter Tomorrow published in U.S. News 
and World Report changed entirely. At the time of the Collapse of the Soviet Empire, it 
mostly focused on domestic issues and no longer provided economic and political 
forecasts. Therefore, only evidence from articles published in U.S. News and World 
Report are presented in this sub-section. 
On December 11, 1989, the cover of U.S. News and World Report featured an 
article entitled “After the Cold War? Do We Need an Army?” in which significant cuts in 
defense expenditures are predicted,  
“The tantalizing promise of an end to the cold war is already generating political 
pressure to bring American boys home from Europe and to slash the nation’s 
$300 billion defense budget… 
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has ordered the services to plan for $150 
billion in cuts from projected spending for the next five years. The Army is 
considering eliminating at least 135, 000 troops, reducing its active-duty  
divisions by one sixth; the navy has proposed to abandon its long cherished goal 
of a 600-ship fleet, eliminating three aircraft carriers and about 60 other vessels.” 
(Italics mine). 
 However, in an article entitled “Bush Looks Ahead to the 1990s” published in 
December 25, 1989, it is reported that, while President Bush will support gradual 
reductions, he will oppose drastic cuts in defense expenditures. The following statement 
from President Bush is cited, 
“There has been such a euphoric feeling in Capitol Hill about this change that 
they think they can just cut the heart out of the defense program. And that I will 
resist. I don’t want to encourage the thought that we always have to operate at 




3.2.11 Discussion of the Shocks Identified 
Five exogenous positive shocks to defense purchases were identified in the 
previous section of this chapter. They are referred to as the March Crisis, the Korean 
War, the Kennedy, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan episodes. Four exogenous 
negative shocks were also identified. They are referred to as the Eisenhower, the Johnson, 
the Nixon, and the Bush-Clinton episodes.  
The Korean War build-up is dated as beginning in the third quarter of 1950, 
which is also the date selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997). The Vietnam War build-up 
is dated as beginning in the third quarter of 1965, two quarters after the date selected by 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997). The Carter-Reagan build-up is dated as beginning in the last 
quarter of 1979, one quarter before the date selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997). 
Furthermore, the March Crisis and the Kennedy episodes are dated as beginning in 
1948:2 and 1960:4, respectively. The Eisenhower, the Johnson, the Nixon, and the Bush-
Clinton episodes are dated as beginning in 1952:4, 1963:4, 1969:3, and 1989:4, 
respectively. 
The first panel of Figure 3.1 presents the evolution of real defense purchases over the 
period 1947:1 to 1999:2. The vertical lines mark the onsets of the four exogenous 
increases and the retrenchments in defense purchases identified in the previous section. 
As was mentioned in the first chapter of the dissertation, the evolution of defense 
purchases in the post-World War II era is characterized by the existence of the three 
major cycles in defense purchases that began at the onsets of the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes. They are hereafter referred as the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the 
Carter-Bush cycles. In comparison to these major cycles, the cycle that began at the onset 
the Kennedy episode, which is hereafter referred as the Kennedy-Johnson cycle, appears 
very modest and brief. The rise in defense purchases that followed the March Crisis of 
1948 appears even more modest and brief. 
Defense purchases began to slowly increase two years before the date selected for 
the Carter-Reagan episode and more than a year before the date selected for the Nixon 
episode. It is believed that the lags between the dates when defense purchases began to 
change and the dates selected for these episodes reflect the uncertainty about the future of 
defense spending, which was predominant in the late 1960s and late 1970s. As was 
mentioned before, the key issue in identifying exogenous shocks to defense purchases 
using a narrative approach is to find the dates at which the decisions to implement 
sustained changes in defense purchases were taken and announced, which do not 
necessarily correspond to the dates at which defense purchases actually began to change. 
Furthermore, as Perotti (2000) points out, when a narrative approach is used to 
estimate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, it is usually assumed that they have 
identical effects on the economy. Since the changes in defense purchases after the March 
Crisis, the Kennedy, and the Johnson episodes were very small and brief, it may be 
difficult to argue that they had the same effects, or even similar effects on the economy, 
as the other episodes identified in the previous section. 
Therefore, it may be problematic to construct a dummy variable that includes the 
March Crisis, the Kennedy, and Johnson episodes along with the other shocks to defense 
purchases identified earlier. Accordingly, the study of the implications of the more 
comprehensive narrative approach presented in the next sections of this chapter focuses  
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Figure 3.1: Real Defense Purchases in the Post-World War II Era 
Sample period: 1947:1-1999:2 
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on the effects of shocks to a dummy variable that includes the six episodes associated 
with the three major defense purchases cycles identified earlier.  
A major advantage of the narrative approach presented in the previous section 
over the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) is that, since it includes 
military retrenchment as well as military build-ups, twice as many exogenous shocks to 
defense purchases are identified. Ramey and Shapiro (1997) do not include retrenchments 
in defense purchases in their study because they argue that they are much more gradual 
than the build-ups. In fact, the three major retrenchments identified in the post-World 
War II era do not appear much more gradual than the preceding military build-ups.  
The maximum decreases in defense purchases within eight quarters after the 
onsets of the Eisenhower, the Nixon, and the Bush-Clinton episodes are $66 billion, $72 
billion, and $21 billion, respectively. The maximum increases in defense purchases 
within eight quarters after the onset of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-
Reagan episodes are $232, $56 and $29 billion, respectively.  
Although the decline in defense purchases during the Eisenhower retrenchment is 
modest in comparison to the increase in defense purchases during the preceding build-up, 
it is larger than the increase in defense purchases during the Vietnam War and Carter-
Reagan build-ups. The decline in defense purchases during the Vietnam War 
retrenchment is slightly larger than the increase during the preceding build-up. The 
Carter-Reagan build-up and the Cold War retrenchment are similar in magnitude.  
3.3 Alternative Dates for Korean War and Vietnam War Episodes 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) examine the sensitivity of the results 
they report for real GDP, residential investment, non-residential investment, after-tax 
manufacturing wages, consumption of non-durables and services, and government 
purchases to small perturbations in the dates selected for the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. 
For each Ramey-Shapiro episode, they carry out the same exercise.  
First, they construct a modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable that has the 
value one the quarter before the one selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for the 
episode under examination and the quarters selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for 
the other episodes. Then, they estimate their benchmark model and extended models in 
which the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is included as an exogenous 
variable.   
Finally, they compute IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to the modified 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable on the variables listed above and plot them against the 
corresponding confidence intervals reported for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. They repeat the same procedure when the episode under examination is 
assumed to have occurred two and three quarters before, and one, two, and three quarters 
after the date selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997).  
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) only present the IRFs computed when 
the date of the Korean War episode is altered. Since these IRFs are generally similar to 
the ones reported for their benchmark model, they argue that the results they report are 
robust to small perturbations in the dates of Korean War episode. Furthermore, they 
claim that their results are “extremely robust” to small perturbations in the dates of the 
Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes (see Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 1999, 
p. 15). 
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The dates selected earlier in this chapter for the onsets of the Vietnam War and 
Carter-Reagan episodes are slightly different from ones selected by Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997). Therefore, they can be used to re-examine the sensitivity of the results reported 
for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable to small perturbations in the dates of 
the Ramey-Shapiro episodes.  
This section investigates the sensitivity of the results reported in the previous 
chapter of the dissertation for the benchmark and alternative models to using the dates 
selected earlier in this chapter for the onsets of the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan 
episodes. The benchmark model is a VAR system that includes a constant and four 
lagged values of real defense purchases, real GDP, the net three month interest rate on 
Treasury bills (RTB), and the GDP deflator that are included as endogenous variables. In 
addition, the contemporaneous value and four lagged values of the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy are entered as exogenous variables. The logarithmic values of the variables are 
used except for interest rates.1 
The alternative model includes the same variables as the benchmark model; 
however, six lagged values of the variables are used and a “Perron-type” time trend is 
added to each equation in the system. The benchmark and alternative models are 
estimated over the sample periods from 1948:1 to 1999:2 and from 1948:3 to 1999:2, 
respectively.  
To examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the benchmark model to 
using the alternative date selected earlier in this chapter for the Vietnam War episode, a 
modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is constructed in which the Vietnam War 
episode is dated as beginning two quarters after the date selected by Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997). It has the value one in 1950:3, 1965:3, 1980:1 and zero otherwise.  
Then, the benchmark model is estimated using the modified Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. Finally, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP 
deflator are computed for a unit shock to the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable 
following the same methodology as the one presented in the previous chapter of the 
dissertation. If the results reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to using the 
alternative date for the Vietnam War episode, the IRFs computed using the modified 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable ought to lie within the corresponding confidence 
intervals reported using the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable.  
The same procedure is implemented to examine the sensitivity of the results 
reported for the benchmark model to using the alternative date selected earlier in this 
chapter for the Carter-Reagan episode. In this case, the Carter-Reagan episode is dated as 
beginning a quarter before the date selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997).  
In the first and second columns of Figure 3.2, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs computed for the benchmark model when the alternative dates for 
the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes selected earlier in this chapter are used, in 
turn, to construct the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. The dashed lines display  
                                                 
























































































































































































Figure 3.2: Point Estimates from Models With Alternative Dates for the Ramey-
Shapiro Episodes 
Confidence Intervals from the Benchmark Model 
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the lower and upper bounds of the sixty-eight percent confidence intervals computed for 
a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, which were reported in the previous 
chapter of the dissertation.  
When the alternative date is used for the Vietnam War episode, all the IRFs 
reported lie within the corresponding confidence intervals reported for a shock to the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable at all horizons. However, the patterns of the IRF for real 
GDP is different from the one reported using the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable at long 
horizons. A year after a Ramey-Shapiro episode, it begins to decline steadily and 
persistently.  
When the alternative date is used for the Carter-Reagan episode, the IRFs 
computed for defense purchases, real GDP, and the GDP deflator lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable at all horizons. The IRF computed for RTB lies above the upper bound of the 
confidence interval reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable for two 
quarters, and then it lies within the confidence interval. Furthermore, the pattern of the 
IRF for RTB is initially very different from the one reported for a shock to the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable.  
To further investigate the sensitivity of the results reported for the benchmark 
model to small perturbations in the dates of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, an alternative 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is constructed using the alternative dates selected earlier 
in this chapter for both the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes. It has the value one 
in 1950:3, 1965:3, 1979:4, and zero otherwise.  
In the last column of 3.2, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit shock to 
the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable when the benchmark model is estimated. 
The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of the sixty-eight percent 
confidence intervals computed for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
The IRFs computed for defense purchases and the GDP deflator lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable at all horizons. Furthermore, their patterns are similar to the ones reported for a 
shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable.  
The IRF for real GDP lies within the confidence interval reported for a shock to 
the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable for three quarters, and then it lies slightly below the 
lower bound of the confidence interval. The IRF for RTB lies above the upper bound of 
the confidence interval reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable for 
two quarters, and then it lies within the confidence interval. Furthermore, the pattern of 
the IRF for real GDP is different from the one reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable at long horizons, and the pattern of the IRF for RTB is initially very 
different from the one reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
To investigate the sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative model to 
small perturbations in the dates of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, the exercises presented 
above for the benchmark model are reproduced for the alternative model. In the first and 
second columns of Figure 3.3, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the alternative 


































































































































































































Figure 3.3: Point Estimates from Models With Alternative Dates for the Ramey-
Shapiro Episodes 
Confidence Intervals from the Alternative Model 
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Carter-Reagan episodes are used, in turn, to construct the modified Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of the sixty-eight 
percent confidence intervals computed for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable, which are reported in the previous chapter of the dissertation.  
When the alternative dates are used for the Vietnam War or the Carter-Reagan 
episodes, the IRFs computed for defense purchases, real GDP, and the GDP deflator lie 
within the corresponding confidence intervals reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable at all horizons. Furthermore, their patterns are similar to the ones 
reported using the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. When the alternative date is used for 
the Vietnam War episode, the IRF for RTB also lies within the confidence interval 
reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable at all horizons.  
However, when the alternative date is used for the Carter-Reagan episode, the IRF 
computed for RTB lies above the upper bound of the confidence interval reported for a 
shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable for two quarters, and then it lies within the 
confidence interval. Furthermore, its pattern is initially very different from the one 
reported using the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable.  
In the last column of Figure 3.3, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs computed for the alternative model for a unit shock to the alternative Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of the 
sixty-eight percent confidence intervals reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. 
The IRF for defense purchases computed for a shock to the alternative Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable lies within or on the confidence intervals reported for a shock to 
the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable at all horizons. The IRF for real GDP lies within the 
confidence interval reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable for two 
quarters, and then it lies slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval for two 
quarters.  
The IRF for RTB lies above the upper bound of the confidence interval reported 
for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable for two quarters, and then it lies 
within the confidence interval. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies within the confidence 
interval reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable for more than three 
years, and then it lies very slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval. 
Furthermore, the pattern of the IRF for RTB is very different initially from the one 
reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, and the pattern of the IRF 
for the GDP deflator is different at long horizons. 
In conclusion, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) argue that the results 
they report are robust to small perturbations in the dates of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. 
However, the IRFs reported in this section indicate that the results presented in the 
previous chapter of the dissertation for the benchmark and alternative models are 
sensitive to small perturbations in the date of the Carter-Reagan episode, and to a lesser 
extent the date of the Vietnam War episode. 
In particular, when an alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is constructed 
using the dates selected earlier in this chapter for the Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan 
episodes, the IRFs for real GDP and RTB computed for the benchmark and alternative 
models are significantly affected by small perturbations in the dates of Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes.  
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3.4  Military Build-ups and Retrenchments 
As was mentioned before, it is of interest to investigate the implications of using a 
more comprehensive narrative approach than the one presented by Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997) to estimate the macroeconomic effects of exogenous shocks to government 
purchases. This section presents the effects of shocks to government purchases computed 
when the six major shocks to defense purchases identified earlier in this chapter are 
included in a measure of shocks to government purchases.  
First, a dummy variable is constructed that has the value one at the dates of the 
onsets of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan shocks, minus one at 
the dates of the Eisenhower, the Johnson, and the Bush-Clinton episodes, and zero 
otherwise. It is hereafter referred to as the defense purchases (DP) dummy variable. It 
differs from the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable by including military retrenchment as 
well as military build-ups. Furthermore, the dates used for the onsets of the Vietnam War 
and Carter-Reagan episodes are slightly different from the dates selected by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997).    
Second, a system identical to the benchmark model introduced in the second 
chapter of the dissertation, except that the DP dummy variable is substituted for the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, is estimated. Finally, the IRFs that present the effects of 
a unit shock to the DP dummy variable on defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the 
GDP deflator are computed following the methodology presented in the second chapter 
of the dissertation.  
In the first column of Figure 3.4, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit 
shock to the DP dummy variable. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of 
sixty-eight percent confidence intervals, which are computed following the methodology 
presented in the second chapter of the dissertation. 
The IRFs for defense purchases and the GDP deflator computed for a shock to the 
DP dummy variable exhibit patterns similar to the ones reported for a shock to the 
alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, which includes the same dates for the onsets 
of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes as the DP dummy variable. However, they are smaller 
than the IRFs reported for a shock to the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. The 
maximum effects of a shock to the DP dummy variable on defense purchases and the 
GDP deflator are only two-thirds and half the size of the ones reported for a shock to the 
alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, respectively. 
The pattern of the IRF for RTB computed for a shock to the DP dummy variable 
is generally similar to the one reported for a shock to the alternative Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. However, the initial rise in RTB reported for a shock to the DP dummy 
variable is relatively small and not significantly different from zero. The pattern of the 
IRF for real GDP is very different from the one reported for a shock to the alternative 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. The IRF for real GDP exhibits a hump-shaped pattern, 
and after a delay of almost a year, it increases significantly for three quarters.  
Overall, the IRFs computed for a shock to the DP dummy variable are consistent 

































































































































Figure 3.4: Point Estimates from Benchmark Model with DP Dummy. Dates 
Selected by Horent or Ramey-Shapiro and Horent 
Confidence Intervals from the Model with the Dates Selected by Horent 
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(1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS- 
LM and one-sector neoclassical models.2 They imply that defense purchases increase 
very persistently in response to a shock to the DP dummy variable, output rises 
temporarily, interest rate and the price level rise persistently.  
The main difference between the results reported for a shock to the DP dummy 
variable and the results presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) is the initial response of RT. This difference may be 
explained by the discrepancies between the dates selected earlier in this chapter for the 
Carter-Reagan and Vietnam War episodes and the dates selected by Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997). Therefore, an alternative DP dummy variable is constructed that has the value 
one at the dates selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for the positive shocks to defense 
purchases, minus one at the dates identified earlier in this chapter for the negative shocks, 
and zero otherwise.  
Then, the benchmark model is estimated using the alternative DP dummy 
variable. Finally, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
are computed for a unit shock to the alternative DP dummy variable. If the results 
computed for the benchmark model are not sensitive to using alternative dates for the 
Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes, the IRFs computed for a shock to the 
alternative DP dummy variable ought to lie within the corresponding confidence intervals 
reported for a shock to the DP dummy variable.   
In the second column of Figure 3.4, the solid lines display the point estimates of 
the IRFs computed for a shock to the alternative DP dummy variable. The dashed lines 
display the lower and upper bounds of the sixty-eight percent confidence intervals 
computed for a shock to the DP dummy variable. The IRFs for defense purchases and the 
GDP deflator computed for a shock to the alternative DP dummy variable lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the model with the DP dummy variable at all 
horizons.  
After a delay of almost a year, the IRF for real GDP computed for a shock to the 
alternative DP dummy variable lies slightly above the upper bound of the confidence 
interval from the model with the DP dummy variable at all horizons. The IRF for RTB 
lies below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the model with the DP 
dummy variable for two quarters, and then it lies within the confidence interval.  
 Overall, the IRFs presented for a shock to the alternative DP dummy variable are 
consistent with the evidence reported earlier on the sensitivity of the IRFs computed for 
the benchmark model to small perturbations in the dates of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. 
In particular, the IRFs for real GDP and RTB computed for a shock to the alternative DP 
dummy variable appear significantly different from the ones reported for the DP dummy 
variable.  
 As was mentioned before, the Kennedy and the Johnson episodes are not 
included in the DP dummy variable because they are much smaller and shorter in 
duration than the episodes included. However, it is of interest to examine the sensitivity 
                                                 
2 It is noted that interest rates increase immediately in response to a shock to government purchases within 
the traditional IS-LM model; however, the IRF for RTB reported in Figure 4 rises after a delay of several 
periods. 
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of the results reported for the benchmark model to adding the Kennedy and Johnson 
episodes to the DP dummy variable.  
First, an extended DP dummy variable is constructed that includes the Kennedy 
and Johnson episodes along with the six major episodes included in the DP dummy 
variable. The dates used for the onsets of the episodes are the ones selected earlier in this 
chapter. Then, the benchmark model is estimated using the extended DP dummy variable, 
and the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed 
for a unit shock to the extended DP dummy variable.  
If the results computed for the benchmark model are not sensitive to adding the 
Kennedy and Johnson episodes to the DP dummy variable, the IRFs computed for a 
shock to the extended DP dummy variable ought to lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals reported for a shock to the DP dummy variable. In the first column 
of Figure 3.5, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs computed for a shock 
to the extended DP dummy variable. The dashed lines display the lower and upper 
bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence intervals reported for a shock to the DP dummy 
variable.  
All the IRFs computed for a shock to the extended DP dummy variable lie within 
the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with the DP dummy variable. 
Furthermore, their patterns are very similar to the ones reported for a shock to the DP 
dummy variable. Therefore, it is concluded that the IRFs reported for the benchmark 
model are not sensitive to adding the Kennedy and Johnson episodes to the DP dummy 
variable. 
The second column of Figure 3.5 presents the IRFs computed when the dates 
selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for the onsets of the Vietnam War and Carter-
Reagan episodes are used to construct an alternative extended DP dummy variable. The 
solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, 
and the GDP deflator computed for a unit shock to this alternative extended DP dummy 
variable. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of the sixty-eight percent 
confidence intervals reported for a shock to the alternative DP dummy variable. 
All the IRFs computed for a shock to the extended alternative DP dummy variable 
lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with the alternative DP 
dummy variable. Furthermore, their patterns are similar to the ones reported for a shock 
to the alternative DP dummy variable. Therefore, it is concluded that the IRFs reported 
for the benchmark model are not sensitive to adding the Kennedy and Johnson episodes 
to the alternative DP dummy variable. 
In conclusion, when the benchmark model is estimated, the IRFs computed for a 
shock to the DP dummy variable are generally similar to the ones reported for a shock to 
the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, which includes the same dates for the 
onsets of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes as the DP dummy variable. They imply that 
defense purchases increase very persistently in response to a shock to the DP dummy 
variable, output rises temporarily, interest rates and the price level rise persistently.  
Furthermore, when the dates selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for the onsets 
of the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes are used to construct the DP dummy 
variable, the IRFs computed for real GDP and RTB imply that the results reported for the 
benchmark model are sensitive to small perturbations in the dates of the Ramey-Shapiro 

































































































































Figure 3.5: Point Estimates from the Model with Extended DP Dummy. Dates 
Selected by Horent or Ramey-Shapiro and Horent 
Confidence Intervals from the Model with the Dates Selected by Horent 
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Johnson episodes is constructed, the IRFs computed imply that they are not sensitive to 
adding the Kennedy and Johnson episodes to the DP dummy variable. 
3.5 Alternative Time Trends and Lag Lengths 
As was mentioned before, although the DP dummy variable includes twice as 
many shocks to defense purchases as the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, the number of 
shocks included remains modest. Therefore, the robustness of the results computed for a 
shock to the DP dummy variable is an important issue to address.  
This section presents statistical evidence on the selection of an appropriate time 
trend and an adequate lag length for the variables included in the VAR system under 
study. It also investigates the sensitivity of the results reported for the benchmark model 
to adding a time trend and changing the lag length used. The methodology followed is 
exactly identical to the one presented for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable in the 
previous chapter of the dissertation. 
3.5.1 Time Trend 
To select an appropriate time trend for the VAR system under study, models in 
which different types of time trend are added, in turn, to each equation of the benchmark 
model are estimated, and the corresponding AIC and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) 
values are computed. Systems with no time trend, a linear trend only, linear and quadratic 
trends, and a “Perron-type” time trend are considered.3 The preferred specification is the 
one that minimizes the AIC and SBC values. 
A series of likelihood ratio test statistics is also computed. First, the null 
hypothesis of no time trend is tested against the alternatives of a linear trend only, linear 
and quadratic trends, and a “Perron-type” trend. Second, the null hypothesis of a linear 
trend only is tested against the alternatives of linear and quadratic trends and a “Perron-
type” trend. 
Table 3.1 reports the AIC and SBC values computed when the benchmark model 
is estimated under the alternative assumptions for the time trend. The AIC criterion 
implies that it is better to include a “Perron type” time trend in the VAR system under 
study. The SBC criterion implies that it is better not to include a time trend; however, it is 
noted that the SBC values computed for the models with no time trend and the model 
with a “Perron-type” trend are almost identical.  
 
Table 3.1: AIC and SBC Values for Time Trend 
Benchmark Model (1948:1-1999:2) 
 
Type of time trend Aikaike’s Information 
Criterion 
Schwarz’s Criterion 
No trend -5852.76 -5559.91 
Linear trend only -5864.02 -5557.85 
“Perron-type” -5878.76 -5559.28 
Linear and quadratic trend -5871.86 -5552.39 
 
Table 3.2 reports the results of the likelihood ratio tests carried out. In each case, 
the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, it is concluded that including any type of time trend 
                                                 
3 The “Perron-type” time trend  as well as the other time trends included in this chapter are discussed in 
details in the previous chapter of the dissertation.  
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is better than including no time trend. Furthermore, it is concluded that including linear 
and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend is better than including a linear trend only. 
While the statistical evidence reported above implies that it may be better to 
include linear and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend to the benchmark model, the 
addition of time trends may not significantly affect the IRFs reported. If the results 
reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to the addition of time trends, the 
IRFs computed for the models with time trends ought to lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals reported for the benchmark model. 
 
Table 3.2: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Time Trend 
Benchmark Model (1948:1-1999:2) 
 
Null hypothesis  Alternative  Test value P-value 
No time trend Linear trend only 17.10* 0.0018 
No time trend Linear and Quadratic trend  31.01** 0.0001 
No time trend “Perron-type” trend  37.10** 0.0000 
Linear trend only Linear and Quadratic trend 14.00* 0.0073 
Linear trend only “Perron-type” trend 20.09* 0.0010 
* 4 restrictions are imposed. The critical value at a 5% significance level for a chi-square distribution with 
4 degrees of freedom is 9.49. 
** 8 restrictions are imposed. The critical value at a 5% significance level for a chi-square distribution with 
8 degrees of freedom is 15.51. 
 
In Figure 3.6, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when linear and quadratic 
trends and a “Perron-type” trend are added, in turn, to the benchmark model. The dashed 
lines display the confidence intervals computed for the benchmark model.  
When linear and quadratic trends are added to each equation of the benchmark 
model, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, and the GDP deflator computed lie 
within or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the benchmark model at all 
horizons. The IRF for RTB lies within the corresponding confidence interval from the 
benchmark model for more than two years, and then it lies slightly below the lower 
bound of the confidence interval.  
When a “Perron-type” trend is added to each equation of the benchmark model, 
all the IRFs computed lie within the corresponding confidence intervals reported for the 
benchmark model at all horizons. Overall, although adding linear and quadratic trends to 
the benchmark model moderately affects the results reported for RTB at long horizons, it 
is concluded that the results reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to adding 
time trends. 
3.5.2  Lag Length  
To select an adequate lag length for the variables included in the VAR system 
under study, models identical to the benchmark model except for the lag length used are 
estimated. Then, the corresponding AIC and SBC values are computed. Systems with one 
to eight lags of the endogenous variables and the DP dummy variable are considered.4 
                                                 
4 As for the study of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables, only models for which the lag length used for 






































































































































Figure 3.6: Point Estimates from Models with Alternative Time Trends 
Confidence Intervals from Benchmark Model 
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The preferred lag length is the one that minimizes the AIC or SBC values. A 
sequence of likelihood ratio tests is also computed. The null hypothesis of seven lags 
versus the alternative of eight lags, then the null hypothesis of six lags versus the 
alternative seven lags, and so on, are tested.  
Table 3.3 reports the AIC and SBC values computed for the VAR systems in 
which one to eight lagged values of the variables are included.5 Table 3.4 reports the 
results of the likelihood ratio tests carried out. The AIC and SBC values and the 
likelihood ratio tests reported for the models with the DP dummy variable yield the same 
conclusions as the ones presented for model with the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable in 
the previous chapter of the dissertation.  
According to the AIC criterion, it is better to include six lagged values of the 
variables. In contrast, the SBC values reported imply that it is better to include two 
lagged values of the variables. The likelihood ratio tests indicate that the null hypotheses 
of seven and six lags cannot be rejected; however, the null hypothesis of five lags can be 
rejected. Therefore, according to the likelihood ratio tests, it is better to include six 
lagged values of the variables.6  
 
Table 3.3: AIC and SBC Values for Lag Length 
Benchmark Model (1949:1-1999:2) 
 
Number of lags Aikaike’s Information  
Criterion 
Schwarz’s Criterion 
1 -5492.73 -5400.10 
2 -5710.44 -5551.64 
3 -5732.84 -5507.88 
4 -5752.45 -5461.32 
5 -5756.73 -5399.44 
6 -5811.78 -5388.32 
7 -5798.02 -5308.40 
8 -5792.02 -5236.23 
 
Table 3.4: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Lag Length 
Benchmark Model (1949:1-1999:2) 
 
Null hypothesis  Alternative  Test value* P-value 
Lag length = 7 Lag length =8 26.29 0.1372 
Lag length = 6 Lag length = 7 24.81 0.2087 
Lag length = 5 Lag length = 6 79.69 0.0000 
* For every test we impose 20 restrictions. The critical value at a 5% significance level for a chi-square 
distribution with 20 degrees of freedom is 31.41. 
                                                 
5 For comparison’s sake, the AIC and SBC values and the likelihood ratio statistic are computed when the 
corresponding systems are estimated over the period from 1949:1 to 1999:2. 
6 In some circumstances, using a criterion such as the AIC, the SBC, or likelihood ratio tests to select the 
lag length may yield a model in which serial correlation of the residuals may be problematic. However, the 
q-statistic computed when the benchmark model is estimated with two, four, and six lags of the endogenous 
and dummy variables suggest that the residuals are serially uncorrelated for all lag lengths. 
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While the statistical evidence reported above implies that it is better to include 
either two or six lagged values of the variables in the VAR system under study, altering 
the lag length used to estimate the system may not affect the results reported for the 
benchmark model. If the results reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to the 
lag length used, the IRFs computed for the models with two and six lags ought to lie 
within the corresponding confidence intervals from the benchmark model.  
In Figure 3.7, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the models with two and 
six lagged values of the variables. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals 
computed for the benchmark model. Several of the IRFs computed for the models with 
two and six lags differ significantly from the ones reported for the benchmark model. 
The IRF for real GDP computed for the model with two lags lies slightly below 
the lower bound of the corresponding confidence interval from the benchmark model for 
several quarters in the second year after a shock. Furthermore, it exhibits a pattern very 
different from the one reported for the benchmark model. It is very small and flat. A year 
after a shock to defense purchases, the IRF for RTB computed for the model with two 
lags lies below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the benchmark model for 
two and a half years. Furthermore, it also exhibits a pattern very different from the one 
reported for the benchmark model. Two quarters after a shock, it is negative. 
Less than a year after a shock to the DP dummy variable, the IRF for defense 
purchases computed for the model with six lags lies below the lower bound of the 
corresponding confidence interval from the benchmark model at all horizons. Three 
quarters after a shock, the IRFs for real GDP and RTB lie below the lower bound of the 
corresponding confidence intervals for more than one and half years and two years, 
respectively. They also exhibit patterns very different from the ones reported for the 
benchmark model. Two quarters after a shock, they are negative. 
In conclusion, the statistical evidence reported in this section imply that it may be 
more appropriate to estimate a VAR system in which each equation includes a “Perron-
type” time trend or linear and quadratic time trends rather than the benchmark model. 
However, the IRFs presented when these time trends are added to the benchmark model 
are not significantly different from the ones reported for the benchmark model.  
With regard to the best lag length to use for the VAR system under study, the 
SBC criterion implies that it is better to include only two lagged values of the variables. 
However, the AIC criterion and the likelihood ratio tests carried out imply that it is better 
to include six lagged values of the variables. Altering the lag length used to estimate the 
VAR system under study significantly affects the results reported for real GDP and RTB, 
and to a lesser extent, defense purchases.  
Furthermore, when two or six lagged values of the variables are used to estimate 
the VAR system under study, the patterns of the IRFs for real GDP and RTB are 
inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models.    
3.6  Alternative Model 
Following Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), the benchmark model 
includes four lagged values of the variables and no time trend. However, it may not be 






































































































































Figure 3.7: Point Estimates from Models with Alternative Lag Lengths 
Confidence Intervals from Benchmark Model 
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computed when twelve models that include defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the 
GDP deflator are estimated using with different lag lengths and time trends.  
Models with two, four, six and eight lagged values of the variables are considered 
as well as with no time trend, linear and quadratic trends, and a “Perron-type” trend. The 
model that yields the lowest AIC value is selected as the alternative model. The AIC 
values computed for the different models are reported in Table 3.5. As for VAR system 
with the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, they indicate that the model with six lags and a 
“Perron-type” time trend represents the best specification for the system with the DP 
dummy variable. 
 
Table 3.5: AIC values for Various Time Trends and Lag Lengths 






Linear and Quadratic 
Trend  
“Perron-type” Trend 
2 -5710.44 -5735.17 -5739.34 
4 -5752.45 -5773.26 -5782.18 
6 -5811.78 -5832.93 -5837.54 
8 -5792.02 -5810.80 -5814.09 
 
In the first column of Figure 3.8, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit 
shock to the DP dummy variable when the alternative model is estimated. The dashed 
lines display the lower and upper bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence intervals. The 
patterns of the IRFs computed for the alternative model differ moderately from the ones 
reported for the benchmark model.  
The IRF for defense purchases appears slightly flatter at long horizons than the 
one reported for the benchmark model. The IRF for real GDP appears similar but more 
persistent than the one reported for the benchmark model. The delayed increase in RTB 
reported for the alternative model is almost twice as large as for the benchmark model. 
Moreover, it is significant for more two and a half years, compared to one and a half 
years for the benchmark model. Finally, the IRF for the GDP deflator is similar to the one 
reported for the benchmark model for more than a year, but then it returns to its original 
value more rapidly than the one reported for the benchmark model.  
To further compare the results reported for the benchmark and alternative models, 
the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the 
benchmark model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
alternative model, which is the preferred model. If the IRFs computed for the benchmark 
model are not significantly different from the IRFs reported for the alternative model, 
they ought to lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model.  
In the second column of Figure 3.8, the solid lines display the point estimates of 
the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the 
benchmark model. The dashed lines display the corresponding confidence intervals 


































































































































Figure 3.8: Point Estimates from Alternative Model and Benchmark Model 
Confidence Interval from Alternative Model 
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GDP deflator computed for the benchmark model are not very different from the ones 
reported for the alternative model. The IRF for RTB appears significantly different from 
the one reported for the alternative model.  
Two years after a shock to the DP dummy variable, the IRF for defense purchases 
computed for the benchmark model lies very slightly above the upper bound of the 
confidence interval from the alternative model. In the second and third year after a shock, 
the IRF for real GDP lies very slightly above the upper bound of the confidence interval 
from the alternative model for several periods.  
A year after a shock to the DP dummy variable, the IRF for RTB lies below the 
lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model for more than a year. 
The IRF for the GDP deflator computed for the benchmark model is not significantly 
different from the one reported for the alternative model for three years. Then, it lies very 
slightly above the upper bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model. 
In conclusion, based on the AIC criterion, it is better to estimate an alternative 
model with a “Perron-type” trend as well as six lagged values of the variables rather than 
the benchmark model. The patterns of the IRFs computed for the alternative model are 
fairly similar to the ones reported for the benchmark model. However, the magnitudes of 
the effects computed for the alternative model differ moderately from the ones reported 
for the benchmark model.  
3.7 Extended Models 
This section investigates the sensitivity of the results reported for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator to adding an endogenous variable or an 
exogenous dummy variable to the alternative model. Seventeen variables are considered; 
they are the ones introduced in the previous chapter for the investigation of the model 
with the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
First, the effects of the shocks to the DP dummy variable in models that 
alternatively include fiscal variables are examined. Then, the effects of the shocks in 
models that alternatively include consumption, investment, and labor market variables are 
investigated. Finally, the effects of the shocks in models that alternatively include the 
Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable, the monetary base, Hamilton’s oil price 
dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and a measure of long-term interest rates are 
presented. 
For each variable under consideration, the same exercise as the one introduced in 
the previous chapter for the model with Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is presented. 
First, an extended version of the alternative model is estimated that includes the DP 
dummy variable, defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, the GDP deflator, and the variable 
under consideration. Six lagged values of the variable under consideration are included if 
it is endogenous. The contemporaneous and six lagged values are included if it is an 
exogenous dummy variable.  
 Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are 
computed for a unit shock to the DP dummy variable. Finally, the point estimates of the 
IRFs computed for the extended model are plotted against the corresponding confidence 
intervals reported for the alternative model. If the results reported for the alternative 
model are not sensitive to perturbations in the list of variables used, the IRFs computed 
for the extended model ought to lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from 
the alternative model.  
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3.7.1 Additional Fiscal Variables 
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to the DP dummy 
variable in models that alternatively include non-defense purchases, real federal 
government receipts, and the real federal government deficit. The logarithmic values of 
the fiscal variables are used except for the deficit, which takes negative values. To 
construct the measures of real federal government receipts and the real federal 
government deficit, the current values of these variables in billions of dollars are deflated 
by the CPI. Non-defense purchases are in billions of chained (1992) dollars.7 
In Figure 3.9, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the fiscal variables listed above are added, in 
turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals 
from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs. The 
dashed lines display the confidence intervals, which were presented in the previous 
section.  
All the IRFs computed for the models with non-defense purchases and real federal 
government receipts lie within or on the confidence intervals from the alternative model 
at all horizons. The IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, and the GDP deflator 
computed for the models with the real federal government deficit also lie within or on the 
confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. The IRF for RTB 
computed for the model with the real federal government deficit lies within the 
confidence interval from the alternative model for three years, and then it lies very 
slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval.  
Overall, eleven out of twelve IRFs computed when the fiscal variables are added, 
in turn, to the alternative model are not significantly different from the corresponding 
IRFs reported for the alternative model at any horizon. Furthermore, the IRF for RTB 
computed for the model with the real federal government deficit is only marginally 
different at long horizons from the IRF reported for the alternative model. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the results reported for the alternative model are not sensitive to the 
addition of fiscal variables.  
3.7.2 Additional Sectoral Variables 
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to the DP dummy 
variable on defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator in models that 
alternatively include components of consumption and investment. Following Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), consumption and investment are broken down into three 
components: consumption of non-durables and services, residential investment plus 
consumption of durables, and non-residential investment.  
 This sub-section also presents evidence on the effects of shocks to the DP dummy 
variable on defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator in models that 
alternatively include measures of employment, real wages, and real compensation. First, 
employment in the private sector, employment in the non-durables manufacturing sector, 
and employment in the durables manufacturing sector are examined. Then, real wages in  
 
                                                 
7 The different extended models estimated in this section and the variables included in these extended 
models are identical to the ones presented in the study of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables. They are 































































































































































































Figure 3.9: Point Estimates from Models with a Fiscal Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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private industry, real compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real compensation in 
the business sector are considered.  
 The logarithmic values of the consumption and investment variables, as well as the 
other sectoral variables examined hereafter, are included in the models estimated. To 
construct the measures of real compensation and real wages, the nominal values of these 
variables are deflated by the CPI. The other additional sectoral variables examined 
hereafter are in billions of chained (1992) dollars.  
 In Figure 3.10, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the consumption and investment variables 
listed above are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the 
point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals. All the 
IRFs reported for the models with a component of consumption and investment lie within 
or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons.  
In Figure 3.11, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when employment in private industry, employment 
in the non-durables manufacturing sector, and employment in the durables manufacturing 
sector are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals.  
Except for the IRF for defense purchases computed for the model with 
employment in the durables manufacturing sector, the IRFs reported for the models with 
a measure of employment lie within or on the corresponding confidence intervals from 
the alternative model at all horizons. The IRF for defense purchases reported for the 
model with employment in the durables manufacturing sector lies within the 
corresponding confidence interval from the alternative model for two years, and then it 
lies slightly above the upper bound of the confidence interval.  
In Figure 3.12, the point estimates of the IRFs computed when real wages in 
private industry, real compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real compensation in 
the business sector are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the 
point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals. Since 
the series for compensation in the manufacturing sector is not available before 1949:1, 
the model with this variable is estimated from 1950:3 to 1999:2, and the IRFs computed 
for this model are plotted against confidence intervals computed for the alternative model 
over the same sub-sample period.  
Except for the IRF for RTB computed for the model with real compensation in the 
manufacturing sector, the IRFs reported for the models with a measure of real wages or 
real compensation lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model at all horizons. The IRF for RTB computed for the model with real compensation 
in the manufacturing sector lies within the corresponding confidence interval from the 
alternative model for three and a half years, and then it lies very slightly above the upper 
bound of the confidence interval. 
Overall, thirty-four out of thirty-six IRFs computed when consumption, 





























































































































































































Figure 3.10: Point Estimates from Models with a Consumption or Investment 
Variable 






























































































































































































Figure 3.11: Point Estimates from Models with an Employment Variable 





























































































































































































Figure 3.12: Point Estimates from Models with a Measure of Real Wages or Real 
Compensation 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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to the alternative are not significantly different from the corresponding IRFs reported for 
the alternative model at any horizon. The IRF for RTB computed for the model with real 
compensation in the manufacturing sector is briefly and marginally different from the 
IRF reported for the alternative model. 
However, the IRF for defense purchases computed for the model with 
employment in the durables manufacturing sector is persistently different from the IRF 
reported for the alternative model. Therefore, it is concluded that the results reported for 
the alternative model are not sensitive to the addition of sectoral variables, except maybe 
for employment in the durables manufacturing sector. 
3.7.3  Additional Macroeconomic Variables 
First, this sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to the DP dummy 
variable in models that alternatively include the Romers’ monetary policy dummy 
variable and the monetary base. The Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable is 
considered since it provides a crude way to control for the effects of monetary policy 
shocks, specifically monetary contractions, on the economy. The monetary base is 
considered because it responds quickly to monetary policy actions; however, it should not 
be interpreted as a measure of monetary policy.  
Second, this sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to the DP 
dummy variable in models that alternatively include Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable 
and the PPI for crude fuel. These variables provide a crude way to control for the effects 
of exogenous supply shocks. Finally, since the interest rate channel is an important 
channel of transmission of fiscal policy, this sub-section presents evidence on the effects 
of shocks in a model that includes the constant maturity ten-year Treasury bond yield 
(LTR) in addition to RTB.  
In the first and second columns of Figure 3.13, the point estimates of the IRFs for 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the monetary 
variables listed above are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the 
point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals. 
All the IRFs computed for the model with the Romers’ monetary policy dummy 
variable lie within the confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. 
Except for defense purchases, the IRFs reported for the model with the monetary base 
also lie within the confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons.  
The IRF for defense purchases computed for the model with the monetary base 
lies within the confidence interval from the alternative model for more than two years 
after a shock to the DP dummy variable, and then it lies very slightly above the upper 
bound of the confidence interval. Furthermore, after a delay of two and a half years, the 
IRF for real GDP lies on the upper bound of the corresponding confidence interval from 
the alternative model.  
In the third and fourth column of Figure 3.13, the point estimates of the IRFs for 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when Hamilton’s oil 
price dummy variable and the PPI for crude fuel are added, in turn, to the alternative 
model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display 





















































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.13: Point Estimates from Models with an Additional Macroeconomic 
Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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dummy variable and the PPI for crude fuel lie within the corresponding confidence 
intervals from the alternative model at all horizons.  
In the last column of Figure 3.13, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when LTR is added to the 
alternative model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
alternative model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed 
lines display the confidence intervals. All the IRFs reported for the model with LTR lie 
within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. 
Overall, nineteen out of twenty IRFs computed when the Romers’ monetary 
policy dummy variable, the monetary base, Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, the PPI 
for crude fuel, and LTR are added, in turn, to the alternative model are not significantly 
different from the corresponding IRFs reported for the alternative model at any horizon.  
Furthermore, the IRF for defense purchases computed for the model with the 
monetary base differs only marginally from the one presented for the alternative model at 
long horizons. Therefore, it is concluded that the results reported for the alternative 
model are not sensitive to the addition of the macroeconomic variables examined in this 
sub-section.  
3.7.4 Responses of Fiscal and Monetary Variables 
As for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, it is of interest to determine whether 
the shocks included in the DP dummy variable coincide not only with increases in 
defense purchases but also changes in other dimensions of fiscal policy or changes in 
monetary policy. Therefore, this sub-section presents the effects of a shock to the DP 
dummy variable on non-defense purchases, real federal government receipts, the real 
federal government deficit, and the monetary base.  
In Figure 3.14, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs computed for 
the additional fiscal variables and the monetary base when the extended models that 
include these variables are estimated. The dashed lines display the lower and upper 
bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence intervals. The IRF reported for the monetary 
base, and to a lesser extent the IRF for non-defense purchases, are different from the ones 
presented for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable in the last chapter.   
The IRF for non-defense purchases is negative for more than a year after a shock to the 
DP dummy variable. However, it is significant for less a year, and then it is not 
significantly different from zero. The IRF for real federal government receipts exhibits a 
hump-shaped pattern. It increases sharply for one and a half years after a shock to the DP 
dummy variable, and then it quickly returns to its original value. Overall, the increase in 
real federal government receipts is significant for more than a year. It is consistent with 
the IRFs reported for real GDP and the GDP deflator.  
The IRF computed for the real federal government deficit is small and not 
significantly different from zero for almost two years after a shock to the DP dummy 
variable. Then, it deteriorates significantly and persistently. The pattern of the IRF 
computed for the real federal government deficit appears consistent with the IRFs 
reported for federal government purchases and receipts.  
Following a shock to the DP dummy variable, non-defense purchases decline for 
more than a year and government receipts increase for more than two years, which allows 
the federal government to finance the military build-up without a significant deterioration 
of its deficit. In the third year after an episode, defense purchases remain very high, but 
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Figure 3.14: Point Estimates of the IRFs for Fiscal and Monetary variables 
Sample Period: 1948:3-1999:2 
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non-defense purchases have returned to their initial level and the increase in federal 
government receipts comes to an end. Therefore, a portion of the military build-up is 
financed through government deficits at longer horizons. 
The IRF for the monetary base is negative at all horizons. Less than a year after a 
shock to the DP dummy variable, it declines significantly and very persistently. This 
result implies that the shocks to defense purchases identified earlier in this chapter may 
have been associated with persistent changes in monetary policy, which is consistent with 
the evidence reported by Caplan (1999) for instance.  
Overall, the IRFs for the fiscal and monetary variables presented in this sub-
section indicate that the shocks to defense purchases included in the DP dummy variable 
coincide with significant and temporary declines in non-defense purchases as well as 
significant and very persistent decrease in the monetary base.  
Furthermore, like the IRFs reported for the models with the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable, the IRFs computed for a shock to the DP dummy variable imply that the 
federal government is initially able to finance military build-ups through increases in 
revenues. However, once the increases in revenues come to end, the government needs to 
finance the military build-ups through deficits. 
3.8 Alternative Sample Periods 
  This section provides evidence on the sensitivity of the results reported for the 
alternative model to perturbations in the sample period used. First, the alternative model 
is estimated over the four sub-sample periods used in the study of the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. The early and late sub-sample periods span from 1948:1 to 1973:1 and 
1960:1 to 1999:2, respectively. The next sub-sample periods selected span from 1950:1 to 
1999:2 and from 1948:3 to 1989:4, which corresponds to the Cold War era. 
For each sub-sample period, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, 
real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit shock to the DP dummy 
variable are plotted along with the corresponding confidence intervals for the whole 
sample period. If the results reported for the alternative model are not sensitive to 
perturbations in the sample period used, the IRFs computed for the different sub-sample 
periods ought to lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the whole sample 
period.  
In the first and second columns of Figure 3.15, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed when the alternative model is estimated over the early and late sub-sample 
periods. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals reported for the whole sample 
period.  
The IRFs for real GDP and the GDP deflator computed for the early sub-sample 
period are marginally different from the ones reported for the whole sample period. The 
IRF for real GDP lies very slightly above the upper bound of the confidence interval from 
the whole sample period for several periods in the first and third year after a shock to the 
DP dummy variable. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies very slightly above the upper 
bound of the confidence interval from the whole sample period at the end of the fourth 
year after a shock  
The IRFs for defense purchases and RTB computed for the early sub-sample 
period are significantly and persistently different from the ones reported for the whole 






































































































































































































































Figure 3.15: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods 
Confidence Intervals from the Whole Sample Period 
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the upper bound of the confidence interval from the whole sample period at all horizons. 
The IRF for RTB is initially negative and it is very small at all horizons. Except for a 
quarter, it lies below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the whole sample 
period. 
The IRF for defense purchases computed for the late sub-sample period is only 
marginally different from the one reported for the whole sample period. It lies on or close 
to the lower bound of the corresponding confidence interval from the whole sample 
period for one and a half years, and then it lies within the confidence interval. The IRF 
for RTB is not significantly different from the one reported for the whole sample period. 
It lies within the confidence interval from the whole sample period at all horizons. 
The IRFs for real GDP and the GDP deflator computed for the late sub-sample 
period are significantly and persistently different from the ones reported for the whole 
sample period. The IRF for real GDP lies on the upper bound of the confidence interval 
from the whole sample period for one and a half years, and then it lies above the upper 
bound. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies below the lower bound of the confidence 
interval from the whole sample period for more than two and a half years. 
In the third and fourth columns of Figure 3.15, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed when the alternative model is estimated over the sub-sample period from 
1950:1 to 1999:2 and the Cold War era. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals 
reported for the whole sample period.  
The IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, and RTB computed for the sub-sample 
period from 1950:1 to 1999:2 are not significantly different from the ones reported for the 
whole sample period. They lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
whole sample period at all horizons. However, the IRF for the GDP deflator is 
significantly different from the one reported for the whole sample period. A year after a 
shock to the DP dummy variable, it lies below the lower bound of the confidence interval 
from the whole sample period. 
The IRF for defense purchases computed for the Cold War era is not significantly 
different from the ones reported for the whole sample period. It lies within the confidence 
interval from the whole sample period at all horizons. However, the IRFs for real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator are significantly different from the ones reported for the 
whole sample period.  
The IRF for real GDP computed for the Cold War era lies within the confidence 
interval from the whole sample period for two and a half years after a shock to the DP 
dummy variable. Then, it lies slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval. 
After a delay of a year, the IRF for RTB lies slightly above the upper bound of the 
confidence interval from the whole sample period. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies 
within the confidence interval from the whole sample period for a year, and then it lies 
above the upper bound of the confidence interval. 
To further examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative model 
to perturbations in the sample period, Figure 3.16 presents the point estimates and 
confidence intervals of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP 
deflator computed for a unit shock to the DP dummy variable when the alternative model 
























































































































Figure 3.16: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Sample Periods  
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estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of sixty-
eight percent confidence intervals.  
The patterns of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, and the GDP deflator 
computed for the early sub-sample period are similar to the ones reported for the whole 
sample period. However, the IRF for defense purchases is much smaller than to the one 
reported for the whole sample period. The IRF for RTB computed for the early sub-
sample period exhibits a pattern very different from the one reported for the whole 
sample period. It declines significantly for three quarters after a shock to the DP dummy 
variable, and then it is not significantly different from zero.  
The pattern of the IRF for defense purchases computed for the late sub-sample 
period is different from the one reported for the whole sample period. It increases more  
gradually than the IRF reported for the whole sample period and it is smaller. The 
patterns and sizes of the IRFs for real GDP and RTB are similar to the ones reported for 
the whole sample period. The pattern of the IRF for the GDP deflator is very different 
from the one reported for the whole sample period. It is negative at all horizons and 
significantly different from zero for almost a year after a shock to the DP dummy 
variable.   
In conclusion, when the alternative model is estimated over the early and late sub-
sample periods, the results reported for the alternative model appear sensitive to 
perturbations in the sample period used. The IRFs computed for over the early and late 
sub-sample periods are very different from the ones reported for the whole sample period. 
Furthermore, when the alternative model is estimated over the Cold War era, the results 
reported for the alternative model also appear sensitive to perturbations in the sample 
period used.  
Except for the GDP deflator, the results computed when the alternative model is 
estimated over the sub-sample period from 1950:1 to 1999:2 are similar to the ones 
reported for the whole sample period. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
sensitivity of the IRF for the GDP deflator to the subtraction of a small number of data at 
the beginning of the whole sample period may be explained by the unusual behavior of 
the GDP deflator during the period from 1948:3 to 1949:4. 
Like the results presented for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable in the previous 
chapter, the IRFs reported above imply that the results computed for the alternative 
model are sensitive to the exclusion of shocks from the DP dummy variable. This may be 
expected since the DP dummy variable includes a modest number of shocks to defense 
purchases. 
3.9 Accounting for the Differences Among the Shocks Identified 
As was mentioned before, the changes in defense purchases and government 
purchases that followed the shocks to defense purchases included in the DP dummy 
variable differ greatly in size and shape. As for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, the 
Korean War episode is much larger than the other episodes included in the DP dummy 
variable.   
Therefore, it is of interest to examine the results reported for the alternative model 
when the values of the shocks included in the DP dummy variable differ according to the 
sizes of the military build-ups or retrenchments that follow them. This is done following 
the same methodology as the one presented in the previous chapter for the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable. 
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An alternative DP dummy variable is constructed that has the value one at the 
date of the Korean War episode. The values of the other shocks are assigned according to 
the maximum change in defense purchases within six quarters after the onsets of these 
shocks relative to the maximum change after the onset of the Korean War episode. The 
Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes have the values 0.44 and 0.12, respectively. 
The Eisenhower, the Nixon, and the Bush-Clinton episodes have the values -0.17, -0.27, 
and -0.05, respectively.  
Then, a system identical to the alternative model, except that it includes the 
modified DP dummy variable, is estimated. Finally, the IRFs for defense purchases, real 
GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to the modified DP 
dummy variable. In Figure 3.17, the solid lines display the point estimates of these IRFs 
and the dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of sixty-eight percent 
confidence intervals.  
The patterns of the IRFs for defense purchases and real GDP computed using the 
modified DP dummy variable are similar to the ones reported using the DP dummy 
variable; however, their magnitudes are very different. The maximum effects reported for 
defense purchases and real GDP using the modified DP dummy variable are twice as 
large as the ones reported for the DP dummy variable.  
The IRF for RTB computed for the modified DP dummy variable is initially very 
different from the one reported for the DP dummy variable. It is negative for a year after 
a shock to defense purchases, and significant for several periods. Then, it is similar to the 
IRF reported for the DP dummy variable. The IRF for the GDP deflator computed for the 
modified DP dummy variable is more persistent and larger than the one reported for the 
DP dummy variable.  
Overall, since the changes in defense purchases and government purchases that 
follow the shocks included in the DP dummy variable differ in size, it could be argued 
that it is better to estimate a VAR system in which the assumption that the shocks to 
defense purchases are of equal intensity is abandoned. Therefore, the modified DP 
dummy variable is constructed. 
 Except for RTB, the patterns of the IRFs computed for a shock to the modified DP 
dummy variable are fairly similar to the ones reported for a shock to the DP dummy 
variable; however, their magnitudes differ. Unlike the IRF for RTB reported for a shock 
to the DP dummy variable, the one computed for a shock to the modified DP dummy 
variable declines significantly in the first year after a shock. This last result may reflect 
the importance of the Korean War episode in generating the IRFs reported for a shock to 
the modified DP dummy variable.  
3.10 The Exogeneity of the Shocks Identified   
In the previous chapter, the exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes was 
investigated following the methodology used by Leeper (1997) to study the exogeneity of 
the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable. First, logit equations that included 
macroeconomic variables were estimated for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
Then, the probability that the logit equations have the value one at the dates 
selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) was computed. The logit equations were very 
imprecisely estimated, and the results reported for the Korean War were problematic. 
Therefore, it was concluded that estimating logit equations did not provide meaningful 




































































Figure 3.17: Point Estimates from the Model with Modified DP Dummy Variable 
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Similarly, several logit equations that included macroeconomic variables were 
estimated for the DP dummy variable.8 Like the logit equations presented for the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable, they were very imprecisely estimated, and the results reported 
for the Korean War were problematic. Therefore, it was concluded that estimating logit 
equations for the DP dummy variable did not provide meaningful evidence on the 
exogeneity of the shocks included the DP dummy variable, and the results computed for 
these equations are not presented in this chapter. 
Two VAR systems in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable was entered as 
an endogenous variable were also estimated in the previous chapter to examine the 
exogeneity of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. Similarly, two VAR systems in which the DP 
dummy variable is entered as an endogenous variable are estimated to examine the 
exogeneity of the shocks included in the DP dummy variable.  
The so-called linear systems include the DP dummy variable along with defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator. Like the other equations in the linear 
systems, the equation for the DP dummy variable includes six lagged values of itself, 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator, plus a constant and a “Perron-
type” time trend. The linear systems are estimated using OLS, and the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator that present the effects of a unit shock 
to the DP dummy variable are computed.  
The Choleski decomposition is used to identify the shocks to the DP dummy 
variable within the linear systems. For the first linear system, the DP dummy variable is 
ordered first, defense purchases are ordered second, real GDP is ordered third, RTB is 
ordered fourth, and the GDP deflator is ordered last. For the second linear system, real 
GDP is ordered first, RTB is ordered second, the GDP deflator is ordered third, the DP 
dummy variable is ordered fourth, and defense purchases are ordered last.9 
If the shocks included in the DP dummy variable are truly exogenous, the IRFs 
computed for the linear systems and the alternative model should be similar. 
Furthermore, if the shocks are truly exogenous, the IRFs computed for the linear systems 
should not be sensitive to the ordering of the residuals in the Choleski decomposition 
used to identify shocks to the dummy variable.  
In Figure 3.18, the short dashed lines display the IRFs for defense purchases, real 
GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit shock to the DP dummy variable 
when the first linear system is estimated. The long dashed lines display the IRFs 
computed when the second linear system is estimated. The solid lines display the 
confidence intervals reported for the alternative model. If the shocks included in the DP 
dummy variable are truly exogenous, the IRFs computed for the linear systems ought to 
lie within corresponding confidence interval reported for the alternative model.  
                                                 
8 Like for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, a logit equation estimated for the DP dummy variable 
included a constant, a “Perron-type” time trend, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator. Four lagged values 
of the independent variables were used because the coefficients estimated did not converge when more than 
four lagged values were used. A second logit equation estimated included a constant, a “Perron-type” time 
trend, real GDP, RTB, the GDP deflator, and defense purchases. In this case, two lagged values of the 
independent variables were used. The equations were estimated from 1948:1 to 1999:2 using a non-linear 
maximum likelihood method. 
 
9 The assumptions underlying of ordering of the residuals in the Choleski decompositions used for the 
linear models are discussed in the first chapter of the dissertation. 
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Figure 3.18: Point Estimates from Linear Systems 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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All the IRFs computed for the linear systems lie well within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons and they exhibit patterns 
very similar to the IRFs reported for the alternative model. Furthermore, the point 
estimates of the IRFs computed for the second linear system are close to the 
corresponding point estimates reported for first linear system.  
Therefore, it is concluded that the IRFs reported for the linear systems are 
consistent with the shocks included in the DP dummy variable being exogenous. 
However, as was mentioned for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, the IRFs reported 
for the linear systems do not represent definitive evidence on the exogeneity of the 
shocks under consideration. 
3.11 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter introduces a more comprehensive narrative approach than the one of 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) that tries to isolate exogenous reductions as well as 
exogenous increases in defense purchases. It also provides evidence on the implications 
of using the more comprehensive narrative approach for estimating the macroeconomic 
effects of exogenous shocks to government purchases.  
Five exogenous increases in defense expenditures are identified in the post-World 
War II era using the more comprehensive narrative approach introduced in this chapter. 
They correspond to the March Crisis, the Korean War, the Kennedy, the Vietnam War, 
and the Carter-Reagan build-ups. Four exogenous retrenchments in defense expenditures 
are also identified that correspond to the Eisenhower, the Johnson, the Nixon, and the 
Bush-Clinton retrenchments.  
The Korean War build-up is dated as beginning in the third quarter of 1950, 
which is also the date selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997). The Vietnam War build-up 
is dated as beginning in the third quarter of 1965, two quarters after the date selected by 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997). The Carter-Reagan build-up is dated as beginning in the last 
quarter of 1979, one quarter before the date selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997). 
Furthermore, the March Crisis and the Kennedy build-ups are dated as beginning in 
1948:2 and 1960:4, respectively. The Eisenhower, the Johnson, the Nixon, and the Bush-
Clinton retrenchments are dated as beginning in 1952:4, 1963:4, 1969:3, and 1989:4, 
respectively. 
Since the dates selected in this chapter for the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan 
shocks are slightly different from the ones presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1999), they 
are used to examine the sensitivity of the results computed in the previous chapter for the 
benchmark and alternative models to small perturbations in the dates of the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes. Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) argue that the results they 
report using the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are robust to small perturbations in the 
dates of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes.  
However, when the alternative dates selected in this chapter for the Vietnam War 
and Carter-Reagan episodes are used to construct modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variables, some of the IRFs reported are significantly different from the ones computed 
when the dates selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) are used. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the results presented in the previous chapter of the dissertation for a shock 
to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are sensitive to small perturbations in the dates of 
the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes.  
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To examine the implications of using the more comprehensive narrative approach 
for estimating the effects of fiscal policy, a dummy variable is constructed that has the 
value one at the dates of the onsets of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-
Reagan episodes, minus one at the dates of the Eisenhower, the Johnson, and the Bush-
Clinton episodes, and zero otherwise. It is referred to as the DP dummy variable. 
As in the previous chapter of the dissertation, this chapter focuses on two VAR 
systems in the spirit of Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). The benchmark model 
includes the contemporaneous and four lagged values of the DP dummy variable that are 
entered as exogenous variables as well as four lagged values of defense purchases, real 
GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator that are entered as endogenous variables. The 
alternative model, which is selected according to the AIC criterion, includes six lagged 
values of the variables and a “Perron-type” time trend.  
The IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to the DP dummy variable on 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for the 
benchmark and alternative models. The IRFs reported for the benchmark model imply 
that defense purchases increase very persistently in response to a shock to the DP dummy 
variable, output rises temporarily, and interest rates and the price level rise persistently. 
The IRFs reported for the alternative model are similar in pattern to the ones reported for 
the benchmark model; however, they are slightly different quantitatively. 
This chapter also presents evidence on the robustness of the results reported using 
the DP dummy variable, which is an important issue since the number of shocks included 
in this dummy variable is modest. First, the sensitivity of the results computed for the 
benchmark model is examined when an extended DP dummy variable is constructed that 
includes the Kennedy and Johnson episodes along with the shocks already in the DP 
dummy variable. The patterns of the IRFs computed for the extended DP dummy variable 
are similar to the ones reported for the DP dummy variable; however, they are generally 
smaller than the ones reported for the DP dummy variable.   
Furthermore, the sensitivity of the results computed for the benchmark model is 
examined when the dates selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for the onsets of the 
Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes are used to construct the DP dummy variable 
or the extended DP dummy variable, the IRFs reported are consistent with the evidence 
presented on the sensitivity of the results computed for the benchmark and alternative 
models to small perturbations in the dates of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes.  
Then, the sensitivity of the results computed for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator to adding time trends and changing the lag length used in the 
benchmark model is examined. It is shown that the results reported for the benchmark 
model are not sensitive to adding time trends. However, the results reported for defense 
purchases, real GDP, and RTB appear sensitive to changing the lag length used.  
Next, the sensitivity of the results computed for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator to perturbations in the list of variables included in the 
alternative model is examined. Seventeen endogenous and exogenous variables are 
added, in turn, to the alternative model, and the IRFs computed for the extended models 
and the alternative model are compared.  
It is concluded that, except maybe for employment in the durables manufacturing 
sector, the results reported for the alternative model are robust to perturbations in the list 
of variables used. In particular, unlike the results reported using the Ramey-Shapiro 
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dummy variable, the IRFs computed for a shock to the DP dummy variable are not 
altered by the addition of Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable to the alternative model. 
Furthermore, the IRFs reported when alternative fiscal variables and the monetary 
base are added, in turn, to the alternative model indicate that the shocks to the DP dummy 
variable ups coincide with significant and temporary changes in non-defense purchases as 
well as significant and very persistent changes in the monetary base. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the results reported using the DP appear may reflect, at least partially, the 
effects of systematic changes in other components of government purchases than defense 
purchases or monetary policy.       
Finally, the sensitivity of the results computed for the alternative model to 
perturbations in the sample period used is examined. The results computed for sub-
sample periods in which some shocks are excluded from the sub-sample used differ 
significantly from the results reported for the whole sample period. Except for the GDP 
deflator, the results computed for sub-sample periods 1950:1 to 1999:2 do not differ 
significantly from the results reported the whole sample period.  
In addition to presenting evidence on the robustness of the results computed for 
the benchmark and alternative models, this chapter investigates the implications of 
abandoning the assumption that the DP episodes are of equal intensity. Furthermore, it 
investigates the exogeneity of the shocks included in the DP dummy variable.  
To account for the differences in size among the shocks included in the DP 
dummy variable, a modified DP dummy variable whose values at the dates of the shocks 
to defense purchases vary according to the size of the changes in defense purchases that 
follows them is constructed. Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to the modified DP dummy variable 
when the alternative model is estimated.  
Except for RTB, the patterns of the IRFs computed for a shock to the modified 
DP dummy variable are fairly similar to the ones reported for a shock to the DP dummy 
variable; however, their magnitudes differ. The IRF for RTB reported for a shock to the 
modified DP dummy variable declines significantly in the first year after a shock, which 
may reflect the importance of the Korean War episode in generating the IRFs reported for 
a shock to the modified DP dummy variable. 
 To examine the exogeneity of the shocks included in the DP dummy variable, 
two linear systems are estimated in which the DP dummy variable is entered as an 
endogenous variable along with defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP 
deflator. Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are 
computed for a unit shock to the DP dummy variable. They are similar to the IRFs 
reported for the alternative model; and therefore, it is concluded that the results reported 
for the linear systems are consistent with the Ramey-Shapiro episodes being exogenous.  
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CHAPTER 4. THE CHOLESKI DECOMPOSITION 
4.1 Introduction 
Whereas the Choleski decomposition has been widely used to identify exogenous 
monetary policy shocks, it has been rarely used to identify exogenous fiscal policy 
shocks, in particular exogenous shocks to government purchases. Garcia-Mila (1989), 
Yuan and Li (1999), and Fatas and Mihov (2000) are among the small number of studies 
that have investigated the macroeconomic effects of government purchases using the 
Choleski decomposition.  
As was mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, the VAR systems 
estimated by Fatas and Mihov (2000) are similar in spirit to the ones presented by 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999); however, the sample period used by Fatas and 
Mihov (2000) is different. Furthermore, the values of some of the government data used 
by Fatas and Mihov (2000) are incorrect. As a result, the evidence they report cannot 
actually be compared to the one presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999).  
Moreover, the VAR systems estimated by Garcia-Mila (1989), and Yuan and Li 
(1999) are different in spirit from the models estimated by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and 
Fisher (1999) and Fatas and Mihov (2000). Yuan and Li (1999) do not include a measure 
of the price level in their model and Garcia-Mila (1999) does not include measures of the 
price level and interest rates in her model. The sample periods used by Garcia-Mila 
(1989) and Yuan and Li (1999) are also different from the one presented by Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). 
This chapter of the dissertation examines the implications of using the Choleski 
decomposition for estimating the effects of an exogenous shock to defense purchases. To 
compare the implications of using the Choleski decomposition and the narrative 
approaches presented in the previous chapters of the dissertation, it focuses on the same 
benchmark and alternative models as the ones examined in the previous chapters. 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), who 
use a narrative approach to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases, argue against 
using the Choleski decomposition. They claim that several important problems may 
plague the evidence reported when the latter is used to identify exogenous shocks to 
defense purchases. 
As was mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, based on a handout for 
comments on a study by Rotemberg and Woodford (1990) provided by Christiano 
(1990), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) argue that evidence reported using the 
Choleski decomposition appears “… Quite fragile to perturbations in the sample period 
used and the list of variables included in the VAR” (Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
1999, p. 3).  
The handout for comments by Christiano (1990) was prepared more than a decade 
ago, and it does not appear to have been published. Therefore, it is important to re-
examine the robustness of the results computed when the Choleski decomposition is used 
to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases, in particular with regard to 
perturbations in the list of variables and the sample period. In this chapter, the same 
methodology used in the previous chapters to investigate the robustness of earlier results 
is used to examine the robustness of the results reported when the Choleski 
decomposition is used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases.  
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In addition, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) argue that many of the shocks identified 
using the Choleski decomposition, “… Are due solely to timing effects on military 
contracts and do not represent unanticipated changes in military spending” (Ramey and 
Shapiro 1997, p. 40). More specifically, Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) 
indicate that they do not reflect policy changes, but the effects of shocks in the private 
sector that cause defense contractors to rearrange their delivery schedules, such as strikes.   
Finally, as the government and private agents may know of changes in defense 
purchases before they are recorded in the data, Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) 
claim, “… Under these circumstances an econometrician will uncover, at best, a polluted 
measure of exogenous shocks to government purchases” (Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and 
Fisher 1999, p. 3).  
In fact, it is likely that private agents and the government have additional 
systematic information beyond the past and current values of the variables included in a 
VAR model that includes defense purchases as the policy variable. For instance, Garnett 
argues, “… Money for defense is not ‘free money’, available to defense policymakers as 
they please. Most of it is already committed to a particular pattern of defense 
spending...Though [policymakers] are able to make change at the margin, existing 
programs reflecting unalterable commitments, sometimes for years ahead, severely 
restrict the defense planner’s freedom to maneuver” (Garnett 1987, pp.10-11).  
If a VAR model does not include systematic information about future defense 
purchases that private agents and the government have, the shocks to defense purchases 
identified using a Choleski decomposition will actually be mixtures of truly exogenous 
shocks to defense purchases and the systematic information about defense purchases 
excluded from the VAR model estimated.    
This chapter also examines the implications of using new orders of defense 
products as a proxy for defense purchases for estimating the effects of a shock to defense 
purchases because the evidence reported when new orders of defense products are used 
as the policy variable is less likely to be subject to the criticisms presented by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). 
 First, new orders of defense products contain information about future flows of 
defense purchases. Second, since new orders of defense products are recorded before 
defense purchases, shocks to new orders of defense products are more likely to be 
unanticipated than shocks to defense purchases. Finally, since new orders of defense 
products are recorded before production begins, shocks to new orders of defense products 
do not reflect shocks to the private sector that lead to changes in delivery schedules such 
as strikes. 
The plan of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 of this chapter 
discusses the model estimated by Fatas and Mihov (2000). Section 4.3 presents the 
results computed for the benchmark model and for models in which alternative measures 
of the price level and interest rates are substituted for the GDP deflator and the net three 
month interest rate on Treasury bills (RTB), respectively. Section 4.4 examines the 
sensitivity of the benchmark model to adding time trends and altering the lag length used.  
Section 4.5 presents the results computed for the alternative model. Section 4.6 
and 4.7 discuss the sensitivity of the alternative model to perturbations in the list of 
variables and in the sample period used, respectively. Section 4.8 examines the results 
computed when new orders of defense products are used as a proxy for defense 
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purchases. Section 4.9 discusses the sensitivity of the model reported for the model with 
new orders of defense products to perturbations in the list of variables and the sample 
period. Section 4.10 provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
4.2 Fatas and Mihov’s Model  
To compare the implications of using the Choleski decomposition and the 
narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for estimating the effects of shocks to 
government purchases, Fatas and Mihov (2000) estimate VAR systems in the spirit of 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999).  
The benchmark model estimated by Fatas and Mihov (2000) includes five 
endogenous variables: real government purchases, real private GDP, the GDP deflator, 
government receipts net of transfer, and real RTB.1  Real government purchases are 
defined as defense and non-defense purchases by the federal government as well as local 
and state governments, real private GDP is defined as real total GDP minus real 
government purchases. The logarithmic values of the variables are used except for real 
RTB, and four lagged values of the variables are included in each equation of the system.  
The benchmark model estimated by Fatas and Mihov (2000) includes one more 
endogenous variable, than the benchmark model estimated by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher (1999): government receipts net of transfer. Furthermore, whereas Fatas and 
Mihov (2000) include the real values of RTB and private GDP in their system, Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) include the nominal value of RTB and total GDP. In 
addition, whereas Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) estimate their systems over 
the sample period 1948:1 to 1996:1, Fatas and Mihov (2000) estimate their systems over 
the sample period 1948:1 to 1996:4.  
Fatas and Mihov (2000) compute impulse response functions (IRFs) that present 
the effects of a shock to government purchases on the variables included in their 
benchmark model as well as a series of aggregate variables. In the Choleski 
decomposition used to identify the exogenous shocks to government purchases within the 
benchmark model, the residuals of the variables are ordered as listed above. 
It is assumed that shocks to defense purchases may have a contemporaneous 
effect on the other variables in the system; however, shocks to the other variables are 
constrained not to have a contemporaneous effect on defense purchases. Ordering defense 
purchases before the other variables in the system is consistent with the view that defense 
purchases are independent from contemporaneous macroeconomic fluctuations. This 
view is presented in many studies published in the foreign and defense policy literature 
(Garnett (1987), Rearden (1984), Shilling (1962)). 
Fatas and Mihov (2000) downloaded the data for their analysis from the website 
of the NIPA visualization program of the University of Virginia.2 Unfortunately, the 
values for government receipts and transfer payments posted on the website, as well as 
other data on this website from Table 3.1 of NIPA, are incorrect. Therefore, the 
benchmark model estimated by Fatas and Mihov (2000) is re-estimated hereafter using 
the correct values for government receipts and transfer payments. Two sample periods 
are considered. The first one spans 1960:1 to 1996:4, the one used by Fatas and Mihov  
                                                           
1 Real RTB is defined as the net nominal three month Treasury bill yield minus inflation. See data appendix 
for details on the data used. 


























































































































































Figure 4.1: Point Estimates from Fatas and Mihov’s Model 
 136
(2000). The second one spans 1948:1 to 1999:2, the one used in the previous chapters of 
the dissertation.  
Following Fatas and Mihov (2000), IRFs that present the effects of a one standard 
deviation shock to government purchases are computed for the endogenous variables 
included in the benchmark model over a horizon of forty quarters. In Figure 4.1, the solid 
lines display the point estimates of the IRFs. The dashed lines display the lower and 
upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals computed using a Monte 
Carlo integration procedure.  
For the sample period 1960:1 to 1996:4, the patterns of the IRFs for government 
purchases, real GDP, and real RTB computed using the correct data are similar to the 
ones reported by Fatas and Mihov (2000). However, the patterns of the IRFs computed 
for the GDP deflator and government receipts are substantially different from the ones 
reported by Fatas and Mihov (2000). Furthermore, the confidence intervals reported 
using the correct data are generally different from the ones presented by Fatas and Mihov 
(2000). 
The IRF for the GDP deflator presented by Fatas and Mihov (2000) is slightly 
negative for more than six years after a shock to government purchases, and is marginally 
significant for two years. Then, it is slightly positive and not significantly different from 
zero. The IRF reported in Figure 4.1 is not positive at any horizon, and declines 
significantly for almost eight years after a shock to government purchases. Whereas the 
IRF for government receipts presented by Fatas and Mihov (2000) increases significantly 
in the period of a shock to government purchases, the one reported in Figure 4.1 increases 
significantly after a delay of several quarters.  
Furthermore, the IRF for government purchases and real GDP presented by Fatas 
and Mihov (2000) increase significantly for ten years after a shock to government 
purchases. However, the IRF for government purchases reported in Figure 4.1 is 
significant for six years only. Similarly, the IRF for private GDP reported in Figure 4.1 is 
marginally significant for five years only.  
Finally, the IRF for real RTB presented by Fatas and Mihov (2000) increases 
significantly for a couple of periods following a shock to government purchases, and then 
it declines gradually but is not significantly different from zero. However, the initial 
increase in real RTB reported in Figure 4.1 is very marginally significant and the ensuing 
decline is marginally significant for two years.   
For the sample period 1948:1 to 1999:2, the IRFs for government purchases and 
the GDP deflator computed using the correct data are generally similar to the ones 
reported for the sample period 1960:1 to 1996:4. However, the IRFs for real private GDP, 
federal receipts, and RTB are different from the ones reported for the sample period 
1960:1 to 1996:4.  
The IRF for real private GDP reported for the sample period 1948:1 to 1999:2 is 
negative for more than six quarters after a shock to government purchases, and is very 
marginally significant for several quarters. Then, it increases slowly and is significant 
four years after a shock. The IRF for government receipts increases significantly in the 
period of a shock to government purchases. The IRF for RTB increases significantly for 
one and a half years after a shock to defense purchases. Then, it gradually declines and it 
is close to being significant at long horizons.  
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Overall, when the benchmark model presented by Fatas and Mihov (2000) is 
estimated using the correct values for government receipts and transfer payments, the 
results computed are troublesome. The IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator reported for 
the sample periods 1960:1 to 1999:2 and 1948:1 to 1999:2 are inconsistent with the 
theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-
sector neoclassical models. The IRF for real GDP reported for the sample period 1948:1 
to 1999:2 is also inconsistent with most theoretical models of the effects of a shock to 
government purchases.  
4.3 Benchmark Model 
For comparison’s sake, the benchmark model estimated in this section includes 
the same endogenous variables as the benchmark models estimated in the precedent 
chapters of the dissertation. They are defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP 
deflator. However, it is not exactly identical to the benchmark models from the precedent 
chapters since it does not include a dummy variable for exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases.3 
A constant and four lagged values of the endogenous variables are included in 
each equation of the benchmark model. The logarithmic values of the variables are used 
except for RTB. The system is estimated from 1948:1 to 1999:2 and data from 1947:1 to 
1947:4 are used as pre-sample data. To identify the exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases, a Choleski decomposition is used.  
As is done by Fatas and Mihov (2000), defense purchases are ordered first in the 
Choleski decomposition used to identify the exogenous shocks to defense purchases. Real 
total GDP is ordered second, RTB is ordered third, and the GDP deflator is ordered last.4 
It is assumed that shocks to defense purchases may have a contemporaneous effect on the 
other variables in the system; however, shocks to the other variables are constrained not 
have a contemporaneous effect on defense purchases.  
Figure 4.2 presents the shocks to defense purchases identified using the Choleski 
decomposition when the benchmark model is estimated for the sample period 1948:1 to 
1999:2. The shocks identified during the Korean War military build-up appear larger than 
the shocks identified in other periods. Otherwise, the shocks identified do not exhibit any 
particular pattern.  
To present the effects of a unit shock to defense purchases, the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real total GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed when the benchmark 
model is estimated. In Figure 4.3, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs. 
The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one standard error confidence 
intervals computed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure. 
The IRF for defense purchases computed for the benchmark model exhibits a 
hump-shaped pattern and is very persistent. It remains highly significant four years after a 
shock. The IRF for real GDP is small and the confidence interval reported is wide,  
                                                           
3 The results computed when the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is added to the benchmark model are not 
significantly different from the ones reported from the benchmark model, except for RTB. See sub-section  
4.6.3. 
4 In the ordering selected by Fatas and Mihov (2000) to identify exogenous shocks government purchases, 
the GDP deflator is ordered before real RTB. If the GDP deflator is ordered before RTB in the Choleski 
decomposition used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases in the benchmark model, the IRFs 
computed are essentially identical to the ones reported hereafter. 
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Figure 4.2: Shocks to Defense Purchases 
Sample Period: 1948:1-1999:2 
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Figure 4.3: Point Estimates from Benchmark Model 
Sample Period: 1948:1-1999:2 
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especially one and a half years after a shock. Nevertheless, it increases significantly for 
almost one and a half years after a shock to defense purchases.  
The IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator are inconsistent with the theoretical two-
sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector 
neoclassical models. The IRF for RTB declines significantly for three quarters after a 
shock to defense purchases. Then, it remains negative, although it is no longer 
significantly different from zero. The IRF for the GDP deflator is very small for several 
periods after a shock. Then, it decreases significantly and very persistently.  
Overall, like the results reported for Fatas and Mihov’s model, the results 
presented for the benchmark model are troublesome. Although a shock to defense 
purchases appears to have a very persistent effect on defense purchases, the IRFs for 
RTB and the GDP deflator are inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical 
models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. 
Given the IRFs reported for RTB and the GDP deflator when the benchmark 
model is estimated, it is of interest to examine the sensitivity of the results computed for 
the benchmark model to the substitution of alternative measures of the price level and 
interest rates for the GDP deflator and RTB. First, the benchmark model is estimated 
when the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI), the producer price index 
for commodities (PCOM), and the producer price index (PPI) for finished goods are 
substituted, in turn, for the GDP deflator.  
In Figure 4.4, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the measures of price level substituted for the GDP 
deflator computed for a unit shock to defense purchases. The dashed lines display the 
lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals. 
When the alternative measures of the price level are substituted for the GDP 
deflator, the IRFs computed for defense purchases, real GDP, and RTB are very similar 
to the ones reported for the benchmark model. Furthermore, the IRF for the CPI is similar 
to the IRF for the GDP deflator. However, the IRFs for PCOM and the PPI for finished 
goods are larger than the IRF for the GDP deflator. Four years after a shock to defense 
purchases, the declines in PCOM and the PPI for finished goods are twice as large as the 
one reported for the GDP deflator. 
Second, the benchmark model is estimated when real RTB and the nominal ten-
year Treasury rate (LTR) are substituted, in turn, for nominal RTB in the benchmark 
model. In Figure 4.5, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, the GDP deflator and the alternative measures of interest rates 
substituted for nominal RTB computed for a unit shock to defense purchases. The dashed 
lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals  
When real RTB or LTR is substituted for nominal RTB, the IRFs computed for 
defense purchases, real GDP, and the GDP deflator are similar to the ones reported for 
the benchmark model. The pattern of the IRF for real RTB is very different from the one 
reported for RTB. It exhibits a hump-shaped pattern, and increases significantly for more 
than two years. The IRF for LTR is negative at all horizons; however, it is not 














































































































































































Figure 4.4: Point Estimates from Models With Alternative Measures of the Price 
Level 





























































































































Figure 4.5: Point Estimates from Models With Alternative Measures of Interest 
Rates 
Sample Period: 1948:1-1999:2 
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In conclusion, when different measures of the price level are substituted, in turn, 
for the GDP deflator in the benchmark model, the IRFs computed for defense purchases, 
real GDP, and RTB are similar to the ones reported for the benchmark model. 
Furthermore, like the IRF for the GDP deflator, the IRFs computed for the different 
measures of the price level are inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical 
models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. 
When real RTB or LTR is substituted for nominal RTB, the IRFs computed for 
defense purchases, real GDP, and the GDP deflator are similar to the ones reported for 
the benchmark model. Furthermore, the IRF for real RTB is consistent with the 
traditional IS-LM model. However, it should be noted that the increase in real RTB 
reported in Figure 4.5 appears driven by the decrease in the inflation rate, not an increase 
in nominal interest rates.  
4.4 Alternative Time Trends and Lag Lengths  
To compare the implications of using the Choleski decomposition and the 
narrative approaches presented in the previous chapters of the dissertation for estimating 
the effects of a shock to defense purchases, four lagged values of the endogenous 
variables are included in each equation of the benchmark model. Furthermore, no time 
trend is included. However, this specification may not be the most appropriate for the 
VAR system under study, and the results reported for the benchmark model may be 
sensitive to adding a time trend and changing the lag length used.  
This section presents statistical evidence on the selection of an appropriate time 
trend and an adequate lag length for the variables included in the VAR system under 
study. It also investigates the sensitivity of the results reported for the benchmark model 
to adding a time trend and changing the lag length used. The methodology followed is 
exactly identical to the one presented in the previous chapters of the dissertation. 
4.4.1 Time Trend 
To select an appropriate time trend for the VAR system under study, models in 
which different types of time trend are added, in turn, to each equation of the benchmark 
model are estimated, and the corresponding Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) values are computed. Systems with no time trend, a 
linear trend only, linear and quadratic trends, and a “Perron-type” time trend are 
considered.5 The preferred specification is the one that minimizes the AIC and SBC 
values. 
A series of likelihood ratio test statistics is also computed. First, the null 
hypothesis of no time trend is tested against the alternatives of a linear trend only, linear 
and quadratic trends, and a “Perron-type” trend. Second, the null hypothesis of a linear 
trend only is tested against the alternatives of linear and quadratic trends and a “Perron-
type” trend. 
Table 4.1 reports the AIC and SBC values computed when the benchmark model 
is estimated under the alternative assumptions for the time trend. The AIC criterion 
implies that it is better to include a “Perron-type” time trend in the system under study. 
The SBC criterion implies that it is preferable not to include a time trend.  
                                                           
5 The “Perron-type” time trend  and the other time trends included in this chapter are discussed in detail in 
the second chapter of the dissertation.  
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Table 4.1: AIC and SBC Values for Time Trend 
Benchmark Model (1948:1-1999:2) 
 
Type of time trend Aikaike’s Information 
Criterion 
Schwarz’s Criterion 
No trend -5852.16 -5625.87 
Linear trend only -5862.86 -5623.25 
“Perron-type” -5871.03 -5618.11 
Linear and quadratic trend -5807.18 -5581.22 
 
Table 4.2 reports the results of the likelihood ratio tests carried out. In every test, 
the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, it is implied that including any type of time trend is 
better than including no time trend. Furthermore, it is implied that including a “Perron-
type” trend or linear and quadratic trends is better than including a linear trend only. 
 
 Table 4.2: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Time Trend 
Benchmark Model (1948:1-1999:2) 
 
Null hypothesis  Alternative  Test value P-value 
No time trend Linear trend only 16.61* 0.0023 
No time trend Linear and Quadratic trend  30.81** 0.0002 
No time trend “Perron-type” trend  35.88** 0.0000 
Linear trend only Linear and Quadratic trend 14.29* 0.0064 
Linear trend only “Perron-type” trend 19.36* 0.0130 
* 4 restrictions are imposed. The critical value at a 5% significance level for a chi-square distribution with 
4 degrees of freedom is 9.49. 
** 8 restrictions are imposed. The critical value at a 5% significance level for a chi-square distribution with 
8 degrees of freedom is 15.51. 
 
While the statistical evidence reported above implies that it may be better to 
include linear and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend to the benchmark model, the 
addition of time trends may not significantly affect the results reported for the benchmark 
model. If the results reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to adding time 
trends, the IRFs computed for the models with time trends ought to lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals reported for the benchmark model. 
In Figure 4.6, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit shock to defense 
purchases when the models with linear and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend are 
estimated. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals computed for the benchmark 
model.  
All the IRFs computed for the models with linear and quadratic trends or a 
“Perron-type” trend lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
benchmark model at all horizons. Furthermore, they appear very similar to the IRFs 
reported for the benchmark model. Therefore, it is concluded that the results reported for 
the benchmark model are not sensitive to adding time trends. In particular, whether linear 
and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend are used, the IRFs for RTB and the GDP 
































































































































Figure 4.6: Point Estimates from Models with Alternative Time Trends 
Confidence Intervals from Benchmark Model 
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4.4.2 Lag Length 
First, VAR systems identical to the benchmark model except for the lag length 
used are estimated, and the corresponding AIC and SBC values are computed. Systems 
with one to eight lags of the endogenous variables are considered. The preferred lag 
length is the one that minimizes the AIC and SBC values. Second, a sequence of 
likelihood ratio tests is computed. The null hypothesis of seven lags versus the alternative 
of eight lags is tested, and then the null hypothesis of six lags versus the alternative seven 
lags, and so on. 
Table 4.3 reports the AIC and SBC values computed for the VAR systems in 
which one to eight lagged values of the variables are included.6 According to the AIC 
criterion, it is better to include six lagged values of the variables in the VAR system 
under study. The SBC criterion implies that including two lagged values is preferable.  
 
Table 4.3: AIC and SBC Values for Lag Length 
Benchmark Model (1949:1-1999:2) 
 
Number of lags Aikaike’s Information 
Criterion 
Schwarz’s Criterion 
1 -5572.34 -5479.71 
2 -5743.58 -5598.01 
3 -5766.16 -5567.66 
4 -5782.00 -5530.57 
5 -5780.55 -5476.19 
6 -5832.56 -5475.27 
7 -5818.94 -5408.71 
8 -5808.75 -5345.57 
 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the likelihood ratio tests carried out. The 
likelihood ratio statistics reported imply that the null hypotheses of seven and six lags 
cannot be rejected; however, the null hypothesis of five lags can be rejected. Therefore, 
based on the likelihood ratio tests, it is better to include six lagged values of the variables. 
 
Table 4.4: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Lag Length 
Benchmark Model (1949:1-1999:2) 
 
Null hypothesis  Alternative  Test value* P-value 
Lag length = 7 Lag length =8 16.72 0.6713 
Lag length = 6 Lag length = 7 20.48 0.4282 
Lag length = 5 Lag length = 6 30.20 0.0000 
* For every test we impose 20 restrictions. The critical value at a 5% significance level for a chi-square 
distribution with 20 degrees of freedom is 31.41. 
 
Although the statistical evidence reported above implies that it is better to include 
two or six lagged values of the variables in the VAR system under study, altering the lag 
                                                           
6 For comparison’s sake, the AIC and SBC values and the likelihood ratio statistic are computed when the 
corresponding systems are estimated over the period from 1949:1 to 1999:2. 
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length used may not affect the results reported for the benchmark model. Therefore, the 
effects of using two and six lagged values of the variables on the results reported for the 
benchmark model are examined.  
If the benchmark model is not sensitive to the lag length used, the IRFs computed 
for the models with two and six lags ought to lie within the corresponding confidence 
intervals from the benchmark model. In Figure 4.7, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed for a unit shock to defense purchases when the models with two or six lags of 
the endogenous variables are estimated. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals 
computed for the benchmark model. 
All the IRFs computed for the model with two lags lie within the confidence 
intervals from the benchmark model at all horizons, and they are very similar to the IRFs 
reported for the benchmark model. The IRF for defense purchases reported for the model 
with six lags lies very slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the 
benchmark model for more than one and a half years, and then it lies within the 
confidence interval. However, the IRFs for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
reported for the model with six lags lie within the corresponding confidence intervals 
from the benchmark model at all horizons. 
In conclusion, except for the IRF for defense purchases computed for the model 
with six lags, all the IRFs reported for the models with two and six lags lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the benchmark model at all horizons. The IRF 
for defense purchases computed for the model with six lags is marginally different from 
the one reported for the benchmark model. Therefore, it is concluded that the results 
reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to changing the lag length used, 
except for defense purchases. In particular, whether two or six lagged values of the 
variables are used, the IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator remain troublesome.  
4.5 Alternative Model 
The evidence reported in the last section suggests that the specification of the 
equations selected for the benchmark model, which is the one used by Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), may not be the best for the VAR system under study. 
Therefore, AIC values are computed when twelve models that include defense purchases, 
real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are estimated using with different lag lengths and 
time trends.  
Models with two, four, six and eight lagged values of the variables are considered 
as well as with no time trend, linear and quadratic trends, and a “Perron-type” trend. The 
model that yields the lowest AIC value is selected as the alternative model. The AIC 
values computed for the different models are reported in Table 4.5. As for the VAR 
systems with a dummy variable for exogenous shocks to defense purchases examined in 
the previous chapters, they indicate that the model with six lags and a “Perron-type” time 
































































































































Figure 4.7: Point Estimates from Models with Alternative Lag lengths 




Table 4.5: AIC Values for Various Time Trends and Lag Lengths 
Benchmark Model (1948:3-1999:2) 
 
Number of lags No Time Trend  Linear and 
Quadratic Trend  
“Perron-type” Trend 
2 -5715.45 -5738.87 -5743.57 
4 -5753.81 -5773.51 -5782.00 
6 -5805.71 -5829.91 -5832.56 
8 -5785.93 -5808.39 -5808.75 
 
In the first column of Figure 4.8, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit 
shock to defense purchases when the alternative model is estimated. The dashed lines 
display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals. The 
main difference between the benchmark and alternative models is found in the response 
of real GDP.  
The IRF for real GDP reported for the alternative model increases significantly 
for three years after a shock to defense purchases, compared to one and a half years for 
the benchmark model. Furthermore, the IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator are 
problematic. The IRF for RTB is significantly negative for a couple of periods 
immediately after a shock to defense purchases, and then it is not significantly different 
from zero. The IRF for the GDP deflator is very small and is not significantly different 
from zero for a year. Then, it begins to decrease steadily, and is significant after a delay 
of less than two years.  
To further compare the results reported for the benchmark and alternative models, 
the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the 
benchmark model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
alternative model, which is the preferred model. If the IRFs computed for the benchmark 
model are not significantly different from the IRFs reported for the alternative model, 
they ought to lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model.  
In the second column of Figure 4.8, the solid lines display the point estimates of 
the IRFs reported for the benchmark model. The dashed lines display the confidence 
intervals computed for the alternative model. The IRF for defense purchases lies very 
slightly above the upper bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model for 
more than a year, and then it lies close to the upper bound of the confidence interval.  
The IRF for real GDP computed for the benchmark model lies within the 
confidence interval from the alternative model until the end of the fourth year after a 
shock to defense purchases. After a delay of one and a half years, the IRF for RTB lies 
very slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model 
for more than a year. After a delay of one and a half years, the IRF for the GDP deflator 
lies permanently below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative 
model.  
In conclusion, according to the AIC criterion, it seems preferable to estimate an 




























































































































Figure 4.8: Point Estimates from Alternative Model and Benchmark Model 
Confidence Interval from Alternative Model  
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endogenous variables. The alternative model selected in this section follows the same 
specification as the alternative models presented in the previous chapters. 
Except for the GDP deflator, the IRFs presented for the alternative model are only 
moderately different from the ones reported for the benchmark model. The IRF for the 
GDP deflator presented for the alternative model is persistently smaller than the one 
reported for the benchmark model. Furthermore, as for the benchmark model, the IRFs 
for RTB and the GDP deflator computed for the alternative model are inconsistent with 
the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) 
and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and 
one-sector neoclassical models. 
4.6  Extended Models 
As was mentioned before, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) argue that 
inference reported using the Choleski decomposition appears fragile to perturbations in 
the list of variables used. Garcia-Mila (1989), and Yuan and Li (1999) do not address this 
issue. Fatas and Mihov (2000) estimate an extended model to examine the robustness of 
the IRFs computed for their benchmark model; however, they do not report their results. 
 This section investigates the sensitivity of the results reported for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator to adding an endogenous variable or an 
exogenous dummy variable to the alternative model. Eighteen variables are considered. 
They are the ones used in the studies of the narrative approaches presented in the 
previous chapters of the dissertation. First, the effects of the shocks to defense purchases 
in models that alternatively include fiscal variables are examined. Then, the effects of the 
shocks in models that alternatively include consumption, investment, and labor market 
variables are investigated.  
Next, the effects of the shocks in models that alternatively include the Romers’ 
monetary policy dummy variable, the monetary base, a measure of long-term interest 
rates, Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable are presented. The Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is added to 
the alternative model to control for the effects of the major military build-ups that took 
place in the post-World War II era, in particular the Korean War and Vietnam War build-
ups, on the results reported for the alternative model. 
The methodology used to examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the 
alternative model to adding any of  the variables under consideration is the same as the 
one presented in the previous chapters for the narrative approaches. First, an extended 
version of the alternative model is estimated that includes defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, the GDP deflator, and the variable under consideration. Six lagged values of the 
variable under consideration are included if it is endogenous. The contemporaneous and 
six lagged values are included if it is an exogenous dummy variable.  
 Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are 
computed for a unit shock to defense purchases and plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals reported for the alternative model. If the results reported for the 
alternative model are not sensitive to perturbations in the list of variables used, the IRFs 
computed for the extended model ought to lie within the corresponding confidence 




4.6.1  Fiscal Variables 
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to defense purchases 
in models that alternatively include non-defense purchases, real federal government 
receipts, and the real federal government deficit. The logarithmic values of the fiscal 
variables are used except for the deficit, which takes negative values. To construct the 
measures of real federal government receipts and the real federal government deficit, the 
current values of these variables in billions of dollars are deflated by the CPI. Non-
defense purchases are in billions of chained (1992) dollars.7 
It is presumed that decisions with regard to defense purchases come before 
decisions with regard to non-defense purchases, real federal government receipts, and the 
real federal government deficit.8 Therefore, defense purchases are ordered first in the 
Choleski decomposition used to identify the shocks to defense purchases. The fiscal 
variable under study is ordered second, real GDP is ordered third, RTB is ordered fourth, 
and the GDP deflator is ordered last. Shocks to the fiscal variables under study are 
constrained not to have a contemporaneous effect on defense purchases; however, they 
may have a contemporaneous effect on real GDP, RTB and the GDP deflator.  
In Figure 4.9, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the fiscal variables are added, in turn, to the 
alternative model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
alternative model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs. The dashed 
lines display the confidence intervals from the alternative model, which are presented in 
the previous section.  
 When non-defense purchases or real federal government receipts are added to the 
alternative model, the IRFs computed for defense purchases lie very slightly below the 
lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model in the second year after 
a shock to defense purchases. When the real federal government deficit is added to the 
alternative model, the IRF computed for defense purchases lies within the confidence 
interval from the alternative model at all horizons.  
The IRFs for real GDP, RTB and the GDP deflator computed for all the models 
with an additional fiscal variable lie on or within the corresponding confidence intervals 
from the alternative model at all horizons. However, it is noted that the IRF for the GDP 
deflator computed for the model with non-defense purchases lies persistently on the 
lower bound of the confidence from the corresponding confidence intervals. 
Overall, except for defense purchases, the IRFs computed when fiscal variables 
are added, in turn, to the alternative model are not significantly different from the 
corresponding IRFs reported for the alternative model at any horizon. The IRFs for 
defense purchases computed for the models with non-defense purchases and real federal 
government receipts are marginally and temporarily smaller than the one reported for the  
alternative model. Therefore, it is concluded that the results reported for the alternative 
model are not very sensitive to adding fiscal variables.  
 
 
                                                           
7 The different extended models estimated in this section and the variables included in these extended 
models are identical to the ones presented in the previous chapters. They are more thoroughly discussed in 
the first chapter of the dissertation. 





















































































































































































Figure 4.9: Point Estimates from Models with a Fiscal Variable 
Confidence Interval from Alternative Model  
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4.6.2 Sectoral Variables  
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to defense purchases 
in models that alternatively include components of consumption and investment.  
Following Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), consumption and investment are 
broken down into three components: consumption of non-durables and services, 
residential investment plus consumption of durables, and non-residential investment.  
 This sub-section also presents evidence on the effects of shocks to defense 
purchases in models that alternatively include measures of employment, real wages, and 
real compensation. First, employment in the private sector, employment in the non-
durables manufacturing sector, and employment in the durables manufacturing sector are 
examined. Then, real wages in private industry, real compensation in the manufacturing 
sector, and real compensation in the business sector are considered.  
 The logarithmic values of the measures of consumption, investment, employment, 
real wages and real compensation are included in the models estimated. To construct the 
measures of real compensation and real wages, the nominal values of these variables are 
deflated by the CPI. The other additional sectoral variables examined hereafter are in 
billions of chained (1992) dollars.  
The measures of consumption, investment, employment, real wages and real 
compensation are ordered last in the Choleski decomposition used to identify shocks to 
defense purchases. Defense purchases are ordered first, real GDP is ordered second, RTB 
is ordered third, and the GDP deflator is ordered fourth.  It is assumed that shocks to the 
sectoral variables are constrained not to have a contemporaneous effect on the other 
variables in the systems estimated; however, shocks to the other variables in the systems 
may affect the sectoral variables contemporaneously.  
In Figure 4.10, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the consumption and investment variables 
listed above are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the 
point estimates of the IRFs. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals from the 
alternative model. All the IRFs reported for the models with a component of consumption 
and investment lie well within the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
alternative model at all horizons.  
In Figure 4.11, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when employment in private industry, employment 
in the non-durables manufacturing sector, and employment in the durables manufacturing 
sector are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals from the 
alternative model. 
When employment in private industry or employment in the non-durables 
manufacturing sector is added to the alternative model, all the IRFs reported lie well 
within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. 
When employment in the durables manufacturing sector is added to the alternative 
model, the IRFs for defense purchases and the GDP deflator lie within or on the 




















































































































































































Figure 4.10: Point Estimates from Models with a Consumption or Investment 
Variable 





















































































































































































Figure 4.11: Point Estimates from Models with an Employment Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model  
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However, the IRF for real GDP computed for the model with employment in the 
durables manufacturing sector lies very slightly above the upper bound of the confidence 
interval from the alternative model for several periods in the first and second years after a 
shock to defense purchases. After a delay of less than two quarters, the IRF for RTB lies 
above the upper bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model for more 
than one and a half years. 
In Figure 4.12, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB and the GDP deflator computed when real wages in private industry, real 
compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real compensation in the business sector 
are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals from the 
alternative model.  
Since the series for compensation in the manufacturing sector is not available 
before 1949:1, the model with real compensation in the manufacturing sector is estimated 
from 1950:3 to 1999:2, and the IRFs reported for this model are plotted against the 
confidence intervals computed for the same sample period. When the different measures 
of real wages and real compensation are added, in turn, to the alternative model, all the 
IRFs reported lie well within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model at all horizons.  
Overall, except when employment in the durables manufacturing sector is added 
to the alternative model, all the IRFs computed when consumption, investment, 
employment, real wages, and real compensation variables are added, in turn, to the 
alternative model are not significantly different from the corresponding IRFs reported for 
the alternative model at any horizon.  
The IRF for RTB, and to lesser extent the IRF for real GDP, computed for the 
model with employment in the durables manufacturing sector are significantly and 
temporarily different from the ones reported for the alternative model. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the results reported for the alternative model are not sensitive to adding 
sectoral variables, except for employment in the durables manufacturing sector.  
4.6.3 Additional Macroeconomic Variables 
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to defense purchases 
in models that include the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable, the monetary base, 
and LTR. It also investigates the effects of shocks to defense purchases in models that 
include Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable.   
For the model with the monetary base, it is assumed that the monetary policy 
authorities do not respond immediately to developments in the economy. Therefore, the 
monetary base is ordered last in the Choleski decomposition used to identify the shocks 
to defense purchases. Defense purchases are ordered first, real GDP is ordered second, 
RTB is ordered third, and the GDP deflator is ordered fourth. Shocks to the monetary 
base are constrained not to have a contemporaneous effect on the other variables in the 
system; however, shocks to the other variables may have a contemporaneous effect on the 
monetary base.  
For the model with LTR, this variable is ordered fourth in the Choleski 




















































































































































































Figure 4.12: Point Estimates from Models with a Measure of Real Wages or Real 
Compensation 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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GDP deflator but after defense purchases, real GDP, and RTB. It is assumed that shocks 
to LTR are constrained not to have a contemporaneous effect on defense purchases, real 
GDP, and RTB; however, they may have a contemporaneous effect on the GDP deflator.  
In Figure 4.13, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the monetary variable variables and LTR are 
added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding confidence 
intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals from the alternative model. 
When the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable or the monetary base is 
added to the alternative model, the IRFs reported for defense purchases, real GDP and the 
GDP deflator lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model at all horizons. Furthermore, when LTR is added to the alternative model, all the 
IRFs reported lie well within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative 
model at all horizons. 
However, the IRF for RTB computed for the model with the Romers’ dummy 
variable lies very slightly above the upper bound of the confidence interval from the 
alternative model for several periods in the second year after a shock to defense 
purchases. In contrast, the IRF for RTB computed for the model with the monetary base 
lies very slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative 
model in the third year after a shock. 
In Figure 4.14, the point estimates of the IRFs computed when Hamilton’s oil 
price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables 
are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals from the 
alternative model. 
When Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable is added to the alternative model, the 
IRF computed for defense purchases lies close to or slightly below the lower bound of the 
confidence interval from the alternative model at all horizons. The IRF for real GDP lies 
below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model for more 
than two years after a shock to defense purchases. Furthermore, when a one standard 
error confidence interval is computed, the IRF for real GDP is not significantly different 
from zero at any horizon. The IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator lie on or within the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. 
 When the PPI for crude fuel is added to the alternative model, all the IRFs 
computed lies within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model 
at all horizons. When the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is added to the alternative 
model, the IRFs computed for defense purchases, real GDP and the GDP deflator lie 
within or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all 
horizons.  
However, the IRF for RTB computed for the model with the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable lies slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the 
alternative model for several periods in the first and second year after a shock to defense 
purchases. Furthermore, it is noted that the patterns of the IRFs for real GDP and RTB 
computed for the model with the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are different from the 




















































































































































































Figure 4.13: Point Estimates from Models with an Additional Macroeconomic 
Variable 




















































































































































































Figure 4.14: Point Estimates from Models with an Additional Macroeconomic 
Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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Overall, the differences in the IRFs reported for the models with an additional 
macroeconomic variable and the alternative model are only minor, except for the model 
with Hamilton’s oil price dummy. In this case, there is a major difference for real 
GDP.Therefore, it is concluded that the results reported for the alternative model are not 
sensitive to adding the additional macroeconomic variables under examination in this 
sub-section, except for Hamilton’s oil price dummy.  
4.6.4  Responses of Fiscal and Monetary Variables 
It is of interest to determine whether the shocks identified using the Choleski 
decomposition coincide not only with increases in defense purchases but also changes in 
other dimensions of fiscal policy or changes in monetary policy. Therefore, this sub-
section presents the effects of a shock to defense purchases on some of the fiscal and 
monetary variables added to the alternative model in the previous sub-section.  
As in the studies of the narrative approaches, the variables selected are non-
defense purchases, real federal government receipts, the real federal government deficit, 
and the monetary base. In Figure 4.15, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs computed for the additional fiscal variables and the monetary base when the 
extended models that include these variables are estimated. The dashed lines display the 
lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals from the 
alternative model.  
The effects of an exogenous shock to defense purchases on the additional fiscal 
variables and the monetary base reported using the Choleski decomposition are different 
from the ones presented in previous chapters of the dissertation using the narrative 
approaches. The IRF for non-defense purchases exhibits a hump shaped pattern, and 
increases significantly for a quarter at the end of the first year after a shock to defense 
purchases.  
The IRF for real federal government receipts increases significantly in the period 
of a shock to defense purchases, and except for two quarters, it remains positive and 
significant for three years. Except for a quarter, the IRF for real federal government 
deficit is negative at all horizons. However, it is only marginally significant at the end of 
the fourth year after a shock to defense purchases.  
The IRF computed for the real federal government deficit may be consistent with 
the IRFs reported for government purchases and receipts. It implies that, as government 
receipts rise persistently after a shock to defense purchases, the government is able to 
finance the increase in defense purchases without a significant deterioration in its deficit 
for four years. Then, as the increase in government receipts comes to an end, the 
government deficit begins to deteriorate slightly. 
The IRF for the monetary base exhibits a hump-shaped pattern, and is very 
persistent. It increases significantly for almost three years after a shock to defense 
purchases. This result implies that the shocks to defense purchases identified using the 
Choleski decomposition may be associated with persistent changes in monetary policy, 
which is consistent with the evidence reported by Caplan (1999) for instance.  
Overall, the IRFs for the fiscal variables and the monetary base presented in this 
sub-section indicate that the shocks to defense purchases identified using the Choleski 
decomposition coincide with significant and very persistent changes in the monetary 
base, but not with significant changes in non-defense purchases. Furthermore, like the 
results reported for the additional fiscal variables using the narrative approaches, the ones  
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Figure 4.15: Point Estimates of the IRFs for Fiscal and Monetary Variables 
Sample Period: 1948:3-1999:2 
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presented using the Choleski decomposition imply that the federal government is able to 
finance military build-ups through increases in revenues. 
4.7 Alternative Sample Periods 
As was mentioned before, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) also argue 
that inference reported using the Choleski decomposition appears fragile to perturbations 
in the sample period used. Garcia-Mila (1989), Yuan and Li (1999), and Fatas and Mihov 
(2000) do not address this issue. This section provides evidence on the sensitivity of the 
results reported for the alternative model to perturbations in the sample period used 
following the same methodology as the one presented for the narrative approaches in the 
previous chapters of the dissertation. 
 First, the alternative model is estimated over four sub-sample periods. The early 
and late sub-sample periods span 1948:3 to 1973:1 and 1960:1 to 1999:2, respectively. 
The next sub-sample periods selected span 1950:1 to 1999:2 and 1948:3 to 1989:4, which 
corresponds to the Cold War era. Then, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to 
defense purchases. 
Finally, the IRFs computed for each sub-sample period are plotted along with the 
corresponding confidence intervals for the whole sample period. If the results reported 
for the alternative model are not sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used, the 
IRFs computed for the different sub-sample periods ought to lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the whole sample period.  
In the first and second columns of Figure 4.16, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed when the alternative model is estimated over the early and late sub-sample 
periods, respectively. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals reported for the 
whole sample period.  
 When the alternative model is estimated over the early sub-sample period, the IRF 
computed for defense purchases lies slightly above the upper bound of the confidence 
interval reported for the whole sample period for almost two years after a shock to 
defense purchases. In contrast, the IRF for real GDP lies slightly below the lower bound 
of the confidence interval from the whole sample period for two quarters. Then, it lies 
within the confidence interval for one and a half years, and finally it remains below the 
lower bound of the confidence interval.  
The IRF for RTB computed for the early sub-sample period lies slightly above the 
confidence interval from the whole sample period for a quarter after a shock to defense 
purchases; however, it remains negative. Then, it lies on or within the confidence 
interval. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies slightly above the upper bound of the 
confidence interval from the whole sample period at all horizons. 
When the alternative model is estimated over the late sub-sample period, the IRF 
computed for defense purchases lies below the lower bound of the confidence interval 
from the whole sample period for two and a half years after a shock to defense purchases. 
Furthermore, it exhibits a pattern very different from one reported for the whole sample 
period. However, the IRFs reported for real GDP, RTB and the GDP deflator lie on or 















































































































































































































































Figure 4.16: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods 
Confidence Intervals from the Whole Sample Period  
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In the third and fourth columns of Figure 4.16, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed when the alternative model is estimated over the sub-sample period 1950:1 to  
1999:2 and the Cold War era, respectively. The dashed lines display the confidence 
intervals reported for the whole sample period.  
When the alternative model is estimated over the sub-sample period 1950:1 to 
1999:2, the IRF computed for defense purchases lies within the confidence interval from 
the whole sample period for almost two years after a shock to defense purchases. Then, it 
lies very slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval for more than a year.  
After a delay of a year, the IRF for real GDP computed for the sub-sample period 
1950:1 to 1999:2 lies very slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval from 
the whole sample period for less than a year. The IRF for RTB lies within the confidence 
interval from the whole sample period at all horizons. After a delay of one and a half 
years, the IRF for real GDP lies slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval 
from the whole sample period. 
When the alternative model is estimated over the Cold War era, the IRFs reported 
for defense purchases, real GDP, and RTB lie within or on the confidence interval from 
the whole sample period at all horizons. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies very close to 
the upper bound of the confidence interval from the whole sample period for three years, 
and then it lies very slightly above the upper bound of the confidence interval.  
Overall, when the alternative model is estimated for the early sub-sample period, 
the IRF computed for defense purchases is significantly larger than the one reported for 
the whole sample period for two years. However, the IRFs for real GDP and the GDP 
deflator are significantly and persistently smaller than the ones reported for the whole 
sample period. The IRF for RTB is significantly, although briefly, smaller than the one 
reported for the whole sample period.  
When the alternative model is estimated for the late sub-sample period, the IRF 
computed for defense purchases is much smaller than the one reported for the whole 
sample period. However, the IRFs for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are not 
significantly different from the ones reported for the whole sample period.  
When the alternative model is estimated for the sub-sample period 1950:1 to 
1999:2, the IRFs computed for defense purchases, real GDP and the GDP deflator are 
marginally different from the ones presented for the whole sample period. The IRF 
reported for RTB is not significantly different from the one presented for the whole 
sample period. 
When the alternative model is estimated for the Cold War era, the IRFs reported 
for defense purchases, real GDP and RTB are not significantly different from the ones 
presented for the whole sample period. The IRF reported for the GDP deflator is 
marginally different from the one presented for the whole sample period. 
Like the results presented for the narrative approaches, the IRFs computed for the 
different sub-sample periods imply that the IRFs reported for the alternative model using 
the Choleski decomposition to identify shocks to defense purchases are sensitive to 
perturbations in the sample period. In particular, the IRF for defense purchases reported 
for the late sub-sample period, which excludes the Korean War era, is much smaller and 
appears to exhibit a pattern very different from the one reported for the other sub-sample 
periods.    
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To further examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative model 
to perturbations in the sample period, Figure 4.17 presents the point estimates and 
confidence intervals of the IRFs computed for a unit shock to defense purchases when the 
alternative model is estimated over the early and late sub-sample periods. The solid lines 
display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the 
GDP deflator. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard 
deviation confidence intervals from these samples, not the full sample.  
The pattern of the IRF for defense purchases reported for the early sub-sample 
period is similar to the one reported for the whole sample period; however; the peak 
effect of a shock reported for the early sub-sample is slightly larger than for the whole 
sample period. Yet, the increase in real GDP reported for the early sub-sample period is 
only significant for a year, compared to three years for the whole sample period. 
The IRF for RTB reported for the early sub-sample period is very small, and is 
never significantly different from zero. The IRF for the GDP deflator increases 
significantly, although very marginally, for two periods after a shock to defense 
purchases. Then, it begins to gradually decrease, and is very marginally significant in the 
fourth year after a shock. 
  The pattern of the IRF for defense purchases computed for the late sub-sample 
period is very different from the one reported for the whole sample period. It is relatively 
flat, and much smaller than the IRF reported for the whole sample. However, the IRFs 
and confidence intervals computed for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are similar 
to the ones reported for the whole sample period. In particular, the IRF for RTB is 
temporarily and significantly negative and the IRF for the GDP deflator is significantly 
and persistently negative.  
Overall, while the pattern and magnitude of the IRF for defense purchases 
reported the early sub-sample are similar to the ones presented for the whole sample 
period, the IRF reported the late sub-sample increases much more gradually and is 
dramatically smaller than the one presented for the whole sample period.  
Furthermore, like the IRFs for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator reported the 
whole sample period, the ones presented for the early and late sub-sample periods remain 
problematic. However, it is noted that while the IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator 
reported for the whole sample period are significantly negative at certain horizons, the 
ones presented for the early sub-sample period are not significantly different from zero at 
any horizon. 
4.8 New Orders of Defense Products 
The IRFs reported in this chapter for the shocks to defense purchases identified 
using a Choleski decomposition, in particular for RTB and the GDP deflator, are 
inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models.  
As was mentioned before, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher (1999) argue that many shocks to defense purchases identified using a 
Choleski decomposition may not be unanticipated, and hence exogenous. Therefore, it is 
interesting to estimate the effects of exogenous shocks to defense spending when new 























































































































Figure 4.17: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Sample Periods 
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 New orders of defense products are a monthly series from a set of 256 data series 
commonly known as the US Business Cycle Indicators (BCI) series that are used for 
tracking and predicting U.S business activity. The series were published in the Survey of 
Current Business by the Bureau of Economic Analysis as well as the Current Industrial  
Report published by the Bureau of the Census. They are now published by the 
Conference Board in a periodical named Business Cycle Indicators.  
The data for new orders of defense products are available since the first month of 
1968. In order to examine the macroeconomic effects of exogenous shocks to new orders 
of defense products, quarterly data are constructed by adding the monthly data within 
each quarter from the sample period 1968:1 to 1999:2. Furthermore, since the data for 
new orders of defense products are originally in billions of current dollars, they are 
deflated by the CPI deflator.9 
 According to the Bureau of the Census, new orders, “are net of order 
cancellations and include orders received and filled during the month as well as orders 
received for future delivery. They also include the value of contract changes which 
increase or decrease the value of the unfilled orders to which they relate” (Bureau of the 
Census, 1995). Defense products represent one of eight market categories that are used to 
separate manufacturing industries in the "Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories, and 
Orders" survey.      
According to the Bureau of the Census, defense products includes the following 
sub-categories: small arms and ordnance, communication equipment, aircraft and parts, 
missiles, space vehicles, and parts, ships and parts, and other parts that fall into the 
category defense products. Ramey and Shapiro (1997) who show that military build-ups 
tend to be concentrated in the industries included in defense products argue, “… Not only 
are government spending increases heavily concentrated in a few industries, but it is also 
the case that government is the primary purchaser of goods from these industries” 
(Ramey and Shapiro 1997, p. 6). The industries listed above represent five of the eight 
industries they specifically mentioned in their study.   
In the first panel of Figure 4.18, the dashed line presents the evolution of new 
orders of defense products from 1968:1 to 1999:2, and the solid line presents the 
evolution of defense purchases. For simplicity’s sake, new orders of defense products are 
hereafter referred to as new orders. The values of the series for new orders are much 
smaller than the ones reported for defense purchases. Furthermore, the changes in the 
trend for new orders appear to precede the changes in the trend for defense purchases by 
one to two years; however, the pattern of the series for new orders is relatively similar to 
the one reported for defense purchases.  
To examine the relations between the series for the shocks to defense purchases 
and the shocks to new orders, the cross-correlation coefficients of the series for the 
shocks to defense purchases and the current and lagged series for the shocks to new 
orders are computed. All the cross-correlation coefficients computed are less than 0.25, 
which implies that the series for the shocks to defense purchases and shocks to new 
orders are moderately correlated.   
To estimate the macroeconomic effects of exogenous shocks to new orders, a 
VAR system identical to the alternative model, except that new orders are substituted for  
                                                           
9 The results computed when new orders of defense products are deflated by the GDP deflator are 
essentially identical to the ones reported hereafter. 
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New Orders of Defense Products and Defense Puchases. Sample period: 1968:1-1999:2


















Innovations in New Orders of Defense Products. Sample period: 1969:3-1999:2



















defense purchases is estimated for the sample period 1969:3 to 1999:2. Data from 1968:1 
to 1969:2 are used as pre-sample data. As was mentioned before, when a Choleski 
decomposition is used to identify exogenous policy shocks, including new orders as the 
policy variable in a VAR system rather than defense purchases presents three major 
relative advantages.  
First, since new orders include orders received for future delivery, they contain 
information about future flows of defense purchases. Second, since shocks to new orders 
of defense products are recorded before shocks to defense purchases, they are less likely 
to be anticipated. Third, since new orders are recorded in the data before production 
begins, they are not affected by shocks in the private sector that lead to changes in 
delivery schedules. As a result, the shocks to new orders identified using a Choleski 
decomposition are more likely to be truly unanticipated, and hence exogenous, than the 
shocks to defense purchases.  
To present the effects of exogenous shocks to new orders, the IRFs for new 
orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to new 
orders following the same procedure as the one used earlier for the alternative model. In 
the Choleski decomposition used to identify the shocks to new orders, new orders are 
ordered before real GDP, RTB and the GDP deflator, respectively. In the second panel of 
Figure 4.18, the solid line displays the shocks to new orders identified using the Choleski 
decomposition when the model with new orders is estimated from 1969:3 to 1999:2. The 
shocks identified do not exhibit any particular pattern, and no shock appears much larger 
than others.  
In the first column of Figure 4.19, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs computed for a unit shock to new orders. The dashed lines display the lower and 
upper bounds of one standard error confidence intervals computed using a Monte Carlo 
integration procedure. The quarter following a shock to new orders, their IRF decreases 
dramatically; however, it remains intermittently significant for almost three years after a 
shock.  
The IRFs for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator increase significantly for one 
and a half years after a shock to new orders. The IRFs for real GDP and RTB exhibits a 
hump-shaped pattern. They increase for more than a year after a shock, and then they 
quickly return toward their original values. The IRF for the GDP deflator increases 
gradually but persistently.   
In the second column of Figure 4.19, the solid lines display the point estimates of 
the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a 
unit shock to defense purchases when the alternative model is estimated over the sample 
period 1969:3 to 1999:2. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one 
standard error confidence intervals.  
As was reported for the whole sample period, the IRFs for RTB and the GDP 
deflator computed for a shock to defense purchases over the sample period 1969:3 to 
1999:2 are inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the 
more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models.  
Overall, when a VAR system identical to the alternative model, except that new 
orders of defense products are substituted for defense purchases, is estimated over the 






























































































































Figure 4.19: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and Defense Purchases 
Sample Period: 1969:3-1999:2 
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consistent with the traditional IS-LM model. They imply that output, interest rates, and 
the price level increase immediately and significantly for one and a half years in response 
to a positive shock to government purchases.  
Furthermore, the IRFs for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the 
alternative model over the sample period 1969:3 to 1999:2 are very different from the 
ones reported for the model with new orders of defense products. In particular, the IRFs 
for RTB and the GDP deflator, are problematic. Therefore, it is concluded that the shocks 
to new orders of defense products identified using a Choleski decomposition are better 
measures of exogenous shocks to defense spending than shocks to defense purchases.  
4.9  Robustness of the Results Reported For the Model with New Orders of  
Defense Products 
This section investigates the sensitivity of the results reported for new orders, real 
GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator to adding an endogenous variable or an exogenous 
dummy variable to the model with new orders. Furthermore, it presents the IRFs 
computed for fiscal variables and the monetary base. The variables added to the model 
with new orders, and the methodology used to examine the sensitivity of the results 
reported for this model to adding any of the variables selected, are the same as the ones 
used earlier for the alternative model. 
This section also examines the sensitivity of the results reported for the model 
with new orders to perturbations in the sample period. The model with new orders is 
estimated over two sub-sample periods, and the IRFs for new orders, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to new orders. If the results reported for 
the model with new orders are not sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used, 
the IRFs computed for the sub-sample periods ought to lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the whole sample period.  
The first sub-sample period selected spans 1969:3 to 1989:4. It excludes the data 
from the post-Cold War era, which represent one-third of the data from the whole sample 
period. The second sub-sample period selected spans 1973:2 to 1999:2. It begins with the 
oil crisis of 1973-1974, which may have affected the structural relations among the 
variables in the model estimated.   
4.9.1  Extended Models 
First, the effects of the shocks to new orders are examined in models that 
alternatively include fiscal variables. In Figure 4.20, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for new orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed 
when non-defense purchases, real federal government receipts, and the real federal 
government deficit are added, in turn, to the model with new orders. The dashed lines 
display the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new orders.  
When non-defense purchases or real federal government receipts are added to the 
model with new orders, all the IRFs reported lie on or within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the model with new orders at all horizons. However, a year 
after a shock to new orders, the pattern of the IRF for real GDP computed for the model 
with non-defense purchases is notably different from the one reported for the model with 
new orders. 
When the real federal government deficit is added to the model with new orders, 
the IRF computed for new orders lies within the confidence interval from the model with 


























































































































































































Figure 4.20: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and a Fiscal Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
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intervals from the model with new orders for two and a half years, and then they lie 
slightly above the upper bounds of the corresponding confidence intervals. The IRF for 
the GDP deflator lie within the confidence interval from the model with new orders at all 
horizons.  
Overall, the IRFs computed when fiscal variables are added, in turn, to the model 
with new orders indicate that the results reported for the model with new orders are not 
sensitive to adding fiscal variables, except for the real federal government deficit. In this 
case, the IRFs for real GDP and RTB are significantly different at long horizons from the 
ones reported for the model with new orders.  
In Figure 4.21, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for new 
orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when consumption of non-
durables and services, residential investment plus consumption of durables, and non-
residential investment are added, in turn, to the model with new orders. The dashed lines 
display the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new orders. When 
consumption of non-durables and services is added to the model with new orders, all the 
IRFs reported lie within or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the model 
with new orders at all horizons.  
When residential investment plus consumption of durables are added to the model 
with new orders, the IRFs reported for new orders, RTB, and the GDP deflator lie within 
or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new orders at all 
horizons. After a delay of several quarters, the IRF for real GDP lies below the lower 
bound of the confidence interval from the model with new orders for a year, and then it 
lies within the confidence interval.  
When non-residential investment is added to the model with new orders, the IRFs 
reported for new orders, real GDP, and the GDP deflator lie within or on the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new orders at all horizons. The 
IRF for RTB lies very slightly below the lower bound confidence intervals from the 
model with new orders for several quarters in the second year after a shock to new orders.  
Overall, the IRFs computed when consumption and investment variables are 
added, in turn, to the model with new orders indicate that the results reported for the 
model with new orders are not very sensitive to adding consumption and investment 
variables, except for residential investment plus consumption of durables. In this case, the 
IRF computed for real GDP is different from the one reported for the model with new 
orders. 
In Figure 4.22, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for new 
orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when employment in private 
industry, employment in the non-durables manufacturing sector, and employment in the 
durables manufacturing sector are added, in turn, to the model with new orders. The 
dashed lines display the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new 
orders. When a measure of employment is added to the model with new orders, all the 
IRFs reported lie within or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the model 
with new orders at all horizons.  
In Figure 4.23, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for new 
orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when real wages in private 
industry, real compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real compensation in the 


























































































































































































Figure 4.21: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and a Consumption or Investment Variable 


























































































































































































Figure 4.22: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and an Employment Variable 


























































































































































































Figure 4.23: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and a Measure of Real Wages or Real Compensation 
Confidence Intervals from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
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the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new orders. When a measure 
of real wages or real compensation is added to the model with new orders, all the IRFs 
reported lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new 
orders at all horizons.  
Overall, the IRFs computed when a measure of employment, real wages, or real 
compensation are added, in turn, to the model with new orders indicate that the results 
reported for the model with new orders are not sensitive to adding measures of 
employment, real wages, or real compensation. 
In Figure 4.24, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for new 
orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the Romers’ monetary 
policy dummy variable, the monetary base, and LTR are added, in turn, to the model with 
new orders. The dashed lines display the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
model with new orders. 
When the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable is added to the model with 
new orders, the IRF reported for RTB lies very slightly below the lower bound of the 
confidence interval from the model with new orders in the period of a shock to new 
orders. Then, it lies within the confidence interval. The IRFs for real GDP, RTB, the 
GDP deflator lie within or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with 
new orders at all horizons. When the monetary base or LTR is added to the model with 
new orders, all the IRFs reported lie within or on the corresponding confidence intervals 
from the model with new orders. 
In Figure 4.25, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for new 
orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when Hamilton’s oil price 
dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are 
added, in turn, to the model with new orders. The dashed lines display the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the model with new orders. Ramey and Shapiro (1997) identify 
only three exogenous military build-ups in the post-World war II era, and only the last 
one occurred during the sample period 1969:3 to 1999:2. Therefore, when the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable is added to the model with new orders, it takes the value one in 
1980:1, and zero otherwise. 
When Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable or the PPI for crude fuel is added to 
the model with new orders, all the IRFs reported lie within or on the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the model with new orders. When the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable is added to the model with new orders, the IRFs for new orders and the GDP 
deflator lie within or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new 
orders. 
However, when the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is added to the model with 
new orders, the IRF for real GDP does not begin to return toward its original value until 
two years after a shock to new orders, and it lies very slightly above the upper bound of 
the confidence interval from the model with new orders for more than a year. The IRF for 
RTB is small at all horizons, and after a delay of several quarters, it lies below the lower 
bound of the confidence interval from the model with new orders for more than a year.  
Overall, the IRFs computed when the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable, 
the monetary base, LTR, Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, 


























































































































































































Figure 4.24: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and an Additional Macroeconomic Variable 


























































































































































































Figure 4.25: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and an Additional Macroeconomic Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
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indicate that the results reported for the model with new orders are not sensitive to adding 
these variables, except for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. In this case, the IRF for 
RTB, and to a lesser extent real GDP, are different from the ones reported for the model 
with new orders. 
As was done for the alternative model, it is of interest to present the effects of a 
unit shock to new orders on non-defense purchases, real federal government receipts, the 
real federal government deficit, and the monetary base. In Figure 4.26, the solid lines 
display the point estimates of the IRFs computed for these fiscal variables and the 
monetary base when they are added, in turn, to the model with new orders. The dashed 
lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals.  
The IRF for non-defense purchases exhibits a u-shaped pattern. It drops sharply 
for a year after a shock to new orders, and then it gradually returns to its original value. 
Overall, it decreases significantly for more than a year. The IRF for real federal 
government receipts rises significantly in the period of a shock to new orders. Then, it 
exhibits a tendency to decline; however, it remains positive at all horizons, and it is 
significant for one and a half years.  
The IRF for the real federal government deficit increases significantly for three 
years after a shock to new orders. It implies that the government deficit improves 
immediately and persistently after an increase in government purchases. This result is 
consistent with the patterns of the IRFs reported for new orders, non-defense purchases, 
and for real federal government receipts. 
The IRF for the monetary base exhibits a u-shaped pattern, and is very persistent. 
It declines significantly for almost three years after a shock to new orders. This result 
implies that the shocks to new orders may be associated with persistent changes in 
monetary policy, which is consistent with the evidence reported by Caplan (1999) for 
instance.  
Overall, the IRFs for the fiscal variables and monetary base presented in this sub-
section indicate that the shocks to new orders of defense products identified using the 
Choleski decomposition coincide with significant and persistent changes in non-defense 
purchases, real federal government receipts, the real federal government deficit, and the 
monetary base. Furthermore, the IRFs computed for the fiscal variables imply that the 
federal government is able to finance military increases in new orders of defense products 
through decreases in non-defense purchases and increases in revenues.  
4.9.2  Alternative Sample Periods   
 As was mentioned before, to examine the sensitivity of the results reported for 
the model with new orders to perturbations in the sample period used, the model with 
new orders is estimated over the sub-sample periods 1969:3 to 1989:4 and 1973:2 to 
1999:2. Then, the IRFs for new orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed 
for a unit shock to new orders are plotted against for the corresponding confidence 
intervals reported for the whole sample period. 
In the first and second columns of Figure 4.27, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for new orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed 
when the model with new orders is estimated over the sub-sample periods 1969:3 to 
1989:4 and 1973:2 to 1999:2, respectively. The dashed lines display the confidence 






















































Figure 4.26: Point Estimates of the IRFs for Fiscal and Monetary Variables 































































































































Figure 4.27: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods for Model with New 
Orders of Defense Products 
Confidence Intervals from the Whole Sample Period 
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When the model with new orders is estimated over the sub-sample period 1969:3 to 
1989:4, the IRFs computed for new orders and the GDP deflator lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the whole sample period at all horizons. 
However, the IRF computed for real GDP lies continually below the lower bound of the 
confidence interval from the whole sample period for more than two years. The IRF 
computed for RTB lies intermittently below the lower bound of the confidence interval 
from the whole sample period for more than two years. 
When the model with new orders is estimated over the sub-sample period 1973:2 
to 1999:2, all the IRFs computed lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from 
the whole sample period at all horizons, and their patterns are similar to the ones reported 
for the whole sample period.  
Therefore, when the model with new orders is estimated for the sample period 
1969:3 to 1989:4, it is concluded that the IRFs for real GDP and RTB appear sensitive to 
perturbations in the sample period used. However, when this model is estimated for the 
sample period 1973:2 to 1999:2, none of the IRFs appears sensitive to perturbations in 
the sample period used.  
To further examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the model with new 
orders to perturbations in the sample period, Figure 4.28 presents the point estimates and 
confidence intervals of the IRFs computed for a unit shock to new orders when the model 
with new orders is estimated over the sub-sample periods 1969:3 to 1989:4 and 1973:2 to 
1999:2. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for new orders, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-
standard deviation confidence intervals from these sample periods, not the full sample 
period.   
The patterns and magnitudes of the IRF for new orders reported for the sub-
sample periods 1969:3 to 1989:4 and 1973:2 to 1999:2 are similar to the ones presented 
for the whole sample period. Furthermore, the patterns and magnitudes of the IRF for real 
GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator reported for the sub-sample period 1973:2 to 1999:2 
are similar to the ones presented for the whole sample period.  
However, the patterns of the IRF for real GDP and RTB reported for the sub-
sample period 1969:3 to 1989:4 are quite different from the ones presented for the whole 
sample period. The IRF for real GDP is small and not significantly different from zero for 
more than a year. Then, it exhibits a u-shaped pattern, and it declines significantly for 
several periods in the second year after a shock to new orders. The IRF for RTB increases 
modestly for more than a year after a shock to new orders, and it is not significantly 
different from zero. Then, it declines sharply but briefly, and it is not significantly 
different from zero. 
Overall, the IRF reported for new orders for the sub-sample period 1969:3 to 
1989:4 is similar to the one presented for the whole sample period. However, the IRFs 
reported for real GDP and RTB are quite different. Furthermore, all the IRFs reported for  
the sub-sample period 1973:2 to 1999:2 are similar to the ones presented for the whole 
sample period. 
4.10 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter provides evidence on the implications of using the Choleski 
decomposition for estimating the macroeconomic effects of exogenous shocks to 































































































































Figure 4.28: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods for Model with New 
Orders of Defense Products 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Sample Periods 
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VAR systems in the spirit of Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). In addition, it 
examines the benchmark model presented by Fatas and Mihov (2000). 
Fatas and Mihov (2000) estimate a VAR system in the spirit of Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). However, they use a sample period different from the 
one presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), and the values of the data for 
government receipts and transfer payments they use are incorrect. Therefore, the 
benchmark model presented by Fatas and Mihov (2000) is re-estimated using the correct 
values for government receipts and transfer payments over two different sample periods.  
The IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator reported for both sample periods are 
inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models.  
To compare the implications of using the narrative approaches presented in the 
previous chapters of the dissertation and the Choleski decomposition for estimating the 
effects of exogenous shocks to defense purchases, a benchmark model and an alternative 
model are estimated. They are identical to the ones estimated in the previous chapters, 
except that they do not include a dummy variable for exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases.  
Then, IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to defense purchases on 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed. The IRFs 
reported for the benchmark model imply that defense purchases increase very persistently 
in response to a shock to defense purchases, output rises temporarily, and interest rates 
and the price level decline persistently. The IRFs reported for the alternative model are 
similar in pattern to the ones computed for the benchmark model; however, they are 
slightly different quantitatively. 
Like the IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator reported for Fatas and Mihov’s 
model, the ones computed for the benchmark and alternative models are inconsistent with 
the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) 
and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and 
one-sector neoclassical models.  
Since the robustness of the evidence reported using the Choleski decomposition to 
identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases has been questioned, this chapter 
examines the sensitivity of the results computed for the benchmark model to adding time 
trends and changing the lag length used. It is shown that the results reported for the 
benchmark model are not sensitive to adding time trends and to changing the lag length 
used, except for defense purchases. 
To investigate the sensitivity of the results computed for the alternative model to 
perturbations in the list of variables used, eighteen endogenous and exogenous variables 
are added, in turn, to the alternative model, and the IRFs computed for the extended 
models and the alternative model are compared. It is shown that the results reported for 
the alternative model are sensitive to adding the Romers’ monetary policy dummy, 
Hamilton’s oil price dummy, the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables, and to a lesser extent 
fiscal variables. However, they are not sensitive to adding sectoral variables except for 
employment in the durables manufacturing sector, and they are not sensitive to adding the 
monetary base, LTR, and the PPI for crude fuel.  
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The sensitivity of the results computed using the Choleski decomposition to 
perturbations in the sample period used is examined when the alternative model is 
estimated over four different sub-sample periods identical to the ones selected in the 
previous chapters of the dissertation. As for the narrative approaches, the IRFs reported 
for the four sub-samples periods using the Choleski decomposition imply that the results 
reported for the alternative model, in particular defense purchases, are sensitive to 
perturbations in the sample period used.  
Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) argue that the shocks to government 
purchases identified using the Choleski decomposition may not be unanticipated, and 
hence exogenous. Therefore, a VAR system identical to the alternative model, except that 
new orders of defense products is substituted for defense purchases, is estimated. Then, 
the IRFs that present the effects of a shock to new orders of defense products on new 
orders of defense products, real total GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed. 
The IRFs reported for a shock to new orders of defense products are very different 
from the ones presented for a shock to defense purchases when the alternative model is 
estimated. They imply that output, interest rates, and the price level increase significantly 
for one and a half years in response to a positive shock to government purchases. 
Unlike the IRFs presented for a shock to defense purchases when the alternative 
model is estimated, the ones reported for the model with new orders of defense products 
are consistent with a traditional IS-LM model. Therefore, it is concluded that new orders 
of defense products are a better proxy for government purchases than defense purchases.  
 To investigate the sensitivity of the results computed for the model with new 
orders of defense products to perturbations in the list of variables, the same methodology 
used to examine the robustness of the results reported for defense purchases are used. It is 
shown that the results reported for the model with new orders of defense products are not 
very sensitive to adding the variables selected, except the residential investment and 
consumption of durables and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
 Finally, to investigate the sensitivity of the results computed for the model with 
new orders of defense products to perturbations in the sample period, this model is 
estimated for two different sub-sample periods. It is shown that the results reported for 
the model with new orders of defense products are fairly sensitive to altering the sample 
period. 
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CHAPTER 5. LONG-RUN RESTRICTIONS  
5.1 Introduction 
As was mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, although long-run (LR) 
restrictions have been commonly used in the VAR literature to investigate the 
macroeconomic effects of exogenous monetary policy shocks (Shapiro and Watson 
(1988), Blanchard and Quah (1989), Ahmed and al (1993), Faust and Leeper (1997), 
Fackler and McMillin (1998), Keating (1999), McMillin (2001)), it is believed that they 
have not been used yet to examine the effects of exogenous fiscal policy shocks.  
However, LR restrictions may be an appropriate identification scheme to identify 
exogenous fiscal policy shocks, in particular shocks to government purchases. The most 
attractive feature of LR restrictions is that they are generally less controversial than 
contemporaneous restrictions. For instance, Keating (1999) states, “This method is 
particularly attractive to economists who believe theory describes long-run equilibrium 
phenomena better than short-run dynamics” (Keating 1999, p. 1).  
Like the other identification schemes used to identify exogenous monetary policy 
shocks, LR restrictions have been the subject of several criticisms, which may be relevant 
when LR restrictions are implemented to identify exogenous shocks to government 
purchases. First, Faust and Leeper (1997) argue that the impulse response functions 
(IRFs) computed using LR restrictions are likely to be biased. They argue that the 
structural shocks identified must be viewed as aggregations of underlying shocks; 
however, the conditions for valid shock aggregation are unlikely to be met in a small 
VAR system. In particular, it is unlikely that all the underlying shocks used to construct 
the structural shocks affect the economy in precisely the same way. 
Second, Faust and Leeper (1997) argue, “… The long-run effect of shocks is 
imprecisely estimated in finite samples, and the long-run identification scheme transfers 
this imprecision to other parameters of the model” (Faust and Leeper 1997, pp. 1-2). 
Third, Fackler and McMillin (1998) note, “… It is only in the short- and medium-runs for 
which substantive implications can be asserted since long-run results are constrained by 
the identifying restrictions” (Fackler and McMillin (1998), p. 653).   
This chapter of the dissertation examines the implications of using LR restrictions 
for estimating the effects of exogenous shocks to government purchases. To compare the 
implications of using LR restrictions versus the narrative approaches and the Choleski 
decomposition presented in the previous chapters, it focuses on the same benchmark and 
alternative models as the ones examined in the previous chapters. 
It also investigates the robustness of the results computed for the benchmark and 
alternative models when LR restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks to 
government purchases. As was done in the studies of the narrative approaches and 
Choleski decomposition presented in the previous chapters, the robustness of the results 
computed for the benchmark model to adding time trends and altering the lag length used 
is examined. Furthermore, the robustness of the results computed for the alternative 
model to perturbations in the list of variables and the sample period used is considered.  
Finally, some of the IRFs reported when LR restrictions are used to identify 
shocks to defense purchases are inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical 
models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. 
Therefore, as was done in the previous chapter, the implications of using new orders of 
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defense products as a proxy for defense purchases for estimating the effects of a shock to 
defense are examined. 
The plan of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 presents the 
results computed for the benchmark model and for models in which alternative measures 
of interest rates are substituted for the net three month interest rate on Treasury bills 
(RTB). Section 5.3 examines the sensitivity of the benchmark model to adding time 
trends and altering the lag length used. Section 5.4 presents the results computed for the 
alternative model.  
Section 5.5 and 5.6 discuss the sensitivity of the alternative model to perturbations 
in the list of variables and in the sample period used, respectively. Section 5.7 examines 
the results computed when new orders of defense products are used as a proxy for 
defense purchases. Section 5.8 discusses the sensitivity of the model reported for the 
model with new orders of defense products to perturbations in the list of variables and the 
sample period. Section 5.9 provides a brief summary and conclusion.  
5.2 Benchmark Model 
This section presents the IRFs computed for benchmark model when LR 
restrictions are used to identify the shocks to defense purchases. For comparison’s sake, 
the benchmark model is exactly identical to the one estimated in the study of the Choleski 
decomposition. As was mentioned before, it includes a constant and four lagged values of 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator in each equation. The 
logarithmic values of the variables are used except for RTB. 
The point estimates of the IRFs reported for the benchmark model as well as the 
other VAR systems examined in this chapter are computed following the methodology 
presented by McMillin (2001), who uses LR restrictions as well as contemporaneous 
restrictions to investigate the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks. The 
variables are differenced prior to estimation. Then, a Choleski decomposition of the long-
run relations among the variables in the systems is used to identify the exogenous shocks 
to defense purchases.  
Keating (1999) shows that neutrality restrictions can be imposed within a VAR 
system, and hence structural shocks can be identified, using a Choleski decomposition of 
the long-run relations among the variables from a VAR estimated in first differences, 
provided that the long-run ordering is consistent with the underlying economic structure. 
Since the variables are differenced prior to estimation, the benchmark model is 
estimated from 1948:2 to 1999:2 and data from 1947:2 to 1947:1 are used as pre-sample 
data. To compare the implications of using the identification schemes presented in the 
previous chapters of the dissertation and LR restrictions for estimating the effects of a 
shock to defense purchases, the effects of a shock to defense purchases on the levels of 
the variables are reported. Therefore, the point estimates of the IRFs computed using LR 
restrictions at any horizon are the cumulative sums of the point estimates of the IRFs 
computed for the differenced variables up to and including this point.  
In the Choleski decomposition of the long-run relations among the residuals of the 
variables in the benchmark model, real GDP is ordered first, defense purchases is ordered 
second, the GDP deflator is ordered third, and RTB is ordered last. A key assumption 
made in selecting this ordering is that defense purchases have no effect on the level of 
output in the long run, which implies that the defense purchases should be ordered after 
real GDP. It is consistent with the predictions from a sticky-wage/price aggregate 
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demand-aggregate supply-type model. Furthermore, Keating (2000) shows that it is 
consistent with data from the post-World War II era. 
Keating (2000) carries out a series of experiments to determine if demand shocks, 
including shocks to government purchases, are neutral in the long run. He argues that the 
evidence reported is consistent with the fact that demand shocks do not have a long run 
effect on the level of output, and concludes, “… The empirical results for postwar 
economies are consistent with the textbook aggregate supply and demand structure” 
(Keating 2000, p. 14). 
Another key assumption is that shocks to the price level and RTB do not have a 
long-run effect on defense purchases, which implies that the price level and RTB are 
ordered after defense purchases. It is consistent with many studies published in the 
foreign policy and defense policy literature in which it is argued that decisions with 
regard to defense spending are independent from economic developments (Garnett 
(1987), Rearden (1984), Shilling (1962)).  
For instance, Garnett (1987) argues, “… Defense expenditure is determined not 
by economic constraint, but by political decisions-decisions that reflect the values and 
priorities of the electorate and the government” (Garnett 1987, p. 10). Similarly, Schilling 
(1962) emphasizes that defense policy choices “… Can be made in only one place: the 
political arena” (Shilling 1962, p. 15). Furthermore, he argues that “… The major limit on 
the size of the defense budget is not how much the economy can ‘stand’ but how much 
the people can be persuaded to support” (Schilling  1962, p. 234).  
The shocks to defense purchases identified using LR restrictions for the sample 
period from 1948:2 to 1999:2 are presented in Figure 5.1. The vertical lines mark the 
onsets of the exogenous increases and retrenchments in defense purchases identified in 
the third chapter of the dissertation using a narrative approach. Like the shocks identified 
using the Choleski decomposition, the shocks identified using LR restrictions are 
dramatically larger during the Korean War military build-up than any other period in the 
post-World War II era. The largest shock identified, which occurred in 1951:1, is more 
than twice as large as any other shocks taking place afterward.  
As is done in the study of the Choleski decomposition presented in the previous 
chapter, the benchmark model is estimated, and the IRFs for defense purchases, real total 
GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator that present the effects of a unit shock to defense 
purchases are computed. In Figure 5.2, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one standard error 
confidence intervals computed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure.  
The IRF for defense purchases increases sharply for a year, and then it remains 
stable. It is highly significant at all horizons. The pattern of the IRF for defense purchases 
implies that the shocks to defense purchases identified have a temporary effect on the 
growth rate of defense purchases, and a permanent effect on their level. This is consistent 
with the point estimates of the IRF computed for defense purchases when the benchmark 
model is estimated in first differences, which indicate that the growth rate of defense 
purchases increases temporarily after a shock to defense purchases.         
The IRF for real GDP is positive for one and a half years after a shock to defense 
purchases, and then it is negative. However, it is small and never significantly different 
from zero. The IRF for RTB is negative at all horizons, and it is marginally significant 
the quarter after a shock to defense purchases. The IRF for the GDP deflator is positive  
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Figure 5.1: Shocks to Defense Purchases 
Sample Period: 1948:2-1999:2 
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Figure 5.2: Point Estimates from Benchmark Model 
Sample Period: 1948:2-1999:2 
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and persistent. It increases significantly for almost three years after a shock to defense 
purchases. 
Like the IRF for RTB reported for the benchmark model using the Choleski 
decomposition, the one computed using LR restrictions is problematic. The IRF for RTB 
is inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey 
and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. 
Moreover, although a shock to defense purchases has a large and very persistent 
effect on defense purchases, the IRF computed for real GDP is not significantly different 
from zero at any horizon. However, unlike the IRF for the GDP deflator reported for the 
benchmark model using the Choleski decomposition, the one computed using LR 
restrictions is consistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the 
more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. 
Given the IRF reported for RTB when the benchmark model is estimated, it is of 
interest to examine the sensitivity of the results computed for the benchmark model to 
alternatively substituting real RTB and the nominal ten-year Treasury rate (LTR) for 
RTB. In Figure 5.3, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, the GDP deflator and the alternative measures of interest rates 
substituted for RTB computed for a unit shock to defense purchases. The dashed lines 
display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals.  
The patterns and amplitudes of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, and the 
GDP deflator computed when real RTB or LTR is substituted for RTB are very similar to 
the ones reported for the benchmark model. The pattern of the IRF for real RTB is very 
different from the one reported for RTB. The IRF for real RTB drops significantly in the 
period of a shock to defense purchases, and then it steadily returns toward its original 
value. Overall, it is negative and significant for more than a year. The IRF for LTR is 
positive at all horizons; however, it is small and not significantly different from zero at 
any horizon.  
In conclusion, the IRFs reported for defense purchases, real GDP, and the GDP 
deflator are not affected when real RTB or LTR is substituted for RTB in the benchmark 
model. Furthermore, like the IRF reported for RTB, the IRF computed for real RTB is 
inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. The IRF for LTR is not 
significantly different from zero at any horizon.  
5.3 Alternative Time Trends and Lag Lengths 
The benchmark model estimated in the previous section is exactly identical to the 
one presented in the previous chapter of the dissertation. Therefore, the statistical 
evidence on the selection of an appropriate time trend and an adequate lag length for the 
VAR system under study in the previous chapter applies to the system estimated in the 
previous section.   
According to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values reported in the 
previous chapter, it is best to add a “Perron-type” trend to each equation in the 
benchmark model. The Schwartz Bayesian Criterion  (SBC) values reported imply that it 

























































































































Figure 5.3: Point Estimates from Models With Alternative Measures of Interest 
Rates 
Sample Period: 1948:2-1999:2 
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is preferable to include a “Perron-type” trend or linear and quadratic trends than no trend 
or a linear trend only.  
Furthermore, according to the AIC values and the likelihood ratio tests reported in 
the previous chapter, it is better to include six lagged values of the endogenous variables 
in each equation of the benchmark model. The SBC values reported imply that it is best 
to include two lagged values of the variables.   
5.3.1 Time Trend 
To examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the benchmark model to 
adding time trends, VAR systems are estimated in which linear and quadratic trends and 
a “Perron-type” trend are added to each equation of the benchmark model.1 If the results 
reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to adding time trends, the IRFs 
computed for the systems in which linear and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend 
are included ought to lie within the corresponding confidence intervals reported for the 
benchmark model. 
In Figure 5.4, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit shock to defense 
purchases when the models with linear and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” trend are 
estimated. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals computed for the benchmark 
model. When the model with linear and quadratic trends is estimated, all the IRFs 
reported lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the benchmark model at 
all horizons. Furthermore, their patterns are similar to the ones reported for the 
benchmark model. 
When the model with a “Perron-type” trend is estimated, the IRF for defense 
purchases increases much more gradually than the one presented for the benchmark 
model, and it lies well below the confidence interval from the benchmark model at all 
horizons. The IRF for real GDP lies within or on the confidence interval from the 
benchmark model at all horizons; however, its pattern is very different from the one 
reported for the benchmark model.  
Except for the first quarter after a shock to defense purchases, the IRF for RTB 
lies within or on the confidence interval from the benchmark model at all horizons; 
however, its pattern is different from the one reported for the benchmark model at long 
horizons. The IRF for the GDP deflator lies below the corresponding confidence interval 
from the benchmark model at all horizons.  
Overall, the IRFs reported in this sub-section yield mixed evidence on the 
sensitivity of the results reported for the benchmark model to adding a time trend. The 
IRFs reported for the benchmark model are not significantly affected when linear and 
quadratic trends are added. In contrast, they are significantly affected when a “Perron-
type” trend is added. Furthermore, whether linear and quadratic trends or a “Perron-type” 
trend are added, the IRF reported for RTB remains troublesome.  
5.3.2  Lag Length 
To examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the benchmark model to 
altering the lag length used, VAR systems identical to the benchmark model, except that 
they include two or six lagged values of the variables, are estimated. If the results 
reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to the lag length used, the IRFs  
                                                           
1 The “Perron-type” time trend as well as the other time trends included in this chapter are discussed in 
































































































































Figure 5.4: Point Estimates from Models with Alternative Time Trends 
Confidence Intervals from Benchmark Model 
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computed for the systems with two or six lagged values of the variables ought to lie 
within the corresponding confidence intervals from the benchmark model.  
In Figure 5.5, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit shock to defense 
purchases when the systems with two or six lags of the variables are estimated. The 
dashed lines display the confidence intervals computed for the benchmark model. All the 
IRFs computed for the models with two and six lags lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the benchmark model at all horizons. Furthermore, except for 
the IRF for real GDP computed for the model with six lags, the patterns of the IRFs 
reported for the models with two and six lags are similar to the ones presented for the 
benchmark model.  
Overall, all the IRFs computed for the models with two or six lagged values of the 
variables lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the benchmark model at 
all horizons. Furthermore, all but one of the IRFs computed for the models with two or 
six lagged values of the variables exhibit patterns similar to the ones reported for the 
benchmark model. Therefore, it is concluded that the results reported for the benchmark 
model are not sensitive to altering the lag length used. 
5.4 Alternative Model  
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the specification of the equations 
selected for the benchmark model, which is the one used by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and 
Fisher (1999), is not the best for the VAR system under study. According to the AIC 
criterion, it is best to estimate an alternative model that includes six lagged values of the 
endogenous variables and a “Perron-type” trend. 
Therefore, this section presents the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, 
and the GDP deflator computed for a unit shock to defense purchases when the 
alternative model is estimated over the sample period from 1948:4 to 1999:2. In the first 
column of Figure 5.6, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs and the 
dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence 
intervals computed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure.  
Except for real GDP, the IRFs reported for the benchmark and alternative models 
appear relatively similar. The main difference between the two models is found in the 
response of the real GDP. Whereas the IRF reported for the benchmark model is 
temporarily positive after a shock to defense purchases, the one computed for the 
alternative model remains negative. Furthermore, the IRF for the GDP deflator computed 
for the alternative model rises significantly for only one and a half years, compared to 
three years for the benchmark model. 
To further compare the results computed for the benchmark and alternative 
models, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator reported 
for the benchmark model are plotted against the confidence intervals from the alternative 
model, which is the preferred model. If the IRFs computed for the benchmark model are 
not significantly different from the ones reported for the alternative model, they ought to 
lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model.  
In the second column of Figure 5.6, the solid lines display the point estimates of 
the IRFs reported for the benchmark model and the dashed lines display the confidence 
intervals computed for the alternative model. The IRF for defense purchases lies very 
































































































































Figure 5.5: Point Estimates from Models with Alternative Lag lengths 
































































































































Figure 5.6: Point Estimates from Alternative Model and Benchmark Model 
Confidence Interval from Alternative Model 
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several quarters, and it remains close to the upper bound of the confidence interval for 
more than two years. The IRFs for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons.  
In conclusion, except for real GDP, the patterns of the IRFs presented for the 
alternative model are similar to the ones reported for the benchmark model. Except for 
defense purchases, the amplitudes of the IRFs presented for the alternative model are not 
significantly different from the ones reported for the benchmark model. The IRF for 
defense purchases is marginally and temporarily smaller than the one reported for the 
benchmark model. 
Furthermore, as for the benchmark model, the IRF for RTB computed for the 
alternative model is inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models 
presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as 
well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. In addition, the 
IRF for real GDP is not significantly different from zero at any horizon. 
5.5 Extended Models 
This section investigates the sensitivity of the results reported for defense 
purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator to adding an endogenous variable or an 
exogenous dummy variable to the alternative model. Eighteen variables are alternatively 
considered. They are the ones used in the study of the Choleski decomposition presented 
in the previous chapter of the dissertation.  
To examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative model to 
adding any of the variables under consideration, the methodology used is the same as the 
one presented in the previous chapters. First, an extended version of the alternative model 
is estimated that includes defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, the GDP deflator, and the 
variable under consideration. Six lagged values of the variable under consideration are 
included if it is endogenous. The contemporaneous and six lagged values are included if 
it is an exogenous dummy variable.  
 Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are 
computed for a unit shock to defense purchases, and plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals reported for the alternative model. If the results reported for the 
alternative model are not sensitive to perturbations in the list of variables used, the IRFs 
computed for the extended model ought to lie within the corresponding confidence 
intervals from the alternative model. 
First, the effects of the shocks to defense purchases in models that alternatively 
include additional fiscal variables are examined. Then, the effects of the shocks in models 
that alternatively include consumption, investment, and labor market variables are 
investigated. Next, the effects of the shocks in models that alternatively include the 
Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable, the monetary base, a measure of long-term 
interest rates, Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are presented.  
5.5.1 Fiscal Variables 
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to defense purchases 
in models that alternatively include non-defense purchases, real federal government 
receipts, and the real federal government deficit. The logarithmic values of the additional 
fiscal variables are used except for the deficit, which takes negative values. To construct 
the measures of real federal government receipts and the real federal government deficit, 
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the current values of these variables in billions of dollars are deflated by the CPI. Non-
defense purchases are in billions of chained (1992) dollars.2 
For the models with an additional fiscal variable, real GDP is ordered first in the 
long-run Choleski decomposition used to identify the shocks to defense purchases, 
defense purchases are ordered second, the additional fiscal variables are ordered third, the 
GDP deflator is ordered fourth, and RTB is ordered last. This ordering implies that 
shocks to the additional fiscal variables under study may not a have long-run effect on 
defense purchases. 
The critical assumption made in identifying the shocks to defense purchases 
within the fiscal models is that decisions regarding defense purchases in the long run 
come before other fiscal decisions. While this assumption is generally consistent with 
many studies in the foreign and defense policy literature, it is noted that shocks to the 
additional fiscal variables under consideration, in particular the real federal government 
deficit, may have some effects on defense purchases in the long run.3  
However, a long-run Choleski decomposition of the residuals from the fiscal 
models does not permit to account for potential interactions among fiscal variables in the 
long run. Therefore, the exercises presented above for the fiscal variables were replicated 
when for real GDP is ordered first in the long-run Choleski decomposition used to 
identify the shocks to defense purchases, the additional fiscal variables are ordered 
second, defense purchases are ordered third, the GDP deflator is ordered fourth, and RTB 
is ordered last. The results computed for the alternative ordering are similar to the ones 
presented hereafter. 
In Figure 5.7, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the additional fiscal variables are added, in 
turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals 
from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs and the 
dashed lines display the confidence intervals.  
When non-defense purchases, real federal government receipts or the real federal 
government deficit are added to the alternative model, all the IRFs reported lie within or 
on the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. 
Furthermore, the patterns of the IRFs reported are similar to the ones presented for the  
alternative model. Therefore, it is concluded that the results reported for the alternative 
model are not sensitive to adding fiscal variables. 
5.5.2 Sectoral Variables 
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to defense purchases 
in models that alternatively include components of consumption and investment. 
Following Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), consumption and investment are 
broken down into three components: consumption of non-durables and services, 
residential investment plus consumption of durables, and non-residential investment.  
 It also presents evidence on the effects of shocks to defense purchases in models 
that alternatively include measures of employment, real wages, and real compensation.  
                                                           
2 The different extended models estimated in this section and the variables included in these extended 
models are identical to the ones presented in the previous chapters of the dissertation. They are more 
thoroughly discussed in the second chapter of the dissertation. 
3 The historical accounts discussed in the second chapter of the dissertation suggest that the impact of high 
military expenditures on the deficit was a concern toward the end of the Korean War, the Kennedy, and 



























































































































































































Figure 5.7: Point Estimates from Models with a Fiscal Variable 
Confidence Interval from Alternative Model 
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First, employment in the private sector, employment in the non-durables manufacturing 
sector, and employment in the durables manufacturing sector are examined. Then, real 
wages in private industry, real compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real 
compensation in the business sector are considered.  
 The logarithmic values of the measures of consumption, investment, employment, 
real wages and real compensation are included in the models estimated. To construct the 
measures of real compensation and real wages, the nominal values of these variables are 
deflated by the CPI. The other additional sectoral variables examined hereafter are in 
billions of chained (1992) dollars.  
The measures of consumption and investment are ordered third in the long-run 
Choleski decomposition used to identify the shocks to defense purchases. It is ordered 
after real GDP and defense purchases but before the GDP deflator and RTB. The key 
assumption is that shocks to consumption and investment may not have long run effects 
on the levels of output and defense; however, they may have long-run effects on the price 
level and interest rates.  
The ordering presented above is consistent with the results from a simple 
aggregate supply-aggregate demand model in which aggregate demand shocks have a 
temporary effect on the level of output, but may have a permanent effect on the levels of 
interest rates and price. However, shocks to private investment, in particular non-
residential investment, may in fact have some effects on the level of output in the long 
run since they may influence the stock of capital in the economy.  
A long-run Choleski decomposition of the residuals from the models with a 
measure of investment does not permit one to account for potential interactions between 
investment and output in the long run. Therefore, the IRFs for the model with non-
residential investment are also computed when non-residential investment is ordered first 
in the long-run Choleski decomposition used to identify the shocks to defense purchases, 
real GDP is ordered second, defense purchases are ordered third, the GDP deflator is 
ordered fourth, and RTB is ordered last. The results computed for the alternative ordering 
are similar to the ones presented hereafter. 
Like the measures of consumption and investment, the different measures of 
employment, real wages, and real compensation added to the alternative model are 
ordered third in the long-run Choleski decomposition used to identify the shocks to 
defense purchases. It is assumed that shocks to employment, real wages, and real 
compensation may not have a long run effect on the level of output and defense; 
however, they may have long-run effects on the price level and interest rates.  
In Figure 5.8, the point estimates of the IRFs computed for defense purchases, 
real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator when the consumption and investment variables  
listed above are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the 
point estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals.  
In Figure 5.9, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when employment in private industry, employment 
in the non-durables manufacturing sector, and employment in the durables manufacturing 
sector are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point 


























































































































































































Figure 5.8: Point Estimates from Models with a Consumption or Investment 
Variable 
























































































































































































Figure 5.9: Point Estimates from Models with an Employment Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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In Figure 5.10, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB and the GDP deflator computed when real wages in private industry, real 
compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real compensation in the business sector 
are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals.  
Since the series for compensation in the manufacturing sector is not available 
before 1949:1, the model with real compensation in the manufacturing sector is estimated 
from 1950:4 to 1999:2, and the IRFs reported for this model are plotted against the 
confidence intervals computed for the same sample period. 
When measures of consumption and investment, or measures of employment, or 
measures of real wages and real compensation are added, in turn, to the alternative 
model, all the IRFs reported lie within or on the corresponding confidence intervals from 
the alternative model at all horizons. Furthermore, the patterns of the IRFs reported are 
similar to the ones presented for the alternative model. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
results reported for the alternative model are not sensitive to adding sectoral variables.  
5.5.3 Additional Macroeconomic Variables 
This sub-section presents evidence on the effects of shocks to defense purchases 
in models that include the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable, the monetary base, 
and LTR. It also investigates the effects of shocks to defense purchases in models that 
include Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable.   
For the model with the monetary base, this variable is ordered third in the long-
run Choleski decomposition used to identify the shocks to defense purchases.  It is 
ordered after real GDP and defense purchases but before the GDP deflator and RTB. 
Shocks to the monetary base are assumed not to have long-run effects on real GDP and 
defense purchases; however, they may have a permanent effect on the levels of interest 
rates and price.4   
For the model with LTR, this variable is ordered last in the long-run Choleski 
decomposition used to identify the shocks to defense purchases. The other variables 
follow the same ordering as in the alternative model. Shocks to LTR are assumed not to 
have long-run effects on the other variables in the system estimated; however, shocks to 
the other variables in the system, in particular RTB, may have a long-run effect on LTR. 
In Figure 5.11, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator computed when the monetary variables and LTR are added, 
in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding confidence intervals 
from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs and the 
dashed lines display the confidence intervals. 
When the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable is added to the alternative 
model, the IRF computed for defense purchases increases much more gradually than the 
one reported for the alternative model. It lies below the lower bound of the confidence 
interval from the alternative model at all horizons. The IRFs for real GDP and RTB lie 
                                                           
4 Since the traditional IS-LM model predicts that monetary shocks have only temporary effects on the price 
level and interest rates, the monetary base may be ordered after the GDP deflator and RTB in the long-run 
Choleski decomposition used to identify shocks to defense purchases. It does not affect the results reported 


























































































































































































Figure 5.10: Point Estimates from Models with a Measure of Real Wages or Real 
Compensation 


























































































































































































Figure 5.11: Point Estimates from Models with an Additional Macroeconomic 
Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at all horizons. 
The IRF for the GDP deflator is small at all horizons, and it lies slightly below the lower 
bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model for more than two quarters 
after a shock to defense purchases. 
 When the monetary base or LTR is added to the alternative model, all the IRFs 
reported lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at 
all horizons. Furthermore, the patterns of the IRFs reported are similar to the ones 
presented for the alternative model. 
In Figure 5.12, the point estimates of the IRFs computed when Hamilton’s oil 
price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable 
are added, in turn, to the alternative model are plotted against the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the alternative model. The solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs and the dashed lines display the confidence intervals. 
When Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable is added to the alternative model, the 
IRF computed for defense purchases increases much more gradually than the one 
reported for the alternative model, and it lies below the lower bound of the confidence 
interval from the alternative model at all horizons. The IRF for real GDP lies within the 
confidence interval from the alternative model at all horizons. 
The IRF for RTB reported for the model with Hamilton’s oil price dummy 
variable is positive at all horizons, and it lies above the upper bound of the confidence 
interval from the alternative model at all horizons. The IRF for the GDP deflator is small, 
and it lies slightly below the lower bound of the confidence interval from the alternative 
model for two quarters after a shock to defense purchases. 
When the PPI for crude fuel is added to the alternative model, all the IRFs 
computed lies within the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model 
at all horizons. Furthermore, the patterns of the IRFs reported are similar to the ones 
presented for the alternative model. 
When the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is added to the alternative model, the 
IRF computed for defense purchases increases much more gradually than the one 
reported for the alternative model, and it lies below the lower bound of the confidence 
interval from the alternative model at all horizons. The IRFs computed for real GDP and 
RTB lie within or on the corresponding confidence intervals from the alternative model at 
all horizons. The IRF for the GDP deflator is small, and it lies slightly below the lower 
bound of the confidence interval from the alternative model for more than a year after a 
shock to defense purchases. 
Overall, The results computed when the monetary base, LTR, and the PPI for 
crude fuel are added, in turn, to the alternative model imply that the IRFs reported for the 
alternative model are not sensitive to adding these variables. However, the results 
computed when the dummy variables are added, in turn, to the alternative model imply 
that the IRFs reported for the alternative model, in particular for defense purchases, are 
sensitive to adding the dummy variables.  
When the dummy variables are added, in turn, to the alternative model, the IRFs 
reported for defense purchases are much smaller than the one reported for the alternative 
model, and the IRFs for the GDP deflator are initially smaller than the one reported for 



























































































































































































Figure 5.12: Point Estimates from Models with an Additional Macroeconomic 
Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Model 
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to the alternative model, the IRF for RTB is larger than the one reported for the 
alternative model.  
5.5.4 Responses of Fiscal and Monetary Variables 
As was done for the narrative approaches and the Choleski decomposition, it is of 
interest to determine whether the shocks identified using LR restrictions coincide not 
only with increases in defense purchases but also changes in other dimensions of fiscal 
policy or changes in monetary policy. Therefore, this sub-section presents the effects of a 
shock to defense purchases on some of the fiscal and monetary variables added, in turn, 
to the alternative model in the previous sub-section.  
It is of interest to present the effects of a unit shock to new orders on additional 
fiscal variables and the monetary base. In Figure 5.13, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs computed for non-defense purchases, real federal government 
receipts, the real federal government deficit, and the monetary base when the extended 
models that include these variables are estimated. The dashed lines display the lower and 
upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals. The IRFs for the additional 
fiscal variables are very different from the ones reported when a narrative approach or the 
Choleski decomposition is used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases. 
The IRF for non-defense purchases decreases significantly in the period of a 
shock to defense purchases, and then it gradually returns toward its original level. The 
decline in non-defense purchases is persistent, it is significant for almost three years after  
a shock. The IRF for real federal government receipts increases significantly in the period 
of a shock to defense purchases, and then it remains stable. It is positive and significant at 
all horizons.  
The IRF for the real federal government deficit declines steadily for one and a 
half years after a shock to defense purchases, and then it remains stable. It is significant at 
all horizons after a delay of a year, which means that the federal government deficit 
deteriorates significantly and persistently in response to a shock to defense purchases. 
This result may be consistent with the IRFs reported for the other fiscal variables 
examined. Together with the IRF for government deficit, the IRFs for government 
purchases and government receipts imply that the government has to finance large 
increases in defense purchases through deficits in spite of the rise in government receipts 
and the decline in non-defense purchases.  
The IRF for the monetary base is very different from the one reported when the 
Choleski decomposition is used to identify shocks to defense purchases. It increases 
persistently; however, it is relatively small and not significantly different from zero at any 
horizon. It implies that shocks to defense purchases do not coincide with significant 
changes in monetary policy.  
5.6 Alternative Sample Periods 
This section examines the sensitivity of the results reported for defense purchases, 
real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator to perturbations in the sample period used to 
estimate the alternative model. The methodology implemented is the same as the one 
presented for the narrative approaches and Choleski decomposition in the previous 
chapters of the dissertation. 
 First, the alternative model is estimated over four sub-sample periods. The early 
and late sub-sample periods span from 1948:4 to 1973:1 and 1960:1 to 1999:2,  
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Figure 5.13: Point Estimates of the IRFs for Fiscal and Monetary Variables 
Sample Period: 1948:4-1999:2 
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respectively. The next sub-sample periods selected span from 1950:1 to 1999:2 and from 
1948:4 to 1989:4, which corresponds to the Cold War era.  
Then, the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to defense purchases for each sub-sample 
period, and they are plotted along with the corresponding confidence intervals reported 
for the whole sample period. If the results computed for the alternative model are not 
sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used, the IRFs reported for the different 
sub-sample periods ought to lie within the corresponding confidence intervals from the 
whole sample period.  
In the first and second columns of Figure 5.14, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed when the alternative model is estimated over the early and late sub-sample 
periods, respectively. The dashed lines display the confidence intervals reported for the 
whole sample period.  
When the alternative model is estimated over the early sub-sample period, the IRF 
computed for defense purchases increases more sharply in the first year after a shock to 
defense purchases than the one reported for the whole sample period. After the initial 
shock to defense purchases, it lies above the upper bound of the confidence interval 
reported for the whole sample period at all horizons.  
The IRFs computed for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the 
early sub-sample period lie within the corresponding confidence intervals reported for the 
whole sample period at all horizons. However, the pattern of the IRF for real GDP is  
initially different from the one reported for the whole sample period. In the first two years 
after a shock to defense purchases, it is positive and exhibits a hump-shaped pattern. 
When the alternative model is estimated over the late sub-sample period, the IRF 
computed for defense purchases increases more gradually than the one reported for the 
whole sample period. After the initial shock to defense purchases, it lies below the lower 
bound of the corresponding confidence interval from the whole sample at all horizons.  
The IRFs computed for real GDP and RTB lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals reported for the whole sample period at all horizons, and their 
patterns are similar to the ones reported for the whole sample period. The IRF computed 
for the GDP deflator is small, and it lies slightly below the lower bound of the confidence 
interval reported for the whole sample period for two quarters after a shock to defense 
purchases, and then it lies within the confidence interval.  
In the third and fourth columns of Figure 5.14, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
computed when the alternative model is estimated over the sub-sample period from 
1950:1 to 1999:2 and the Cold War era, respectively. The dashed lines display the 
confidence intervals reported for the whole sample period. All the IRFs reported for the 
sub-sample period from 1950:1 to 1999:2 and the Cold War era lie within or on the 
corresponding confidence intervals reported for the whole sample period at all horizons. 
Furthermore, their patterns are similar to the ones reported for the whole sample.   
Overall, when the alternative model is estimated over the early sub-sample period, 
the IRF computed for defense purchases is significantly larger than the one reported for 






















































































































































































































































Figure 5.14: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods 
Confidence Intervals from the Whole Sample Period 
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deflator are not significantly different from the ones reported for the whole sample period 
at any horizon.  
When the alternative model is estimated over the late sub-sample period, the IRF 
computed for defense purchases is significantly smaller than the one reported for the 
whole sample period at all horizons. The IRF for the GDP deflator is slightly smaller than 
the one reported for the whole sample period in the first year after a shock to defense 
purchases. The IRFs for real GDP and RTB are not significantly different from the ones 
reported for the whole sample period at any horizon.  
Therefore, based on the results presented above, it is concluded that the IRF for 
defense purchases computed for the alternative model is sensitive to perturbations in the 
sample period used. However, it is concluded that the IRFs for real GDP and RTB are not 
sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used, and the IRF for the GDP deflator is 
only marginally sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used. 
When the alternative model is estimated over the sub-sample period from 1950:1 
to 1999:2 and the Cold War era, none of the IRFs computed are significantly different 
from the corresponding IRFs reported for the whole sample period at any horizon. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the IRFs computed for the alternative model are not 
sensitive to small perturbations in the sample period used. 
To further examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the alternative model 
to perturbations in the sample period, Figure 5.15 presents the point estimates and 
confidence intervals of the IRFs computed for a unit shock to defense purchases when the 
alternative model is estimated over the early and late sub-sample periods. The solid lines 
display the point estimates of the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the 
GDP deflator. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard  
deviation confidence intervals for the two sub-sample periods, not the whole sample 
period. 
As was mentioned before, when the alternative model is estimated over the early 
sub-sample period, the IRF computed for defense purchases increases more sharply than 
the one reported for the whole sample period. Furthermore, the maximum effect of a 
shock on defense purchases computed for the early sub-sample period is somewhat larger 
than for the whole sample period. 
The IRF for real GDP computed for the early sub-sample period exhibits a hump-
shaped pattern. It is positive for almost two years; however, it is not significantly 
different from zero at any horizon. The IRF for RTB is negative at all horizons, but it is 
never significantly different from zero. The IRF for the GDP deflator rises more 
persistently than the one reported for whole sample period. It is significant at all horizons, 
compared to less than one and a half years for the one reported for the whole sample 
period.  
When the alternative model is estimated over the late sub-sample period, the 
pattern of the IRF computed for defense purchases is very different from the one reported 
for the whole sample period. It increases more gradually and is smaller than the IRF 
reported for the whole sample. After a delay of two quarters, the IRF for real GDP is 
slightly negative; however, it is never close to being significant. The IRFs for RTB and 
the GDP deflator are small and never significantly different from zero. 
Overall, like the IRFs reported when the alternative model is estimated over the 




























































































































Figure 5.15: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Sample Periods 
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samples are problematic. The IRF for defense purchases reported for the early sub-
sample period is larger than the one presented for the whole sample period; however, the 
IRF for real GDP is not significantly different from zero at any horizon, and the IRF for 
RTB is negative at all horizons, although not significantly. 
The IRF for defense purchases reported for the late sub-sample period increases 
much more gradually, and is smaller, than the one presented for the whole sample period. 
Furthermore, the IRF for the GDP deflator reported for the late sub-sample period is not 
significantly different from zero at any horizon, and the IRFs for real GDP and RTB are 
negative at most horizons, although not significantly. 
5.7 New Orders of Defense Products 
The IRFs for RTB and to a lesser extent the IRFs for real GDP reported for the 
VAR systems estimated in this chapter are inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector 
neoclassical models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical 
models. Therefore, it is of interest to examine the effects of substituting new orders of 
defense products for defense purchases in the alternative model. 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter of the dissertation, new orders of 
defense products are a monthly series from a set of 256 data series commonly known as 
the US Business Cycle Indicators (BCI) series that are used for tracking and predicting 
U.S business activity. Quarterly data are constructed by adding the monthly data within 
each quarter from the sample period 1968:2 to 1999:2. Furthermore, since the data for 
new orders of defense products are originally in billions of current dollars, they are 
deflated by the GDP deflator.5 
 Although the values of new orders of defense products are small in comparison to 
those of defense purchases, new orders of defense products may be a better policy 
variable than defense purchases for several reasons discussed in the previous chapter. In 
particular, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) argue that changes in defense spending tend to be 
concentrated in a few industries that manufacture defense products. For simplicity’s sake, 
new orders of defense products are hereafter referred to as new orders.  
To estimate the macroeconomic effects of the exogenous shocks to new orders 
identified using LR restrictions, a VAR system identical to the alternative model, except 
that new orders are substituted for defense purchases, is estimated for the sample period 
1969:4 to 1999:2. Data from 1968:2 to 1969:3 are used as pre-sample data. Then, the 
IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to new orders on new orders, real GDP, RTB, 
and the GDP deflator are computed following the same procedure as the one used earlier 
for the alternative model.  
In the long-run Choleski decomposition used to identify the shocks to new orders, 
real GDP is ordered first, new orders is ordered second, the GDP deflator is ordered third, 
and RTB is ordered last. As was done for defense purchases in the alternative model, new 
orders are constrained not to have an effect on real GDP in the long run. In Figure 5.16, 
the solid line displays the shocks to new orders identified using LR restrictions when the 
model with new orders is estimated from 1969:4 to 1999:2. The shocks identified do not 
exhibit any particular pattern, and no shock appears particularly larger than others.  
 
                                                           
5 The results computed when new orders of defense purchases are deflated by the CPI are similar to the 
ones reported hereafter.  
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Figure 5.16: Shocks to New Orders of Defense Products 




To examine the relations between the series for defense purchases and new 
orders, the cross-correlation coefficients of the series for the shocks to defense purchases 
and the contemporaneous and lagged series for shocks to new orders identified using LR 
restrictions are computed. All the cross-correlation coefficients are less than 0.2, which 
implies that the shocks to defense purchases and new orders are weakly correlated.  
In the first column of Figure 5.17, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs computed for a unit shock to new orders. The dashed lines display the lower and 
upper bounds of one standard error confidence intervals computed using a Monte Carlo 
integration procedure. The IRF for new orders decreases sharply in the period of a shock; 
however, it remains above its initial level and it is significantly positive at all horizons. 
This result implies that the growth rate of new orders declines quickly after a shock to 
new orders. However, it remains positive, and the level of new orders is permanently 
higher after a shock.  
The IRF for real GDP exhibits a hump-shaped pattern in the first two years after a 
shock to new orders. However, it is small and not significantly different from zero at any 
horizon. After a delay of three quarters, the IRF for RTB increases persistently, and it is 
significant for more than a year. The IRF for the GDP deflator increases persistently after 
a shock to new orders, and it is significant except in the quarters of a shock.  
The IRFs reported for a shock to new orders imply that output is not affected by a 
positive shock to government purchases; however, interest rates and the price level 
increase significantly and persistently. Unlike The IRF for the GDP deflator computed 
for a shock to defense purchases, the one reported for a shock to new orders is consistent 
with a traditional IS-LM model. However, the IRFs for real GDP and RTB reported for a 
shock to new orders are not totally consistent with a traditional IS-LM model. The IRF 
for real GDP is never significantly different from zero, and the IRF for RTB does not 
increase immediately after a shock to new orders.  
The sample period used to estimate the models with new orders and defense 
purchases are different. To compare the implications of using new orders and defense 
purchases as policy variables, the alternative model is estimated over the sample period  
1969:4 to 1999:2, and the IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to defense 
purchases on defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed. In 
the second column of Figure 5.17, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs 
computed for the alternative model. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds 
of the corresponding one standard error confidence intervals.  
As was reported for a shock to new orders, the IRF for real GDP computed for a 
shock to defense purchases over the sample period 1969:4 to 1999:2 is not significantly 
different from zero at any horizon. The IRF for RTB is not significantly different from 
zero at any horizon either. Therefore, it is concluded that the shocks to new orders of 
defense products identified using LR restrictions are better measures of exogenous 
shocks to defense spending than shocks to defense purchases, even though the IRF for 








































































































































Figure 5.17: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and Defense Purchases 
Sample Period: 1969:4-1999:2 
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5.8 Robustness of the Results Reported For the Model with New Orders of  
 Defense Products  
This section investigates the sensitivity of the results reported for the model with 
new orders to perturbations in the list of variables used following the same procedure as 
the one used earlier for the alternative model. Furthermore, it presents the IRFs computed 
for additional fiscal variables and the monetary base.  
To investigate the sensitivity of the results reported for the model with new orders 
to perturbations in the list of variables, the same endogenous variables and exogenous 
dummy variables as the ones used earlier for the alternative model are added, in turn, to 
the model with new orders. Then, the IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to new 
orders on new orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed. If the results 
reported for the model with new orders are not sensitive to perturbations in the list of 
variables used, the IRFs computed for the extended models ought to lie within the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new orders.  
This section also examines the sensitivity of the results reported for the model 
with new orders to perturbations in the sample period used. The model with new orders is 
estimated over two sub-sample periods, and the IRFs for new orders, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to new orders. If the results reported for 
the model with new orders are not sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used, 
the IRFs computed for the sub-sample periods ought to lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the whole sample period.  
As was done in the previous chapter of the dissertation, the model with new 
orders is estimated for a first sub-sample period that spans 1969:4 to 1989:4 and a second 
one that spans 1973:2 to 1999:2. The former excludes the data from the post-Cold War 
era, which represent one-third of the data from the whole sample period. The latter begins 
with the oil crisis of 1973-1974, which may have affected the structural relations among 
the variables in the model estimated.  
5.8.1 Extended Models 
In Figure 5.18 to Figure 5.23, the solid lines display the point estimates of the 
IRFs for new orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a shock to new 
orders when the endogenous variables and exogenous dummy variables are added, in 
turn, to the model with new orders. The dashed lines display the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the model with new orders.  
Figure 5.18 presents the effects of the shocks in models that alternatively include 
the following additional fiscal variables: non-defense purchases, real federal government 
receipts, and the real federal government deficit. Figure 5.19 presents the effects of the  
shocks in models that alternatively include the following consumption and investment 
variables: consumption of non-durables and services, residential investment plus 
consumption of durables, and non-residential investment. 
Figures 5.20 and 5.21 present the effects of the shocks in models that alternatively 
include labor market variables. The variables examined in Figure 5.20 are employment in 
private industry, employment in the non-durables manufacturing sector, and employment 
in the durables manufacturing sector. The variables examined in Figure 5.21 are real 
wages in private industry, real compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real 












































































































































































































Figure 5.18: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and a Fiscal Variable 






































































































































































































Figure 5.19: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and a Consumption or Investment Variable 












































































































































































































Figure 5.20: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and an Employment Variable 












































































































































































































Figure 5.21: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and a Measure of Real Wages or Real Compensation 












































































































































































































Figure 5.22: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and an Additional Macroeconomic Variable 












































































































































































































Figure 5.23: Point Estimates from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
and an Additional Macroeconomic Variable 
Confidence Intervals from Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
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Figures 5.22 and 5.23 present the effects of the shocks in models that alternatively 
include additional macroeconomic variables. The variables examined in Figure 5.22 are 
the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable, the monetary base, and the constant 
maturity ten-year Treasury bond yield (LTR). The variables examined in Figure 5.23 are 
Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. 
Except for the PPI for crude fuel and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, all the 
IRFs reported for the extended models lie well within the corresponding confidence 
intervals from the model with new orders at all horizons. Furthermore, the patterns of the 
IRFs reported are generally similar to the ones presented for the model with new orders.  
When the PPI for crude fuel is added to the model with new orders, the IRF 
computed for the GDP deflator lies slightly below the lower bound of the confidence 
interval from the model with new orders at all horizons. However, the IRFs for new 
orders, real GDP, and RTB lie within the corresponding confidence intervals.  
When the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is added to the model with new orders, 
the IRF reported for new orders lies within the confidence interval from the model with 
new orders at all horizons. However, the IRFs reported for real GDP and the GDP 
deflator differ significantly and persistently from the ones presented for the model with 
new orders. The IRF for real GDP lies below the lower bound of the confidence interval 
from the model with new orders for more than a year. Then, it lies within the confidence 
interval for several periods, and finally it lies above the upper bound of the confidence 
interval. The IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator lie below the lower bound of the 
corresponding confidence intervals from the model with new orders at all horizons.  
Overall, the IRFs computed when eighteen different variables are added, in turn, 
to the model with new orders indicate that the results reported for the model with new 
orders are not sensitive to adding an endogenous variable or an exogenous dummy 
variable, except for the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable and to a lesser extent the PPI for 
crude fuel.  
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) identify 
only one exogenous shock to defense purchases during the sample period 1969:4 to 
1999:2. It corresponds to the Carter-Reagan episode that is dated as beginning in 1980:1. 
However, Hamilton (1985) also identifies a major exogenous increase in oil price the 
quarter the onset of the Carter-Reagan episode.  
Therefore, the sensitivity of the results reported for the model with the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable may reflect not only the effects of the increase in defense 
purchases identified by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) but also the effects of the increase in 
oil price identified by Hamilton (1985). In fact, the results reported above indicate that 
the IRFs computed for the model with new orders are sensitive to adding a measure of oil 
price, although not as much as the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
As was done for the alternative model, it is of interest to present the effects of a 
unit shock to new orders on additional fiscal variables and the monetary base. In Figure 
5.24, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs computed for non-defense 
purchases, real federal government receipts, the real federal government deficit, and the 
monetary base are added, in turn, to the model with new orders. The dashed lines display 













































































































































Figure 5.24: Point Estimates of the IRFs for Fiscal and Monetary Variables 
Models with New Orders of Defense Products 
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The patterns of the IRFs reported for the additional fiscal variables and the 
monetary base are very different from the ones presented in the previous chapter of the 
dissertation using a Choleski decomposition. The IRF for non-defense purchases is 
alternatively positive and negative for two years, and then it remains negative. It is 
negative and very marginally significant for less than a quarter at the end of the first year 
after a shock to new orders.  
The IRF for real federal government is positive at all horizons; however, it is only 
marginally significant for two quarters in the first year after a shock to new orders. After 
a delay of a quarter, the IRF for the real federal government deficit is positive; however, 
it is small and never close to being significantly different from zero. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the shocks to new orders do not coincide with significant changes in non-
defense purchases, real federal government receipts, and the real federal government 
deficit. 
The IRF for the monetary base is positive for more than a year after a shock to 
new orders, and then it declines quickly and persistently. However, it is never close to 
being significant. Therefore, it is concluded that the shocks to new orders do not appear 
to coincide with changes in monetary policy.   
5.8.2 Alternative Sample Periods  
As was mentioned before, to examine the sensitivity of the results reported for the 
model with new orders to perturbations in the sample period used, the model with new 
orders is estimated over the sub-sample periods 1969:4 to 1989:4 and 1973:2 to 1999:2. 
Then, the IRFs for new orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for a unit 
shock to new orders are plotted against for the corresponding confidence intervals 
reported for the whole sample period. 
In the first and second columns of Figure 5.25, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for new orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed 
when the model with new orders is estimated over the sub-sample periods 1969:4 to 
1989:4 and 1973:2 to 1999:2, respectively. The dashed lines display the confidence 
intervals reported for the whole sample period.  
When the model with new orders is estimated over the sub-sample periods 1969:4 
to 1989:4 and 1973:2 to 1999:2, all the IRFs reported lie within the corresponding 
confidence intervals from the whole sample period at all horizons. Furthermore, their 
patterns are generally similar to the ones reported for the alternative model. Therefore, it 
is concluded that the IRFs computed for the model with new orders are not sensitive to 
perturbations in the sample period used.  
Figure 5.26 presents the point estimates and confidence intervals of the IRFs 
computed for a unit shock to new orders when the model with new orders is estimated 
over the sub-sample periods 1969:4 to 1989:4 and 1973:2 to 1999:2. The solid lines 
display the point estimates of the IRFs for new orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP  
deflator. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation 
confidence intervals from these sample periods, not the full sample period.   
The patterns and magnitudes of the IRFs reported for the sub-sample periods 
1969:4 to 1989:4 and 1973:2 to 1999:2 are similar to the ones presented for the whole 
sample period. However, not only the IRF for real GDP but also the IRFs for RTB and 
the GDP deflator reported for the sub-sample period 1969:4 to 1989:4 are not 











































































































































Figure 5.25: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods for Model with New 
Orders of Defense Products 











































































































































Figure 5.26: Point Estimates from Alternative Sample Periods for Model with New 
Orders of Defense Products 
Confidence Intervals from Alternative Sample Periods 
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5.9 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter of the dissertation examines the implications of using LR restrictions 
for estimating the effects of exogenous shocks to defense purchases. It focuses on a 
benchmark model and an alternative mode that are identical to the ones estimated in the 
previous chapter to investigate the implications of using the Choleski decomposition. 
First, the IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to defense purchases on 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed when the 
benchmark and alternative models are estimated. Like the results reported using the 
Choleski decomposition, the results computed using LR restrictions are not consistent 
with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-
LM and one-sector neoclassical models.   
The IRFs for defense purchases and the GDP deflator reported for the benchmark 
and alternative models increase very persistently in response to a shock to defense 
purchases. The IRFs for real GDP are not significantly different from zero at any horizon. 
The IRF for RTB computed for the benchmark model is negative at all horizons, and it is 
briefly significant. The IRF for RTB computed for the alternative model is negative at all 
horizons, but it is never significant.  
As was done in the previous chapter, the sensitivity of the results computed for 
the benchmark model to adding time trends and changing the lag length used is 
examined. It is shown that the results reported for the benchmark model are sensitive to 
adding a “Perron-type” time trend; however, they are not sensitive to changing the lag 
length used. 
To investigate the sensitivity of the results computed for the alternative model to 
perturbations in the list of variables used, eighteen endogenous and exogenous variables 
are added, in turn, to the alternative model, and the IRFs computed for the extended 
models and the alternative model are compared. It is shown that the IRFs reported for the 
alternative model, in particular for defense purchases, are sensitive to adding the 
exogenous dummy variables under examination. However, they are not sensitive to 
adding the endogenous variables 
To examine the sensitivity of the results computed for the alternative model to 
perturbations in the sample period used, the alternative model is estimated over four 
different sub-sample periods, including an early sub-sample period that spans 1948:4 to 
1973:1 and a late sub-sample period that spans 1973:2 to 1999:2. As for the narrative 
approaches and the Choleski decomposition, the IRFs reported using LR restrictions 
imply that the results computed for the alternative model, in particular for defense 
purchases, are sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used. Furthermore, like the 
IRFs reported when the alternative model is estimated over the whole sample period, the 
ones computed when it is estimated over the early and late sub-sample periods are 
problematic.  
As was done in the previous chapter, a VAR system identical to the alternative 
model, except that new orders is substituted for defense purchases, is estimated. Then, the 
IRFs that present the effects of a shock to new orders on new orders, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator are computed. 
The patterns of the IRFs for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator reported for a 
shock to new orders are relatively similar to the ones presented for a shock to defense 
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purchases when the alternative model is estimated. The main difference between the 
results reported for the model with new orders and the alternative model is found in the 
response of RTB, which is significant for the model with new orders, but not for the 
alternative model. 
Furthermore, the IRFs reported for the model with new orders are not totally 
consistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. Therefore, it is concluded that 
when LR restrictions are used to identify shocks to defense spending, new orders do not 
appear to be a much better policy variable than defense purchases.  
 To investigate the sensitivity of the results computed for the model with new 
orders to perturbations in the list of variables, the same methodology used to examine the 
robustness of the results reported for the alternative model is used. It is shown that the 
results reported for the model with new orders are not sensitive to adding the variables 
selected, except the PPI for crude fuel and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
 Finally, to investigate the sensitivity of the results computed for the model with 
new orders of defense products to perturbations in the sample period, this model is 
estimated for two different sub-sample periods. It is shown that the results reported for 
the model with new orders are not sensitive to altering the sample period used. 
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CHAPTER 6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
6.1 Summary 
In 1997, Ramey and Shapiro published an influential study in which they applied 
a narrative approach in the spirit of Hamilton (1983) and Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) 
to identify three exogenous increases in defense purchases in the post-World War II era. 
The exogenous increases in defense purchases, which are commonly referred to as the 
Ramey-Shapiro episodes, correspond to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 
Carter-Reagan military build-ups.  
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) use the shocks they identify to construct a dummy 
variable that has the value one at the onsets of the increases in defense purchases, and 
zero otherwise. Then, they include the dummy variable as an exogenous variable in a 
series of univariate equations, and compute impulse response functions (IRFs) that 
present the effects of an average Ramey-Shapiro episode. 
Defense purchases have long been used as a proxy for government purchases in 
empirical studies of the macroeconomic effects of government purchases because they 
are widely believed to be exogenous with respect to macroeconomic variables (Barro 
(1981), Kormendi (1983)). This is consistent with many studies published in the foreign 
policy and defense policy literature (Garnett (1987), Rearden (1984), Shilling (1962)). 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) 
include the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable as an exogenous variable in a series of 
vector autoregression (VAR) systems. Following Ramey and Shapiro (1997), they 
compute IRFs that present the macroeconomic effects of an average Ramey-Shapiro 
episode.  
The evidence presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) has been a 
point of reference within a small but influential literature in which VAR systems are used 
to estimate the macroeconomic effects of exogenous shocks to government purchases. In 
particular, Fatas and Mihov (2000), who use a Choleski decomposition to identify 
exogenous shocks to government purchases, estimate VAR systems in the spirit of 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999).  
As was discussed in the introduction of the dissertation, the effects of shocks to 
government purchases estimated using the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997) and contemporaneous restrictions differ greatly. As Perotti (2000) argues, “… 
Despite some methodological advances, there is absolutely no consensus on even the 
basic effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy” (Perotti, 2000, p. 1).   
Since the VAR systems estimated in the studies recently published differ in terms 
of the method of identifying the exogenous policy shocks, the variables in the models 
estimated, and the sample period over which the models are estimated, the source of the 
different results across studies is not clear. The dissertation provides evidence on the 
implications of using four different methods of identifying exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases within a common VAR system estimated over a specific sample period.  
The narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) is examined in the second 
chapter of the dissertation. A more comprehensive narrative approach that tries to isolate 
exogenous reductions in defense expenditures as well as exogenous increases in defense 
expenditures is examined in the following chapter. Finally, two statistically-based 
methods of identifying defense spending shocks, a Choleski decomposition and a long-
run restrictions, are examined in the last two chapters. 
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The benchmark models estimated in each chapter of the dissertation includes a 
constant and four lagged values of defense purchases, real GDP, a short-term interest 
rate, and the GDP deflator that are entered as endogenous variables. In addition, the 
contemporaneous value and four lagged values of a dummy variable are entered as 
exogenous variables when the narrative approaches are used to identify the policy shocks. 
The logarithmic values of the variables are used except for interest rates. 
The benchmark models estimated in the dissertation are identical to the 
benchmark model presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), except that the 
GDP deflator is substituted for the producer price index (PPI) for crude fuel in the 
benchmark models estimated in the dissertation. Based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), the specification of the equations selected for the benchmark models 
does not appear to be the best for the VAR systems under study; therefore, alternative 
models are also estimated.  
The alternative models include a constant and six lagged values of defense 
purchases, real GDP, the net three month interest rate on Treasury bills (RTB), and the 
GDP deflator as well as a “Perron-type” time trend. In addition, the contemporaneous 
value and six lagged values of a dummy variable are included when the narrative 
approaches are used to identify the policy shocks.  
The benchmark and alternative models are estimated over the sample periods 
from 1948:1 to 1999:2 and from 1948:3 to 1999:2, respectively.1 To examine the 
implications of using the different methods of identifying exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases under study, the IRFs that present the effects of exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases on defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed 
over a horizon of sixteen quarters.  
When the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) is used to identify 
exogenous shocks to defense purchases, the IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock 
to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are computed. The Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable has the value one at the onsets of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, and zero 
otherwise. The episodes are dated as beginning in 1950:3, 1965:1, and 1980:1, 
respectively.  
When a more comprehensive narrative approach than Ramey and Shapiro (1997) 
is used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases, the IRFs that present the 
effects of a unit shock to a defense purchases (DP) dummy variable are computed. The 
DP dummy variable has the value one at the dates of the onsets of the military build-ups 
identified in the second chapter of the dissertation, minus one at the dates of the military 
retrenchments, and zero otherwise  
The date of the onset of the Korean War build-up is the same as the one selected 
by Ramey and Shapiro (1997); however, the dates of the onsets of the Vietnam War and 
Carter-Reagan build-ups are different. They are dated as beginning in 1965:3 and 1979:4, 
respectively. The onsets of the military retrenchments that are identified using the more 
comprehensive narrative are dated as beginning in 1952:4, 1969:3, and 1989:4, 
respectively.  
                                                           
1 When long-run restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks, the variables are differenced before 
estimation. In this case, the benchmark model and alternative models are estimated for 1948:2 to 1999:2 
and 1948:4 to 1999:2, respectively.    
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When the Choleski decomposition is used to identify exogenous shocks to 
defense purchases, economic theory is used to impose a recursive contemporaneous 
causal structure among the variables in the VAR systems estimated. Then, the IRFs that 
present the effects of a unit shock to defense purchases are computed. When long-run 
restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases, economic theory 
is used to impose a recursive long-run causal structure among the variables in the VAR 
systems estimated.  
When the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) is used to identify 
exogenous shocks to defense purchases, the IRFs reported for the benchmark model 
imply that defense purchases increase very persistently following an exogenous increase 
in government purchases, output rises temporarily, the price level rises persistently, and 
interest rates initially fall and then they rise significantly.   
When the more comprehensive narrative approach is used to identify exogenous 
shocks to defense purchases, the IRFs reported for the benchmark model imply that 
defense purchases increase very persistently following an exogenous increase in 
government purchases, output rises temporarily, and interest rates and the price level rise 
persistently. The main difference with the results reported for the narrative approach of 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) is that interest rates do not decrease initially.  
When the Choleski decomposition is used to identify exogenous shocks to 
defense purchases, the IRFs reported for the benchmark model imply that defense 
purchases increase very persistently following an exogenous increase in government 
purchases, output rises temporarily, and interest rates and the price level decline 
persistently. When long-run restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases, the IRFs reported imply that defense purchases and the GDP deflator increase 
very persistently; however, real GDP and RTB are not significantly affected. 
For all the methods of identifying the exogenous policy shocks under 
examination, the IRFs reported for the alternative models estimated are similar in pattern 
to the ones reported for the benchmark models. However, they are quantitatively 
different, in particular for the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997). 
As was mentioned in the first chapter of the dissertation, there is an abundant 
literature in which theoretical models of the effects of shocks to government purchases on 
the economy are analyzed. Generally, the predictions of the theoretical models differ if 
the shocks to government purchases are temporary or permanent. Furthermore, they 
differ if the economy is closed or open.  
With regard to the effects of a temporary shock to government purchases within a 
closed economy, the traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical theoretical models as 
well as the two-sector theoretical models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) predict that output, the price level, and interest rates rise 
temporarily in response to an increase in government purchases. However, according to 
the two-sector models of Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), interest rates briefly 
fall before they rise.  
The IRFs reported for the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) are 
consistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models of Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). The IRFs reported for the more 
comprehensive narrative approach are consistent with the traditional IS-LM model, 
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except that the IRF for RTB does not increase immediately after a shock to defense 
purchases.    
The IRFs for RTB and the GDP deflator reported for the Choleski decomposition 
are not consistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models of Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. Furthermore, when the benchmark 
model used by Fatas and Mihov (2000) is estimated and shocks to government purchases 
are identified using the Choleski decomposition, the IRFs computed for real RTB and the 
GDP deflator are also problematic. Finally, the IRFs for real GDP and RTB reported 
using long-run restrictions are not consistent with the theoretical models mentioned 
above. 
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) only identify three exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases. Furthermore, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) argue that results 
reported using the Choleski decomposition appears to be sensitive to perturbations in the 
sample period used and the list of variables used. However, the amount of evidence 
available on the robustness of the results reported for the different methods of identifying 
exogenous shocks to defense purchases is limited. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate the robustness of the results computed for 
the models estimated in the dissertation. For each method of identifying exogenous 
shocks to defense purchases under examination, the sensitivity of the results computed 
for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator to adding time trends and 
changing the lag length in the benchmark model is investigated.  
Then, the sensitivity of the results computed for defense purchases, real GDP, 
RTB, and the GDP deflator to adding, in turn, additional endogenous variables and 
exogenous dummy variables to the alternative model is examined. Finally, the sensitivity 
of the results computed for the alternative model to perturbations in the sample period is 
considered. 
To examine the sensitivity of the results computed for the benchmark model to 
adding time trends, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
are computed when linear and quadratic trends and a “Perron-type” time trend are added, 
in turn, to each equation of the benchmark model. To examine the sensitivity of the 
results computed for the benchmark model to perturbations in the lag length used, the 
IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for 
models identical to the benchmark model, except that two and six lagged values of the 
variables are included in each equation of the benchmark model. 
When the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and the more 
comprehensive narrative approach are used to identify exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases, the results reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to adding time 
trends. However, the results reported for defense purchases, real GDP, and RTB appear 
to be sensitive to changing the lag length used.  
When the Choleski decomposition is used to identify exogenous shocks to 
defense purchases, the results reported for the benchmark model are not sensitive to 
adding time trends and to changing the lag length used, except for defense purchases. 
When long-run restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases, 
the results reported for the benchmark model are sensitive to adding a “Perron-type” time 
trend; however, they are not sensitive to changing the lag length used. 
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To examine the sensitivity of the results computed for the alternative model to 
perturbations in the list of variables, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator are computed for extended models in which six lagged values of 
additional endogenous variables and exogenous dummy variables are added, in turn, to 
each equation of the alternative model. For each method of identifying exogenous shocks 
to defense purchases under examination, seventeen additional variables are considered.  
First, the effects of shocks to defense purchases are examined in models that 
alternatively include non-defense purchases, real federal government receipts, and the 
real federal government deficit. Then, the effects of shocks to defense purchases are 
investigated in models that alternatively include consumption of non-durables and 
services, consumption of durables plus residential investment, and non-residential 
investment. 
Next, the effects of shocks to defense purchases are examined in models that 
alternatively include total private employment, employment in the non-durables 
manufacturing sector, employment in the durables manufacturing sector, real wages in 
private industry, real compensation in the manufacturing sector, and real compensation in 
the business sector.  
Finally, the effects of shocks to defense purchases are presented in models that 
alternatively include the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable, the monetary base, 
Hamilton’s oil price dummy variable, the PPI for crude fuel, and a measure of long-term 
interest rates are presented. Furthermore, when the Choleski decomposition and long-run 
restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases, the effects of 
shocks to defense purchases are presented in models that include the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable. 
When the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) is used to identify 
exogenous shocks to defense purchases, the results reported for the alternative model 
appear to be robust to perturbations in the list of variables used, except for Hamilton’s oil 
price dummy variable. When the more comprehensive narrative approach is used to 
identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases, the results reported for the alternative 
model appear to be robust to perturbations in the list of variables used, except for 
employment in the durables manufacturing sector. 
When the Choleski decomposition is used to identify exogenous shocks to 
defense purchases, the results reported for the alternative model appear to be robust to 
perturbations in the list of variables used, except for Hamilton’s oil price dummy, and to 
a lesser extent the additional fiscal variables.  
When long-run restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases, the results reported for the alternative model, in particular for defense 
purchases, are sensitive to adding the exogenous dummy variables under examination. 
However, they are not sensitive to adding the endogenous variables. 
To examine the sensitivity of the results computed for the alternative model to 
perturbations in the sample period, the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and 
the GDP deflator are computed when the alternative model is estimated over four 
different sub-sample periods. The first two sub-sample periods selected spans 1948:3 to 
1973:1 and 1960:1 to 1999:2. They are referred to as the early-sub-sample period and the 
late sub-sample period, respectively. The next sub-sample periods selected span 1950:1 
to 1999:2 and 1948:3 to 1989:4, which corresponds to the Cold War era.  
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When the alternative model is estimated for the early and late sub-sample periods, 
the IRFs reported for all the method of identifying exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases imply that the IRFs computed for the alternative model, in particular defense 
purchases, are sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used. When it is estimated 
for the sub-sample period 1950:1 to 1999:2 and the Cold War era, the IRFs computed for 
the alternative model do not appear to be sensitive to perturbations in the sample period 
used, except for the IRFs for the GDP deflator computed when the narrative approaches 
are used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases. 
In conclusion, for all the methods of identifying exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases under examination, the results reported for the benchmark model are not very 
sensitive to adding time trends and changing the lag length used, except when long-run 
restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases and a “Perron-
type” time trend is added to the benchmark model.  
As Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) claim, when the Choleski 
decomposition is used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases, the IRFs 
computed for the alternative model, in particular for defense purchases, appear to be 
sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used. However, the IRFs computed for all 
the methods of identifying exogenous shocks to defense purchases, including the 
narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997), appear to be sensitive to perturbations 
in the sample period used.  
Finally, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) argue that when the Choleski 
decomposition is used to identify exogenous shocks to government purchases, the results 
are sensitive to perturbations in the list of variables used. When the Choleski 
decomposition and the other methods under examination are used to identify exogenous 
shocks to defense purchases, the differences in the IRFs reported for the extended models 
and the alternative model are only minor, except for the model with Hamilton’s oil price 
dummy variable.  
In order to further investigate the implications of the methods of identifying 
exogenous shocks to defense purchases under examination, the dissertation also examines 
issues specific to each method. When the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997) and the more comprehensive narrative approach are used to identify exogenous 
shocks to defense purchases, the implications of abandoning the assumption that the 
shocks to defense purchases are of equal intensity is examined. Furthermore, the 
exogeneity of the shocks included in the Ramey-Shapiro dummy and DP dummy 
variables is investigated.  
To account for the differences in size among the shocks included in the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy and the DP dummy variables, modified dummy variables are constructed 
whose values at the dates of the shocks to defense purchases vary according to the size of 
the changes in defense purchases that follow each shock identified. Then, the IRFs for 
defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock 
to the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable and the modified DP dummy variable 
when the alternative model is estimated.  
Except for RTB, the patterns of the IRFs computed for shocks to the modified 
dummy variables are fairly similar to the ones reported when the shocks to defense 
purchases are of equal intensity; however, their magnitudes differ. The IRFs for RTB 
reported for shocks the modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable and the modified DP 
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dummy variable decline significantly in the first year after a shock, and then it is not 
significantly different from zero.  
When the assumption that the shocks to defense purchases are of equal intensity is 
abandoned, the IRFs for RTB are inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical 
models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as 
well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. Furthermore, they 
imply that the results reported for shocks to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy or DP dummy 
variable are sensitive to allowing variation in the intensity of the episodes. 
To examine the exogeneity of the shocks included in the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
and the DP dummy variables, a methodology used by Leeper (1997) to study the 
exogeneity of the Romers’ monetary policy dummy variable is implemented. First, a logit 
equation that includes macroeconomic variable is estimated for the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable, and the conditional expectations for the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are 
computed.  
The logit equation is very imprecisely estimated. Moreover, although it is widely 
accepted that the breakout of the Korean War was sudden and unexpected, the 
conditional expectation reported for the Korean War episode implies that this episode 
was predicted by recent developments in the U.S economy. Therefore, it is concluded that 
the logit equation does not appear to provide meaningful evidence on the exogeneity of 
the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. Similarly, a logit equation was estimated for the DP dummy 
variable that led to the same conclusion. 
Second, linear systems are estimated in which the Ramey-Shapiro dummy and the 
DP dummy variables are entered, in turn, as endogenous variables along with the other 
variables included in the alternative model. Then, the IRFs for defense purchases, real 
GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy and the DP dummy variables. Since they are similar to the corresponding IRFs 
computed for the alternative model, it is concluded that the results reported for the linear 
systems are consistent with the shocks identified using the narrative approaches being 
exogenous.  
Finally, since the dates identified for the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan 
episodes in the third chapter of the dissertation are slightly different from the ones 
selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1999), they are used to examine the sensitivity of the 
results computed for the benchmark and alternative models to small perturbations in the 
dates of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes.  
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) argue that the results they report using 
the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are robust to small perturbations in the dates of the 
Ramey-Shapiro episodes. However, when the alternative dates selected for the Vietnam 
War and Carter-Reagan shocks are used to construct a modified Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable, the IRFs reported for real GDP and RTB are significantly different from the 
ones computed when the dates selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) are used. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the results computed for the benchmark and alternative 
models are sensitive to small perturbations in the dates of the Vietnam War and Carter-
Reagan episodes. 
Since the anticipation, and hence exogeneity, of the shocks to fiscal policy 
identified using the Choleski decomposition are serious concerns, a VAR system 
identical to the alternative model, except that new orders of defense products is 
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substituted for defense purchases, is estimated. Then, the IRFs that present the effects of 
a unit shock to new orders of defense products on new orders of defense products, real 
total GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator are computed. 
New orders of defense products are a series from the US Business Cycle 
Indicators (BCI) series that are used for tracking and predicting U.S business activity. 
Since the data for new orders of defense products are available since 1968:1, the model 
with new orders of defense products is estimated over the sample period 1969:3 to 
1999:2. 
The evidence reported when new orders of defense products are used as a proxy 
for defense purchases is less likely to be subject to the criticisms against using the 
Choleski decomposition to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases presented in 
the literature for several reasons. First, new orders of defense products contain 
information about future flows of defense purchases. Second, since new orders of defense 
products are recorded before defense purchases, shocks to new orders of defense products 
are more likely to be unanticipated than shocks to defense purchases. Finally, since new 
orders of defense products are recorded before production begins, shocks to new orders 
of defense products do not reflect shocks to the private sector. 
 As was done in earlier chapters, new orders of defense products are hereafter 
referred to as new orders. When the Choleski decomposition is used to identify 
exogenous shocks to new orders, the IRFs reported are very different from the ones 
presented when it is used to identify exogenous shocks to defense purchases. They imply 
that output, interest rates, and the price level increase significantly for one and a half 
years in response to a positive shock to government purchases.  
The IRFs reported for the model with new orders are consistent with a traditional 
IS-LM model when accelerator effects are considered. Furthermore, the IRFs for real 
GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator computed for the alternative model over the sample 
period 1969:3 to 1999:2 are problematic. Therefore, it is concluded that new orders are 
better proxy for government purchases than defense purchases. 
 To investigate the sensitivity of the results computed for the model with new 
orders to perturbations in the list of variables, the methodology used to examine the 
robustness of the results reported for defense purchases is used. It is concluded that the 
results reported for the model with new orders are not very sensitive to adding the 
variables selected, except for residential investment plus consumption of durables and the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
 To investigate the sensitivity of the results computed for the model with new 
orders to perturbations in the sample period, this model is estimated for two sub-sample 
periods that spans1969:3 to 1989:4 and 1973:2 to 1999:2, respectively. It is concluded 
that the IRFs for real GDP and RTB reported for the model with new orders are fairly 
sensitive to perturbations in the sample period used. 
When long-run restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks to defense 
purchases, a VAR system identical to the alternative model, except that new orders is 
substituted for defense purchases, is also estimated. Then, the IRFs that present the 
effects of a unit shock to new orders on new orders, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP 
deflator are computed. 
The IRFs for real GDP, and the GDP deflator reported for a shock to new orders 
are relatively similar to the ones presented for a shock to defense purchases; however, the 
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IRF for RTB is different. They imply that defense purchases, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
increase persistently in response to a shock to new orders, and real GDP is not 
significantly affected. 
The IRFs reported for the model with new orders are not totally consistent with 
the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) 
and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and 
one-sector neoclassical models. Furthermore, the IRFs for real GDP, RTB, and the GDP 
deflator computed for the alternative model over the sample period 1969:3 to 1999:2 are 
even more problematic than the ones computed for the model with new orders. Therefore, 
it is concluded that new orders are better proxy for government purchases than defense 
purchases, although they do not appear to be a much better policy variable than defense 
purchases.  
 Following the same methodology as the one used for the Choleski decomposition, 
it is concluded that the results reported for the model with new orders are not sensitive to 
adding an additional endogenous or exogenous variable, except for the PPI for crude fuel 
and the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. It is also concluded that the results reported for 
the model with new orders are not sensitive to altering the sample period used. 
6.2 The Effects of Exogenous Shocks to Defense Purchases on Consumption,  
Investment, and Labor Market Variables 
As was mentioned in the first chapter of the dissertation, the traditional IS-LM, 
one-sector neoclassical model, and the two-sector models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) 
and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) predict that employment rises and real 
wages fall in response to an increase in government purchases.  
However, theoretical models generally differ on their predictions about the effects 
of a shock to government purchases on consumption and investment. The traditional IS-
LM model predicts that private consumption rises temporarily in response to a temporary 
increase in government purchases. Since a rise in interest rates crowds out private 
investment, it also predicts that private investment declines temporarily. However, since 
an increase in the level of income raises private investment, the effect of a temporary 
increase in government purchases on private investment is uncertain when accelerator 
effects are considered. 
Because of the wealth effect of a change in government purchases, the one-sector 
neoclassical model predicts that private consumption declines permanently in response to 
a temporary increase in government purchases. Furthermore, since employment rises 
permanently after an increase in government purchases, Perotti (2000) argues that gross 
investment should also be permanently larger to maintain the ratio of labor to capital in 
the economy constant in the long run. The two-sector model of Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher (1999) predicts that private consumption declines but non-residential 
investment rises in response to a temporary increase in government purchases.  
This section examines the implications of different methods of identifying 
exogenous shocks to defense purchases for estimating the effects of these shocks on 
consumption, investment, and labor market variables. Specifically, the IRFs that present 
the effects of a shock to defense purchases on the consumption, investment, and labor 
market variables are computed when extended models identical to the ones used in the 
previous chapters of the dissertation are estimated. 
 247
The variables included in the systems estimated, the specification of the systems 
estimated, and the sample period used are held constant so that discrepancies in the IRFs 
computed using different identification schemes can be attributed to the identification 
schemes. The identification schemes examined include the narrative approach of Ramey 
and Shapiro (1997), and the more comprehensive narrative approach that tries to isolate 
exogenous reductions in defense expenditures as well as exogenous increases in defense 
expenditures, the Choleski decomposition, and long-run restrictions.   
For each method of identifying exogenous shocks to defense purchases, the same 
models are estimated over the sample period from 1948:3 to 1999:2. Six lagged values of 
defense purchases, GDP, RTB, the GDP deflator, and a consumption, investment, or 
labor market variable under examination are entered as endogenous variables. A constant 
and a “Perron-type” time trend are also included in each equation of the models 
estimated. Furthermore, when a narrative approach is used to identify shocks to defense 
purchases, the relevant defense purchases dummy variable is entered as an exogenous 
variable. 
It was shown in the third chapter of the dissertation that the inference reported 
using the narrative approach are sensitive to using alternative dates for the exogenous 
increases in defense purchases identified by Ramey and Shapiro (1997). Therefore, this 
section presents IRFs computed when the dates selected by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) as 
well as the alternative dates selected in the second chapter of the dissertation are used to 
construct the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. Furthermore, it presents IRFs computed 
when the dates selected in the second chapter of the dissertation are used to construct the 
DP dummy variable that includes exogenous increases and exogenous decreases in 
defense purchases.  
It was shown in the fourth chapter of the dissertation that the results reported for a 
shock to defense purchases using the Choleski decomposition are inconsistent with the 
theoretical two-sector neoclassical models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector 
neoclassical models. However, when new orders are used as a proxy for defense 
purchases, the results reported using the Choleski decomposition are consistent with the 
traditional IS-LM model.  
Furthermore, it was shown in the fifth chapter of the dissertation that the results 
reported using long-run restrictions when new orders are used as a proxy for defense 
purchases appear to be better than the ones presented for the models with defense 
purchases. Therefore, this section presents IRFs computed when the Choleski 
decomposition and long-run restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks to new 
orders as well as defense purchases. Due to data availability, the models with new orders 
are estimated over the sample periods 1969:3 to 1999:2.  
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) identify only one shock to defense purchases since 
1969:3 that corresponds to the Carter-Reagan episode. Furthermore, it was shown in the 
second chapter of the dissertation that the results reported using the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable are very sensitive to excluding the Korean war episode from the sample 
period used. Therefore, it would be meaningless to compare the results reported using the 
Choleski decomposition and long-run restrictions to identify shocks to new orders over 
the sample period 1969:3 to 1999:2 and the results computed using the narrative 
approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) over the same sample period.  
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Therefore, the IRFs for the consumption, investment, and labor market variables 
reported for the models with new orders were not directly compared to the ones 
computed for the models estimated earlier for the sample period 1948:3 to 1999:2. 
However, it would be of interest to compare in a future study the IRFs computed for 
models with defense purchases and new orders over the same sample period using the 
Choleski decomposition and long-run restrictions.  
The methodologies used to compute the IRFs reported in the previous chapters of 
the dissertation are used to compute the IRFs that present the effects of a unit shock to the 
different policy variables on consumption, investment, and labor market variables. 
Following Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), consumption and investment are 
broken down into three variables: consumption of non-durables and services, 
consumption of durables plus residential investment, and non-residential investment 
In Figure 6.1, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for 
consumption of non-durables and services, consumption of durables plus residential 
investment, and non-residential investment computed for a unit shock to the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable, the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, and the DP 
dummy variable. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of sixty-eight 
percent confidence intervals.2 The patterns of the IRFs for consumption and investment 
reported in Figure 6.1 are similar to the ones presented by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and 
Fisher (1999).  
After a brief delay, the IRF for consumption of non-durables and services declines 
significantly for two quarters, and then it is no longer significantly different from zero. 
The IRF for consumption of durables plus residential investment rises significantly at the 
time of a shock to defense purchases, and it declines significantly in the period after a 
shock. Then, it is not significantly different from zero for a year, and finally it declines 
significantly and persistently. The IRF for non-residential investment rises significantly 
in the period of a Ramey-Shapiro episode, then it is not significant for several periods, 
and finally it rises significantly for almost two years.  
The IRFs for consumption and investment reported for a shock to the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable are consistent with the theoretical two-sector models of Ramey 
and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) that imply that private 
consumption falls and non-residential investment rises in response to a shock to 
government purchases.      
The pattern of the IRF for consumption of non-durables and services computed 
for a shock to the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is different from the one 
reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. It increases significantly in 
the period of a shock to defense purchases, and then it is not significantly different from 
zero for more than two years. Finally, it declines significantly, although marginally.   
The IRF for consumption of durables plus residential investment initially declines 
more rapidly than the one reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable; 
however, it is not very different. The pattern of the IRF for non-residential investment is 
very different from the one reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
It rises slightly but significantly in the period of a shock to defense purchases, then it is  
                                                           
2 The lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals represent the 80th lowest and 420th highest values 
across 500 impulse response coefficients computed using a bootstrap Monte Carlo procedure identical to 





















































































































































Figure 6.1: Point Estimates for Consumption and Investment Computed Using 
Narrative Approaches  
Ramey-Shapiro Dummy (RS), Alternative Ramey-Shapiro Dummy, Defense Purchases 
Dummy (DP) 
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not significantly different from zero for almost three years, and finally it decreases 
significantly.  
The IRFs for consumption and investment computed for a shock to the DP 
dummy variable are not very different from the ones reported for a shock to the 
alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. However, it is noted that the IRF for non-
residential investment computed for a shock to the DP dummy variable declines for 
several quarters in the first year as well as in the fourth year after a shock to defense 
purchases.  
The patterns of the IRFs for consumption of non-durables and services and 
consumption of durables plus residential investment computed for a unit shock to the 
alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy and the DP dummy variables are consistent with the 
theoretical two-sector models and the empirical evidence presented by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999).  
However, the patterns of the IRFs for non-residential investment computed for a 
unit shock to the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable and the DP dummy variable 
are not consistent with the theoretical two-sector models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) 
and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and 
one-sector neoclassical models.  
The discrepancies between the results for non-residential investment may reflect 
the sensitivity of the IRFs reported for shocks to the dummy variables to small 
perturbations in the dates of the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes. As was 
shown in the third chapter of the dissertation, the IRFs for RTB computed for IRFs 
reported for shocks to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are sensitive to using 
alternative dates for the onsets of the Vietnam War and Carter-Reagan episodes.   
In the first and second columns of Figure 6.2, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for consumption of non-durables and services, consumption of 
durables plus residential investment, and non-residential investment computed for a unit 
shock to defense purchases and new orders using the Choleski decomposition. The 
dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence 
intervals computed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure.  
The magnitudes of the IRFs for consumption and investment reported for a unit 
shock to defense purchases or new orders using the Choleski decomposition are much 
smaller than the ones presented above for a unit shock to the dummy variables. This also 
true when the other IRFs reported for employment, real wages, and real compensation are 
computed using the Choleski decomposition. Similarly, the IRFs reported using long-run 
restrictions are much smaller than the ones presented above for a unit shock to the 
dummy variables, although they are larger than the ones reported using the Choleski 
decomposition. 
After a delay of more than a year, the IRF for consumption of non-durables and 
services computed for a shock to defense purchases using the Choleski decomposition 
exhibits a hump-shaped pattern. It increases significantly for a year. The IRF for 
consumption of durables plus residential investment is not significantly different from 
zero at any horizon. The IRF for non-residential investment is negative and significant at 
all horizons, except for a year when it is only marginally significant.  
The IRF for consumption of non-durables and services computed for a shock to 

































































































































































































Figure 6.2: Point Estimates for Consumption and Investment from Choleski 
Decomposition (Chol.) and Long-Run Restrictions (LR) 
Defense Purchases (Purch.) and New Orders of Defense Products (NO) 
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and then it stabilizes. After a delay of two quarters, it is significant for more than two 
years. The IRF for consumption of durables plus residential investment exhibits a u-
shaped pattern. It increases significantly at the time of a shock to new orders, but it is not 
significantly different from zero at any horizon afterward. The IRF for non-residential 
exhibits a hump-shaped pattern, and it increases significantly for one and a half years 
after a shock to new orders. 
Overall, the IRFs for consumption of non-durables and services, consumption of 
durables plus residential investment, and non-residential investment computed for a unit 
shock to defense purchases using the Choleski decomposition imply that consumption of 
non-durables and services increases temporarily in response to a shock to defense 
purchases, non-residential investment declines persistently, and consumption of durables 
plus residential investment does not change significantly.  
These IRFs are inconsistent with the one-sector neoclassical model and the two-
sector neoclassical models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and 
Fisher (1999). However, they are consistent with a traditional IS-LM model in which an 
increase in government purchases crowds out private investment.  
The IRFs for consumption of non-durables and services, consumption of durables 
plus residential investment, and non-residential investment computed for a unit shock to 
new orders using the Choleski decomposition imply that consumption of non-durables 
and services rises persistently in response to a shock to new orders, consumption of 
durables plus residential investment increases very briefly, and non-residential 
investment increases temporarily. They are inconsistent with the one-sector neoclassical 
model and the two-sector neoclassical models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). However, they are consistent with an IS-LM 
model in which accelerator effects are considered.  
In the third and fourth columns of Figure 6.2, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for consumption of non-durables and services, consumption of 
durables plus residential investment, and non-residential investment computed for a unit 
shock to defense purchases and new orders using long-run restrictions. The dashed lines 
display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals 
computed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure. 
The IRFs for consumption of non-durables and services, consumption of durables 
plus residential investment, and non-residential investment computed for a shock to 
defense purchases using long-run restrictions are negative at all horizons. The IRF for 
consumption of non-durables and services is significant for one and a half years. The 
IRFs for consumption of durables plus residential investment and non-residential 
investment are significant at all horizons. 
The IRFs for consumption of non-durables and services and consumption of 
durables plus residential investment computed for a shock to new orders using long-run 
restrictions are not significantly different from zero at any horizon. The IRF for non-
residential investment is positive, and it is marginally significant at all horizons. 
Overall, the IRFs for consumption of non-durables and services, consumption of 
durables plus residential investment, and non-residential investment computed for a unit 
shock to defense purchases using long-run restrictions imply that both private 
consumption and investment decrease persistently in response to a shock to defense 
purchases. They are inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models of 
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Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the 
more traditional one-sector neoclassical and IS-LM models.  
The IRFs for non-residential investment computed for a unit shock to new orders 
using long-run restrictions are inconsistent with the IS-LM model. They are consistent 
with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional one-sector 
neoclassical model. However, the lack of significance of the IRFs reported for the 
consumption variables is troublesome. 
 In Figure 6.3, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for 
employment in private industry, employment in the non-durables manufacturing sector, 
and employment in the durables manufacturing sector computed for a unit shock to the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, and the 
DP dummy variable. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of sixty-eight 
percent confidence intervals.  
The IRFs for employment reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
variable exhibit a hump-shaped pattern. After a delay of several periods, the IRF for 
employment in private industry increases significantly for more than one and a half years. 
In the period of a shock to defense purchases, the IRFs for employment in the non-
durables manufacturing sector and employment in the durables manufacturing sector 
increase significantly for two and a half years. 
The pattern and magnitude of the IRF for employment in private industry reported 
for a shock to the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is very different from the 
one computed for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. The IRF for 
employment in private industry reported for a shock to the alternative Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy variable is small for one and a half years after a shock to defense purchases, and 
then it declines persistently and significantly.  
The patterns and magnitudes of the IRFs for employment in the non-durables 
manufacturing sector and employment in the durables manufacturing sector are similar to 
the ones computed for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. They exhibit 
hump-shaped patterns and they increase significantly for two and a half years.  
The pattern of the IRF for employment in private industry reported for a shock to 
the DP dummy variable is initially different from the one computed for a shock to the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable and the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
The IRF for employment in private industry reported for a shock to the DP dummy 
variable declines significantly for several quarters. Then, it increases steadily for a year, 
but it is not significant. Finally, it declines significantly and persistently. The IRFs for 
employment in the non-durables manufacturing sector and employment in the durables 
manufacturing sector exhibit hump-shaped patterns. After a delay of a year, they increase 
significantly for one and a half years.  
Overall, the patterns of the IRFs for employment in private industry, employment 
in the non-durables manufacturing sector, and employment in the durables manufacturing 
sector computed for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are consistent 
with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and 
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-

































































































































































Figure 6.3: Point Estimates for Employment Computed Using Narrative 
Approaches  
Ramey-Shapiro Dummy (RS), Alternative Ramey-Shapiro Dummy, Defense Purchases 
Dummy (DP) 
 255
The patterns of the IRFs for employment in private industry computed for a unit 
shock to the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy and the DP dummy variables are 
inconsistent with these theoretical models. However, the patterns of the IRFs for 
employment in the non-durables manufacturing sector and employment in the durables 
manufacturing sector computed for a unit shock to the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy 
and the DP dummy variables are consistent with these theoretical models. 
In the first and second columns of Figure 6.4, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for employment in private industry, employment in the non-
durables manufacturing sector, and employment in the durables manufacturing sector 
computed for a unit shock to defense purchases and new orders using the Choleski 
decomposition. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard 
deviation confidence intervals computed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure.  
The IRFs for employment in private industry for a unit shock to defense 
purchases using the Choleski decomposition exhibit hump-shaped patterns. After a delay 
of several periods, the IRF for employment in private industry increases significantly for 
a year. In the period of a shock to defense purchases, the IRF for employment in the non-
durables manufacturing sector increases significantly for more than three years. After a 
delay of a quarter, the IRF for employment in the durables manufacturing sector increases 
significantly for two and a half years.  
The IRF for employment in private industry and employment in the non-durables 
manufacturing sector computed for a unit shock to new orders using the Choleski 
decomposition also exhibit hump-shaped patterns, and they increase significantly for 
more than one and a half years. However, after a delay of more than one and a half years, 
the IRF for employment in the durables manufacturing sector decreases significantly and 
persistently. Given the other IRFs for employment reported, this result is puzzling. 
In the third and fourth columns of Figure 6.4, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for employment in private industry, employment in the non-
durables manufacturing sector, and employment in the durables manufacturing sector 
computed for a unit shock to defense purchases and new orders using long-run 
restrictions. The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard 
deviation confidence intervals computed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure. 
The patterns of the IRFs for employment reported using long-run restrictions are 
very different from the ones presented using the narrative approaches or the Choleski 
decomposition. Furthermore, the IRFs for employment in private industry and 
employment in the durables manufacturing sector computed for a unit shock to defense 
purchases or new orders using long-run restrictions are not significantly different from 
zero at any horizon or are marginally and briefly significant.  
Overall, the patterns of the IRFs for employment computed for a shock to defense 
purchases or new orders using the Choleski decomposition are consistent with the 
theoretical two-sector neoclassical models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector 
neoclassical models, except for employment in the durables manufacturing sector. In this 
case, the IRF reported decreases significantly and persistently. Furthermore, the patterns 
of the IRFs for employment computed for a shock to defense purchases or new orders 









































































































































































































Figure 6.4: Point Estimates for Employment from Choleski Decomposition (Chol.) 
and Long-Run Restrictions (LR) 
Defense Purchases (Purch.) and New Orders of Defense Products (NO) 
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In Figure 6.5, the solid lines display the point estimates of the IRFs for real wages 
in private industry, real compensation in the business sector, and real compensation in the 
manufacturing sector computed for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, 
the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable, and the DP dummy variable. 
The dashed lines display the lower and upper bounds of sixty-eight percent confidence 
intervals. Due to data availability, the model with real compensation in the manufacturing 
sector is estimated from 1950:3 to 1999:2. 
The IRF for real wages in private industry computed for a unit shock to the 
Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable is never significantly different from zero. It is negative 
for a year after a shock to defense purchases, then it is positive for a year, and finally it is 
negative. The IRFs for real compensation in the business sector and manufacturing sector 
are negative for at least two and a half years after a shock to defense purchases. The IRF 
for real compensation in the business sector is significant for less than two quarters in the 
first year after a shock to defense purchases. The IRF for real compensation in the 
manufacturing sector is significant for two years after a shock, except for a couple of 
periods. 
 The IRF for real wages in private industry computed for a unit shock to the 
alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are initially different from the ones reported 
for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. It is negative and significant for 
several quarters in the first year after a shock to defense purchases. The IRFs for real 
compensation in the business sector and manufacturing sector are fairly similar to the 
ones reported for a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. However, the IRF for 
real compensation in the business sector is never significantly different from zero, and the 
IRF for real compensation in the manufacturing sector is only marginally and 
intermittently significant. 
 The pattern of the IRF for real wages in private industry reported for a shock to 
the DP dummy variable initially are very different from the ones computed for a shock to 
the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable and the alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable. 
The IRF for real wages in private industry reported for a shock to the DP dummy variable 
declines significantly at the time of a shock to defense purchases. It remains significant 
for more than two quarters after a shock to defense purchases, and then it is not 
significantly different from zero. 
Less than a year after a shock to defense purchases, the IRFs for real 
compensation in the business sector and manufacturing sector are positive. The IRF for 
real compensation in the business sector is marginally significant in the fourth year after a 
shock to defense purchases, and the IRF for real compensation in the manufacturing 
sector is marginally and briefly significant at the end of the first year after a shock. 
Overall, the patterns of the IRFs for real wages and real compensation computed 
for a unit shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable and the alternative Ramey-
Shapiro dummy variable are consistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical 
models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) as 
well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models.  
However, it is noted that the effects of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes on real wages 
and compensation are modest, and some of the IRFs for real wages and real 


































































































































































Figure 6.5: Point Estimates for Real Wages and Real Compensation Computed 
Using Narrative Approaches 




alternative Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable are not significantly different from zero at 
any horizon.  
Furthermore, the pattern of the IRF for real wages in private industry computed 
for a unit shock to the DP dummy variable is consistent with the theoretical two-sector 
neoclassical models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
(1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. 
However, the patterns of the IRFs for real compensation in the business sector and 
manufacturing sector are not consistent with these models.  
In the first and second columns of Figure 6.6, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for real wages in private industry, real compensation in the business 
sector, and real compensation in the manufacturing sector computed for a unit shock to 
defense purchases and new orders using a Choleski decomposition. The dashed lines 
display the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals 
computed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure.  
The IRF for real wages in private industry computed for a unit shock to defense 
purchases using the Choleski decomposition exhibits a hump-shaped pattern. After a 
delay of more than a year, it increases significantly for two and a half years. The IRF for 
real compensation in the business sector declines significantly in the period of a shock to 
defense purchases, and then it increases persistently and it is significant two years after a 
shock to defense purchases. The IRF for real compensation in the manufacturing sector 
declines significantly in the period of a shock to defense purchases, and it remains 
negative for more than three years. However, it is only intermittently significant for one 
and a half years, and then it is not significantly different from zero. 
The IRF for real wages in private industry computed for a unit shock to new 
orders using the Choleski decomposition exhibits a hump-shaped pattern, and it increases 
significantly for one and a half years after a shock to new orders. The IRF for real 
compensation in the business sector also exhibits a hump-shaped pattern; however, it is 
never significantly different from zero. The IRF for real compensation in the 
manufacturing sector becomes positive in the first year after a shock to new orders, and it 
is very marginally significant in the third year after a shock.  
In the third and fourth columns of Figure 6.6, the solid lines display the point 
estimates of the IRFs for real wages in private industry, real compensation in the business 
sector, and real compensation in the manufacturing sector computed for a unit shock to 
defense purchases and new orders using long-run restrictions. The dashed lines display 
the lower and upper bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals computed 
using a Monte Carlo integration procedure.  
The patterns of the IRFs for real wages and real compensation reported using 
long-run restrictions are very different from the ones presented using the narrative 
approaches or the Choleski decomposition. Furthermore, the confidence intervals 
reported using long-run restrictions are notably larger than the ones computed for the 
other identification schemes. The IRFs for real wages and real compensation reported for 
shocks to defense purchases using long-run restrictions are negative at all horizons. The 
IRF for real wages in private industry is significant for less than two quarters after a 






















































































































































































































Figure 6.6: Point Estimates for Real Wages and Real Compensation from Choleski 
Decomposition (Chol.) and Long-Run Restrictions (LR) 
Defense Purchases (Purch.) and New Orders of Defense Products (NO) 
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and the IRF for real compensation in the manufacturing sector is significant at all 
horizons. 
The IRFs for real wages and real compensation reported for shocks to new orders 
using long-run restrictions exhibit different patterns. The IRF for real wages in private 
industry reported is positive at all horizons, and very marginally significant for one and a 
half years. The IRF for real compensation in the business sector is negative at all horizons 
significant; however, it is not significantly different from zero at any horizon. The IRF 
for real compensation in the manufacturing sector is mostly negative for two years, and 
then it is positive. It is not significantly different from zero at any horizon either. 
Overall, except for real compensation in the manufacturing sector, the patterns of 
the IRFs for real wages and real compensation computed for a shock to defense purchases 
or new orders using the Choleski decomposition are inconsistent with the theoretical two-
sector neoclassical models of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and 
Fisher (1999) as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models.  
Furthermore, the patterns of the IRFs for real wages and real compensation 
computed for a shock to defense purchases using long-run restrictions are consistent with 
these theoretical models. The IRFs for real wages and real compensation computed for a 
shock to new orders using long-run restrictions are never significantly different from 
zero. 
In his study of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, Perotti (2000) asks, “Is 
there at least a set of results that are consistent with a specific theory?” The IRFs for 
consumption, investment, employment, real wages and real compensation reported in this 
section as well as the IRFs for defense purchases, real GDP, RTB, and the GDP deflator 
presented in earlier chapters imply that there are sets of results that are consistent with 
specific economic theories.    
The IRFs reported for the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1997) are 
consistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). However, the IRFs for key 
variables such as RTB, non-residential investment, and employment in private industry 
appear to be sensitive to using alternative dates for the onsets of the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes.  
In fact, when alternative dates selected earlier in the dissertation are used to 
construct the Ramey-Shapiro dummy or the DP dummy variable, the IRFs reported for 
non-residential investment and employment in private industry are inconsistent not only 
with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and Shapiro 
(1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher, but also the more traditional IS-LM and 
one-sector neoclassical models. 
When the Choleski decomposition and long-run restrictions are used to identify 
exogenous shocks to defense purchases, the IRFs reported for a shock to defense 
purchases are inconsistent with the theoretical two-sector neoclassical models presented 
by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher as well as the more 
traditional IS-LM and one-sector neoclassical models. 
In particular, when the Choleski decomposition is used to identify exogenous 
shocks to defense purchases, the IRF reported for non-residential investment declines 
persistently. However, when extended models that included consumption and investment 
variables were estimated in the fourth chapter of the dissertation, the IRFs for RTB 
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computed using the Choleski decomposition declined persistently, and the IRFs for real 
GDP rose temporarily. Therefore, one should not expect the IRF for non-residential 
investment reported for shocks to defense purchases to decline persistently.  
When the Choleski decomposition is used to identify exogenous shocks to new 
orders of defense products, the IRFs reported are consistent with an IS-LM model in 
which accelerator effects are considered, except for employment in the non-durables 
manufacturing sector. When long-run restrictions are used to identify exogenous shocks 
to new orders of defense products, the IRFs reported are inconsistent with the theoretical 
two-sector neoclassical models presented by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher as well as the more traditional IS-LM and one-sector 
neoclassical models. 
In conclusion, in spite of methodological advances in estimating the effects of 
exogenous shocks to government purchases, there is still no consensus on the effects of 
these shocks. Therefore, as Perotti (2000) argues, “… We should admit that, at present, 
our area of ignorance even on the basic signs of fiscal policy multipliers is too great. At a 
minimum, this should suggest using fiscal policy very sparingly” (Perotti 2000, p. 24). 
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